The 'English Disease' —Cured or in Remission? An Analysis of Police Responses to Football Hooliganism in the 1990s

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Incidents of football-related disorder are still evident at league and national team fixtures in England. This article assesses the levels and trends of this disorder, and examines the methods used to police hooliganism in the 1990s, including the use of closed-circuit television, private police and police intelligence gathering. Although it is acknowledged that these strategies have had some impact in reducing levels of disorder, the number of incidents of violence stilt occurring seems to indicate that 'solving the problem of football-related disorder is not simply a matter of concentrating on organised hooligan gangs, and it is contended that much of the hooliganism is unorganised and spontaneous. The rote of the media in amplifying incidents, and the subsequent construction of hooligan identities, is also assessed.

Key Words: Football hooliganism; public order policing strategies; crime prevention; identity; closed-circuit television (CCTV)

Introduction

The number of violent incidents involving spectators during the 1998/99 football season indicated that hooliganism is still a significant problem for the English game. The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) announced that there had been an increase in arrests for affray, violent disorder and throwing missiles in the first part of the season compared to the same period in the previous season, with serious outbreaks of trouble at Swindon, Norwich and Millwall.[2] NCIS commented on those involved in the disorder:

> The numbers of people involved do remain comparatively small but it is hard-core, well organised and hell-bent on causing mayhem, that is using football matches as a cover for its criminal activities.[3]

Interestingly, the disturbances that followed Newcastle United's defeat by Manchester United in the 1999 FA Cup Final occurred in Newcastle city centre, and not in or around Wembley Stadium itself. Newcastle supporters had been watching the match *en masse* in pubs and bars, something that has been a feature of the consumption of 'Sky era' 1990s football. This has created the culture of collective participation in crowd-style activity in pubs that previously was confined to the stadium itself. As Redhead notes:[4]

> The traditional soccer culture of yesteryear of participatory, largely male, fandom of the terraces — threatened by small all-seater stadia, steeply rising prices of admission and the embourgeoisement of the sport — has effectively transformed itself to the already existing male 'pub culture' which in large part it created in the first place.

The volatile mixture of extended drinking and the passions aroused by major matches has, unsurprisingly, resulted in violence in many locations far removed from the stadium. Such incidents of unrest were widely reported across the country after the England team exited from Euro '96 following its loss against Germany.[5]

The physical dislocation of these incidents from football stadia raises particular problems for the police and other authorities who might find it extremely difficult to predict where unrest might occur. It also raises questions about how 'football hooliganism' is defined and where the boundary might be drawn between this and other kinds of violence, such as that which occurs fairly routinely in and around pubs and clubs. A useful distinction may be to distinguish between football violence involving relatively organised and committed actors (the so-called 'hooligan gangs'), and more or less spontaneous unrest that occurs in a football-related context, which may be more akin to other kinds of public disorder. One of the aims of this article is to explore the nature of 'unorganised football hooliganism' and to consider the methods used to police it.

The article sets out to review the key dimensions in the apparent success story of the English football policing methods. Critical analysis is especially important since many of the measures introduced in the context of football, such as the introduction of closed-circuit television and an increased employment of private police, have also been deployed as solutions to problems of crime and disorder in society more generally. In the final part of the paper it is argued that the problem of hooliganism has certainly not been eliminated, and that the occurrence of spontaneous disorder inside stadia needs to be addressed. It is suggested that orchestrated football violence might have been successfully confronted by the authorities, at least in the environs of football grounds, but 'unorganised hooliganism' is a significant issue, and that this form of disorder is much more difficult to police.

The changing face of football policing

Claims that the problem of crowd violence has been successfully tackled in England have gained considerable currency in recent years. Commenting on plans for the policing of the 1998 World Cup, the French Director of Security claimed that 'The English invented the poison of hooliganism at the start, but they have also invented the antidote'.[6] Similar sentiments were expressed in the English Football Association's bid for the 2006 World Cup, which suggested that'… England's new breed of fully trained safety officers, inspectors and stadium managers have ensured that "fortress football" is no more. Our new generation of welcoming, fan-friendly and family-oriented stadiums are safe, secure and accessible to all'.[1] Such conceptions are shared, it seems, by many of those at the other end of the football hierarchy. Survey results from season 1995/96 found that 81.5 per cent of supporters felt that there had been a decline in the problem of hooliganism over the preceding five-year period.[8]

