Crime Detection and
Prevention Series
Paper 90

Repeat Victimisation:

Taking Stock

Ken Pease

Editor: Barry Webb
Home Office
Police Research Group
50 Queen Anne's Gate
London SW1H 9AT

First Published 1998

Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series

The Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) was formed in 1992 to increase the influence of research and development in police policy and practice. The objectives are to sponsor and undertake research and development to improve and strengthen the police service and to identify and disseminate good policing practice.

The Crime Detection and Prevention Series follows on from the Crime Prevention Unit Papers, a series which has been published by the Home Office since 1983. The recognition that effective crime strategies will often involve both crime prevention and crime investigation, however, has led to the scope of this series being broadened. This new series will present research material on both crime prevention and crime detection in a way which informs policy and practice throughout the service.

A parallel series of papers on resource management and organisational issues is also published by PRG, as is a perodical on policing research called 'Focus'.

ISBN 1-84082-089-6

Copies of this publication can be available in formats accessible to the visually impaired on request.

Foreword

The development of repeat victimisation as a crime prevention strategy has come a long way since the start of the Kirkholt project in 1986. Some key milestones include the series of regional conferences organised jointly by the Home Office and ACPO in 1994, the adoption of repeat victimisation as a key performance indicator for the police, and the Biting Back project in Huddersfield. Our understanding of the implications of this crime pattern for policing and crime prevention continues to grow as we learn more about it, and now seems a timely point at which to summarise the current state of the art.

Professor Ken Pease OBE is the leading authority in this country, if not the world