Recent high-profile incidents of disorder in other European countries may give further credence to the view that the English model of policing hooliganism is more 'progressive' than other methods deployed in continental Europe. For example, the trouble at the Italy versus England Word Cup qualifier in Rome in 1997 was widely held to have been exacerbated by the aggressive and inappropriate reaction of the Italian police to minor scuffles, an allegation often made against the police in England in the 1980s.[9] As pockets of trouble flared inside the stadium, it was widely held by eye-witnesses and attendant media that the Carabinieri's violent response, including attacking English supporters with truncheons, aggravated an already tense situation.[10] This event followed on from other much-publicised incidents in the 1990s, including the batoning and tear-gassing of peaceful Manchester United supporters in Portugal; the arbitrary

arrest of Norwich fans in Milan; the unjustified deporting of Leeds followers from Holland and the beating and imprisoning of Manchester United fans in Turkey.[11]

As political debate in recent years has often focused on the possibilities of privatising or 'civilianising' certain roles and responsibilities of the police,[12] football has become something of a role model for other spheres. A Home Affairs Committee report[13] echoed the earlier recommendation of the Taylor Report[14] into the Hillsborough Stadium disaster of 1989, suggesting that private-sector personnel ought to supplant many of the activities traditionally undertaken by the public police. In keeping with these reports there has been an increasing absence of uniformed police officers from stadia.[13] Although the police remain responsible for maintaining order in public areas outside of stadia, private-sector personnel are now often solely responsible for the safety of the public inside football grounds and regularly there are games played with no internal police presence whatsoever. The emergence of a private-sector security industry has occurred in various contexts in Britain during recent years; in the case of football this process has been closely allied to a shift in emphasis from the maintenance of public order to the promotion of public safety. The discursive change reflected in a move towards a safety culture both reflects and influences the wider rehabilitation of the game that has seen an emphasis on the creation of a sanitised 'family atmosphere'.

As Stenning[16] has observed, the relations between private and public police can be considered against a spectrum which ranges from out-and-out hostility to mutual co-operation and collaboration. Often, he argued, the initial reaction of public police forces has been to disparage the professional credentials and ability of private-sector operators.[17] While there continue to be grounds for concern about the efficacy of some private-sector personnel, as discussed below, it is clear that there are few, if any, a priori reasons to prefer the public over the private. Stenning[18] observed in general terms that:

> ... many private police organisations often have considerably longer experience (and in some cases greater success) than most public police organisations in addressing almost all of the key issues which are now said to confront our public police organisations. This proposition ... does not sit very well with many public police officials.

Recognition that stewards can play a professional and effective role within football grounds, and that they can provide a service that is preferable to that offered by the police, has grown within the football industry. A police football liaison officer commented on the relative proficiency of the two sectors:

> I could show to you several club stewards at my club who are very competent at doing their job, and then I could show half a dozen police officers who have never been to a football match before and yet, because of their uniform, you would have the impression that the police officers knew what they were doing, when in fact they wouldn't.[19]

Despite these positive attitudes there are reasons to be cautious about the abilities of some stewards to carry out their duties capably, and to some extent these might arise from the unregulated status of private-sector police in Britain and the lack of control on recruitment and training that this allows. Many clubs employ stewards who are recruited through word of mouth, and who are often 'friends' of the club and familiar with many of the spectators that they are supervising. Other clubs contract private security companies, who may set higher standards in their methods of recruitment and training of personnel. In some environments, a combination of club and private company stewards work together, creating a more complicated policing framework. This framework appears to be independent of the status or wealth of a club, as research conducted by the authors indicates that cost has no real bearing on the decision as to the hiring of club or private company stewards.[20]

Whether club or private company personnel, the training and recruitment of stewards to work at football matches is an issue of concern. The suitability of stewards who support the club that employs them to supervise 'away' fans is questionable, as anecdotal evidence suggests that on rare occasions stewards have provocatively celebrated home goals in front of opposition fans, and have even attacked visiting supporters![21] A less stark but probably more common difficulty is the employment of stewards who are unsuitable, for a variety of reasons, for the job. One journalist who reported on his experience of stewarding at an England fixture suggested that his colleagues were typical casual workers, with little dedication to the job:

> Everyone I spoke to had come to see the game and certainly not for the money which, at £3.50 an hour failed to generate many feelings of job responsibility. Our minibus included temping agency lifers, drifting from order-picking jobs in the supermarket warehouses to early starts 'on the bins', and students, either struggling to balance night-shifts and engineering degrees—those just out for a laugh.[22]

The beating of a teenager by two other teenagers who had been hired as private security guards at an event at the Wembley entertainment complex in 1997 further highlighted issues of training, recruitment and accountability.[23] Neither of the hired guards had had any training; one had previous convictions for violence, and both had given false names when hired. The incident revealed that Wembley had employed a private company, Event Security, to provide security for all of its events, including football matches, but that this firm had then subcontracted other outfits to provide staff. It was reported that new recruits did not receive training until they had 'proved themselves'.[24]

Recognition of the variable standards of stewarding led, in 1995, to various agencies within the game producing a guide to assist clubs in the training and management of stewards.[25] Whilst this document established some useful principles surrounding the role of stewards, it is still the case that agreed common standards remain to be established, and local authorities retain considerable discretion in certifying that clubs provide appropriate training. The relatively recent introduction of NVQ-level qualifications for stewards has helped to provide adequate levels of relevant training, but again these are not mandatory and serve only to complement the existing training packages.

Since stewards are employed primarily to ensure crowd safety and enforce ground regulations, rather than to deal with disorder, they are more likely to *eject* troublemakers from the stadium, rather than arrest them. This difference between the manner in which stewards deal with crime compared to the police illustrates one tension between the contrasting cultures of safety and law enforcement. The lesser power of stewards vis-à-vis the police may also explain the declining number of arrests made in grounds over recent seasons, a decrease made even more stark when increasing overall attendances are taken into account.[26]

As has been mentioned, an important change in the policing of football since the disasters of the 1980s has been the shift towards an emphasis on crowd management and safety, a shift that has driven the employment of more stewards. The resultant low profile of public police within stadia may create environments more conducive to outbreaks of disorder, as security personnel are untrained, or unable (as it is not their function to deal with violent disturbances) to cope with events; as the Football Liaison Officer of a First Division club commented:

> If there's trouble, the stewards' duty is to alert the safety officer, then summon the police. If there are no police inside the ground, *stewards have to call 999 like anyone else.[our emphasis]*[27]

At a fixture between West Bromwich Albion and Bristol City in season 1998/99, a serious outbreak of disorder *did* occur inside the stadium, where no public police were on duty. The

resultant violence, reportedly involving hundreds of supporters, lasted for 15 minutes before some semblance of order was restored.[28] Interestingly, although the police were summoned to deal with the incident, it was the stewards who managed, eventually, to quell the disorder on their own. The police arrived two minutes after the game had restarted.

This case throws into sharp relief many of the issues discussed in this paper. For example, did the lack of a public police presence inside the stadium mean that supporters were not deterred from disorder? Did the relatively long time that it took to bring the disturbance under control signify that the stewards cannot be left to police matches on their own, or did the fact that the stewards managed to cope without the police mean that their role should be widened to encompass public order situations?

Another conundrum posed by the above incident is that it occurred within full view of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, which did not appear to deter supporters from engaging in disorder, nor lead to many retrospective arrests.[29] An increasing reliance on technology and environmental design has been another important development in the policing of football. The 'electronic panacea for crime'[30] that is CCTV was introduced in football ahead of other areas in society, in the mid-1980s, in much the same way that private-sector policing made an early appearance in the sporting environment. Coupled with technological assistance to crowd-control techniques has been the post-Taylor development of all-seater stadia. Together these moves have made the identification of individuals considerably easier than during the era when supporters were packed together on terraces.

Previous research by the authors found that CCTV was almost universally regarded by the authorities as beneficial to policing the game and fan surveys suggest that supporters also welcome this development, as other surveys have suggested the public more generally welcome its introduction.[31] The capacity of CCTV cameras to prevent crime may be enhanced by the use of computer software and Photophone technology which can match individual faces against a database of offenders,[32] but the lack of audio facilities means that such apparatus is of limited use in the prevention and detection of other crimes, such as 'racialist chanting' (an offence under s 3 of the 1991 Football Offences Act), for example.

This point, that CCTV can be useful in some instances but not so effective in others, reflects Tilley's view that it is important to realise that it is a mistake to assume that the introduction of cameras will automatically reduce crime levels.[33] Tiiley suggests that is a common mistake of those who install CCTV or evaluate its effectiveness to expect it to unfailingly cut the number of criminal incidents, when, in reality, it is better to understand that such systems only produce results in certain contexts, and even then it is hard to assess whether it is the CCTV, or other crime prevention factors, that may have had an impact.

In the case of football, a significant minority of club safety officers, when surveyed by the authors of this paper, felt that their CCTV system was too slow and cumbersome in reacting to flashpoints of disorder, and consequently missed 'flashpoint' incidents. Others felt that some supporters 'played-up to the cameras', and fans, in the heat of the moment, forgot that cameras were present, and became involved in disorder regardless. Disturbances such as those during the 1998/99 season at fixtures such as Notts County versus Stoke City, Ipswich Town versus Norwich City, and at both Millwall versus Manchester City games indicate that violent behaviour is not entirely prohibited by cameras.[34]

The panopticon capabilities of CCTV have led to concern that increasing regulation of crowd behaviour threatens to undermine legitimate fan cultures regarded as inimical to the interests of the contemporary football industry. Attempts to rid the game of racist chanting, for example,

are often predicated upon the use of technological and other means to identify offenders and either prosecute them through the courts, eject them from stadia, and, more rarely, introduce long-term bans from grounds.[35] While there appears to have been some success in reducing racist chanting, although other dimensions of racism continue to exist within football, it is clear that conceptually the problem is regarded as closely aligned to the broader issue of anti-social behaviour. Interviews and observation carried out by the authors provide a strong impression that club officials, stadium managers and the police often regard racist chanting or abuse as offensive to 'family audiences' in much the same way as vociferous swearing, for example, might deter some spectators from regular attendance. The football fans' pressure group Libero! have been particularly critical of attempts to control elements of supporters' behaviour which has been central to the atmosphere and culture of the game.[36] It seems clear that the prohibition of behaviour deemed to be 'antisocial' will have a detrimental impact upon features of the football 'experience' treasured by some supporters.

The growth in the use of CCTV has coincided with the increased use of police intelligence-gathering in the context of football, and it is to an examination of the role of intelligence sharing at the 1998 World Cup in France, and the nature of disorder that subsequently occurred, that this paper now turns.

Organised or unorganised hooliganism? The case of the 1998 World Cup disorder

Evidence about the behaviour and future intentions of committed hooligans is gathered by football intelligence officers associated with all professional clubs. These officers have close links with their local clubs and also with fan groups, including, in some cases, known hooligans.[37] Their information is sent to a central point, the National Football Intelligence Unit (NFIU), formed in 1989 and part of the National Criminal Intelligence Service. The NFIU co-ordinates and disseminates intelligence to relevant police forces in England and Wales. The Unit also shares information with colleagues abroad, and had a central role in the strategic planning of security arrangements for the 1998 World Cup in France.

In preparation for the Finals the NFIU gathered information on travelling supporters from a number of sources that it worked closely with, including the Civil Aviation Authority, airlines, British Transport Police and a host of travel companies. During the tournament, the plan was for intelligence gathered by British police to be co-ordinated at NCIS headquarters in London and then disseminated via a central point in Paris to the ten cities with match venues, for the attention of the intelligence officers and the local match commanders based there.[38]

In addition to the role of the NFIU the British police also supplied a number of 'spotters' (officers with the task of identifying known hooligans) and mobile liaison officers, whose duties included:

• providing information on supporters likely to commit acts of violence;

• detecting or if possible identifying known trouble makers, including meeting places and accommodation details;

• arbitrating between English supporters and French police officers before the latter have to use coercive power;

• trying to prevent public order situations where supporters group together.[39]

However, the experience of the 1998 World Cup highlighted a number of limitations with the intelligence-led approach to the policing of the tournament, even in circumstances when there appears to have been considerable collaboration between French and English police. Prior to the Finals, efforts were made by the British Home Office to discourage ticketless fans and/or those intent on hooliganism from travelling to France. Advertisements were carried on television and in newspapers warning that the sophisticated ticketing arrangements devised for the tournament meant that there was little chance of those unable to purchase tickets in advance getting into games with those bought from touts. In addition the Home Secretary claimed before the World Cup that 'My message to the hooligan is simple—we know who you are, we know what your plans are, and we will do everything we can to stop you'.[40]

In the event, a large number of fans *did* travel to France without tickets for matches, and then bought them from touts, on many occasions in front of police officers who, it is claimed, turned a 'blind eye'.[41] Also, a number of serious incidents of disorder involving England supporters occurred around the team's fixtures in Toulouse, Lens and especially Marseilles, and received vivid and widespread coverage in the tabloid newspapers. The *Sun* featured the initial outbreak of trouble before England's opening match with Tunisia on six pages,[42] while the *Mirror* spread the story over seven.[43] As the historical perspective offered by Dunning et al[44] indicates, the amount of coverage that football hooliganism receives from newspapers is in fact related to the priority of the subject on the media agenda, rather than to the actual level of disorder in any objective sense, and it is therefore worth spending a short while examining the tabloids* coverage of these incidents.

Although a comprehensive media analysis of newspaper coverage of the World Cup is beyond the scope of this paper,[43] of particular interest were two highly ambiguous stories that appeared to praise England's hooligan fans. The *Sun*[46] exclaimed 'Two Nil' over pictures of triumphant England captain Alan Shearer and a defiant England hooligan, seemingly suggesting that 'two nil' meant two English victories, one on the pitch (England's 2-0 win against Tunisia) and one off it (the 'victory' being that of England's righting supporters). The *Daily Star* claimed 'First Blood' in an article about the initial disorder,[41] suggesting that violent English fans had gained initial advantage in the series of fan battles that appeared to lie ahead.

The sensationalist way that the disorder during the World Cup was reported meant that many stories contradicted supporters' accounts of events. Several eye witness accounts speak of heavy-handed or incompetent policing, coupled with allegations that attendant reporters were, in isolated cases, inflaming tense situations in order to get a better story.[48] Whether the provocative reporting resulted in an 'amplification spiral' that then became a factor in further disorder is difficult to gauge.[49] It may be that the 'amplification' of the hooliganism stories was simply regarded as a 'good angle' for what otherwise might have been fairly routine newspaper copy of football disorder. Notwithstanding this, the tabloids' complicity in maintaining the myth of 'highly organised hooligan gangs', and its creation of 'demonised leaders' like James Shayler (who featured prominently on the cover of the *Sun, Daily Mail* and *Mirror* on 16 June, and who was dubbed the 'Pig of Marseilles' by the *Mirror*[50]) can only have helped to reassure the police and government that their preconceptions of who would be involved in the trouble were correct.

Whatever the detail of the disorderly events, it appears that police tactics failed to prevent public order problems. It is clear that the small number of tickets available through legitimate channels, and warnings against travelling to France without one, appear not to have deterred supporters from journeying to the tournament. The broader emphasis on free movement within a borderless European Union appears to have been inimical to efforts to stop the migration of

potentially disorderly fans. For example, it seems to have been particularly problematic for French authorities to prevent German supporters associated with far-right political groups crossing into France and engaging in violence at Lens. In addition, it appears that some English fans known to the police travelled into France via other European countries, thus evading controls and surveillance at Anglo-French crossing points.

Data relating to those English fans arrested in France during the 1998 World Cup reveal further limitations to the intelligence-led strategy. Of the total number of arrests, 86 per cent were for public order offences (see Table 1). Yet, given the Home Secretary's claim referred to above, it is revealing to note that only 35 out of the total of 286 arrested (12 per cent, see Figure 1) were classed by NCIS as Category C supporters—considered as organised hooligans.[51] A further 16 were recorded as 'known Category B' fans, classified as those liable to become involved in disturbances should they occur, and one was Category A, considered non-violent supporters. These totals suggest that 234 of the 286 England fans arrested in France, some 81.8 per cent, were not known to the police. Of course arrest figures such as these must be treated with considerable caution as they do not reflect convictions, although, in the absence of other data, they do provide some ground for suggesting that the conceptualisation of football hooliganism as organised premeditated violence committed by dedicated perpetrators —the kind of behaviour which might be susceptible to surveillance and intelligence gathering—needs to be reconsidered.

Table I. Arrests of England supporters at the 1998 World Cup by offence

Offence	Number of arrests	Per cent*
Public order	246	86
Criminal damage	16	6
Drunk/drunk & incapable	11	4
Other†	13	5
Total	286	101

* Figures are rounded and so do not add up to 100 per cent.

† Other offences include theft of tickets, travelling without a ticket, theft, credit card fraud, entering private property, robbery, ticket touting, assaulting a police officer, and murder.

Source: National Criminal Intelligence Service (1998) *Football Intelligence Unit Arrest Sheet World Cup 98*, NCIS: private correspondence.

Figure 1. NCIS classification of English fans arrested during World Cup 1998

5.61%   0.30%

12.21%

81.88%

- Category A
- Category B
- Category C
- Not known to NCIS

Note: Figures are rounded and so do not add up to 100 per cent.

Source: National Criminal Intelligence Service (1998) *Football Intelligence Unit Arrest Sheet World Cup 98,* NCIS: private correspondence.

The lack of Category C supporters arrested may suggest that the police have had some success in tackling highly organised football violence, and that these types of supporters were deterred from engaging in disorder in France. Conversely, the figures may suggest that Category C fans are better at avoiding detection than less 'experienced' troublemakers. It may even be that the known organisers of hooliganism have simply 'retired' from the hooligan 'scene'. The suspicion lingers, however, that much of the disorder was engaged in by fans who were not involved in organised football-related violence in England, or had not taken part in such violence before,[52] For example, incidents during England's opening match in Marseilles actually occurred away from the stadium, on a beach in front of a giant television screen, and were sparked by a reaction to England's first goal, and did not appear premeditated.[3]

Conclusion

The changes in the methods of policing football in the 1990s described above have, on the whole, been welcomed by supporters, with around 90 per cent of fans surveyed nationally being satisfied with the policing and stewarding they experience at home games.[54] Coupled with the reduction in arrests for football-related offences already detailed, and the post-Taylor emphasis on crowd safety, it is apparent that there has been progress in the way the game is policed since the 1980s.

However, as is also mentioned above, the overall 'picture' of hooliganism is more clouded than may first be apparent, and there is evidence that a 'hooligan culture* is still evident among some football fans, and violent incidents are increasing, despite its lower presence on the media's agenda. Dunning[53] has argued that the rehabilitation of football in the 1990s has meant that political authorities and the media prefer to emphasise the success of policing strategies, rather than the continuing problem of hooliganism. The high-profile politically sensitive campaign to secure the 2006 World Cup for England has created a context in which emphasis on the successful resolution of the hooligan problem coincides more closely with the interests of the English Football Association and the Labour government than it does with the actual reality of the situation. Taylor and Connett[56] went as far as to suggest that there has been a 'cover-up' by the football authorities, police and media of the true extent of football-related disorder, so that the English FA's 2006 World Cup bid would not be tainted.

In a recent article in the football magazine *When Saturday Comes* Powley also suggests that the media is deliberately 'playing down' its reporting of hooliganism, and lists a number of incidents, at places as diverse as Liverpool, Rochdale and Exeter, in support of his argument.[57] Of particular interest was the disorder at the 1999 Worthington Cup Final, which resulted in over 50 injuries and 20 arrests, as it occurred *inside* the stadium after supporters found themselves mixed together when ticketing arrangements for segregation broke down. As Powley notes:

> Even during the hooligans' heyday, fighting within Wembley was a rarity, but here in 1999 was the spectacle of hundreds of panicking fans caught up in an old-fashioned set-to.[58]

Crowd surveillance, police intelligence and the use of technology could not, in this case, prevent serious violence occurring between rival fans actually *inside* the ground, at one of the most high-profile games in the domestic football season. Such strategies are limited since they target organised gangs, yet there is significant evidence that much football-related violence appears to be relatively unorganised and ad hoc, and *not* the product of highly organised groups, and it is therefore very difficult to prevent using the kind of approaches detailed here. It is important to acknowledge that the patterns of hooligan behaviour have changed and evolved, so that the idea that the highly organised, highly mobile fighting 'crews' of the 1980s are still

dominant needs to be reassessed. Elements of such gangs do still exist, and undoubtedly many of those involved are among the 6,500 or so names on the NFIU hooligan database. The police have, through the strategies outlined above, developed effective systems for monitoring and containing these groups, and it is these systems that have attracted the praise from police forces overseas.

Two of the most serious occurrences of violence highlighted by NCIS during the 1998/99 season happened at both of the Millwall versus Manchester City fixtures. Although a senior police officer claimed that the disturbances were planned,[59] one eye-witness account suggests that it may not have been as orchestrated as the police suggested, and reinforces a point made earlier in this paper that some violence which is centred around football may not be very different from that which occurs elsewhere in society:[60]

> ... [T]he club [Millwall] continues to be a focus for anyone with bad intentions and an evening to spare. For the Man City ... fixture, the sections of the ground that are normally almost deserted were suddenly brimming with mobs of young men ... the transgressors at the City game were no more than 14 years old ...

The suggestion in this article, that football 'hooligans' are young lads and/or those who have a propensity to fight and enjoy the opportunity to do so, challenges the police notion that football-related violence is the preserve of the highly organised criminal. It is our contention that this fan 'folk demon', exemplified by the tabloid press with its sensationalist reporting, emphasis on 'hooligan gangs' and creation of 'hooligan celebrities' like James Shayler, obscures the fact that much contemporary disorder is unorganised. As Armstrong argues:[61]

> 'Football hooliganism' lacks legal definition, structural coherence and precise demarcation of membership. It is ephemeral, renegotiated weekly, and constructs nomadic spaces for individuals and social groups to enter, perform and exit... it is also a contested site in which political structures and institutions endeavour to impose simplified, prejudicial readings of complex and evolving practices, through the agencies of the police and various expert opinions.

We are therefore suggesting that the response of the authorities to football-related disorder needs to be more responsive to changing manifestations and cultures of violence. However, the signs are not hopeful. The response from government to recent hooligan incidents, and especially those at France '98, was the announcement of new proposals to combat known trouble-makers. These included: strengthening curbs on foreign travel; toughening existing powers to stop convicted hooligans from travelling to domestic games; and the introduction of new measures to stop unconvicted but known hooligans from travelling abroad.[62] The focus is once more on 'organised hooligans', whether convicted, or, potentially draconianly, unconvicted, and could therefore fail to affect many of those who engage in disorder.

Notes

1   Jon Garland is a Research Associate and Michael Rowe a Lecturer in Public Order Studies at the Scarman Centre, University of Leicester, 154 Upper New Walk, Leicester LEI 7QA, UK.

2   Butler, J. (1998) Alarm Over Increase in Hooliganism. *Sporting Life,* 27 November, *http://www.sporting-life. com/soccer/news/*

3   Ibid, p i .

4 Redhead, S. (1997) *PostFandom and the Millennial Blues: The Transformation of Soccer Culture.* London: Routledge, p 30.

5   Garland, J. and Rowe, M. (1999a) War Minus the Shooting? Jingoism, the English Press and Euro *96. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues. Vol.* 23, No. 1, pp 80-95.

6   Borrows, B. (1998) The Wages of Violence. *Guardian,* Weekend section, 21 February, pp 30-35.

7   Football Association (1997) *World Cup England 2006.* London: The Football Association.

8   Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research (1996) *FA Premier League Fan Survey 1995-96.* Leicester: Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research.

9   Middleham, N. (1993) *Football: Policing the Supporter.* London: Home Office.

10   Troup, J. (1997) Shame of Italy's Thug Cops. *The Sun,* 13 October, pp 6-7; Syal, R. (1997) England Reach World Cup Finals. *The Sunday Times,* 12 October, p 1.

11   Brown, A. (1997) Unreasonable Force. *When Saturday Comes.* No. 123, pp 14-6.

12   Johnston, L. (1992) *The Rebirth of Private Policing.* London: Routledge; Morgan, R. and Newburn, T. (1997) *The Future of Policing.* Oxford; Oxford University Press; Travis, A. (1998) Police Patrols to Go Private. *Guardian,* 17 July, p 1.

13   Home Affairs Committee (1992) *Policing Football Hooliganism: Second Report.* London: Home Office.

14   Taylor Report (1990) *Inquiry into the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Final Report.* London: HMSO.

15   Middleham, op cit.

16   Stenning, P. C. (1989) Private Police and Public Police: Towards a Redefinition of the Police Role. In Loree, D. J. (ed.) *Future Issues in Policing: Symposium Proceedings.* Ontario: Canadian Police College.

17   Other studies have also shown a lack of communication and perceptions of lack of respect between public and private police — see, for example, Nalla, M. K. and Hummer, D. (1999) Relations Between Police Officers and Security Professionals: A Study of Perceptions. *Security Journal.Vol.* 12, No. 3, **pp 31–40**.

18   Stenning, op cit, p 170.

19   Interview with football liaison officer conducted March 1997.

20   A survey of 70 professional clubs showed that there was no identifiable correlation between income from gate receipts and whether club, private company or a combination of stewards were employed. Aside from this survey, other research conducted for this paper included semi-structured interviews with private and public police officers, safety and security officers and supporters.

21   Dispatches (1994) *Accident Waiting to Happen,* 19 October. London: Channel Four Television.

22   Lee, J. (1998) Game for a Laugh at Wembley. *Observer,* 11 January, p 7.

23   Cooper, S. (1998) Wembley Crowd Security Placed in the Hands of Untrained Teenagers. *Observer,* 21 June, p 15.

24   Ibid, p 15.

25   *Stewarding and Safety Management at Football Grounds* (1995) London: Football League, Football Association, Premier League, Football Licensing Authority and the Football Safety Officers' Association.

26   NCIS arrest statistics for 1997/98 show that, when considering all four professional divisions together, arrests per 100,000 spectators have decreased from 22.2 in 1992/93 to 13.4 in 1997/98.

27   Interview with football liaison officer conducted February 1997.

28   Gibson, R. (1999) West Brom Launch Brawl Inquiry. *Sporting Life* website, 22 February. *http://www.sporting-life. com/soccer/news/*

29 Powley (1999) notes that only one arrest was made in connection with the disorder at the West Bromwich versus Bristol City match. Powley, A. (1999) Fighting Talk. *When Saturday Comes.* No. 149, pp 34-36.

30 Beck, A. and Willis, A. (1995) *Crime and Security: Managing the Risk to Safe Shopping.* Leicester: Perpetuity Press.

31 Garland, J. and Rowe, M. (1996) Racism at Work —a Study of Professional Football. *International Journal of Risk and Security Management.* Vol. 1, No. 3, pp 195-205.

32 Thomas, R. (1998) Police switch on the candid camera that knows your face. *The Observer,* 11 October, p 5.

33 Tilley, N. (1997) Whys and Wherefores in Evaluating the Effectiveness of CCTV. *International Journal of Risk and Security Management.* Vol. 2, No. 3, pp 175-185.

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35 Garland, J. and Rowe, M. (1999b) Selling the Game Short? An Examination of the Role of Antiracism in British Football. *Sociology of Sport Journal.* Vol. 16, No. 1, pp 35-53; Advisory Group Against Racism and Intimidation (AGARI) (1996) *Alive and Still Kicking: A Report by the Advisory Group Against Racism and Intimidation.* London; Commission for Racial Equality.

36 Libero! (1998) *Offence.* London: Libero.

37 An interview conducted by the authors with an intelligence officer attached to a Premier League club in 1997 revealed that the officer was on friendly terms with his local hooligan 'faces', and would quite often chat with them before matches.

38 Gibbons, S. (1998) Ahead of the Game. *International Police Review,* No. 7, pp 16-17.

39 French Interior Government (1998) 'Les Missions des Policiers Etrangers', *Coupe du Monde de Football 1998: L'Echange des Informations.*

40 Home Office (1998) *UK Shares World Beating Experience of Policing Football.* London: Home Office Press Release 076798, 27 February.

41 Brimson, E. (1999) *Tear Gas and Ticket Touts: With the England Fans at the World Cup.* London: Headline.

42 *Sun,* 16 June 1998, pp 1-6.

43 *Mirror,* 16 June 1998, pp 1-6, p 40.

44 Dunning, E., Murphy, P. and Williams, J. (1988) *The Roots of Football Hooliganism.* London: Routledge.

45 See Garland, J. and Rowe, M. (2000) *Racism in British Football.* London: Macmillan, forthcoming, for an analysis of the newspaper coverage of the disorder during France '98.

46 *Sun* (1999) Two Nil. 16 June, p 1.

47 *Daily Star* (1999) First Blood. 16 June, pp 4-5.

48 See, for example, Brimson, op cit, orPerryman, M. (1998) Same Old Stories? *When Saturday Comes,* No. 138, August, p 18-19, for a selection of 'fan views' of the t o u r n a m e n t . |

49 See, for example, Cohen, S. (1981) *Folk Devils and Moral Panics.* London: Paladin; or Ingram, R. (1978) *Football Hooliganism.* London: Inter-Action Inprint, for discussions on the media's role in amplifying disorder and 'demonising' certain social groups.

50 *Mirror* (1999) Our Sons Shamed Us. 17 June, p 7.

51 *Police Review* (Vol. 106, No. 5495, 13 November 1998, p 35) cites the national classification of football supporters as: Category A—peaceful, *bonafide* supporters; Category B — possible risk of disorder, especially alcohol-related; Category C—violent supporters or organisers of violence.

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53   Davis, T. (1998) Same Old Stories? *When Saturday Comes,* No. 138, August, pp 18-19.

54   A national survey of supporters showed that 91.9 per cent of non-season ticket holders were generally satisfied with the standards of football policing at their home matches, and 89.5 per cent satisfied with stewarding at home games— source: Mitchell, K. (1998) Goon Show Not Funny for the Fans. *Observer,* 11 January, p 7.

55 Dunning, E. (1994) The Social Roots of Football Hooliganism: a Reply to Critics of the 'Leicester School'. In Giulianotti, R. (ed.) *Football Violence and Social Identity.* London: Routledge.

56   Taylor, D. and Connett, D. (1998) Hooligan 'Cover-up' in World Cup Bid. *Observer,* 4 October, p 3.

57   Powley, op cit.

58   Ibid, p 35.

59   *Morning Star* (1999) Police Say Maine Road Violence 'Was Planned'. 9 February, p 12.

60   Bellers, L. (1998) Backs to the Wall. *When Saturday Comes,* No. 142, p 12.

61 Armstrong, G. (1994) False Leeds: The Construction of Hooligan Confrontations. In Giulianotti, R. and Williams, J. (eds) *Games Without Frontiers: Football, Identity, Modernity.* Aldershot: Gower.

62   ITN (1998) New Crackdown on Football Hooligans. *ITN* website, 27 November, *http://www. itn. co. uk/britain/britl9981127/112705. htm*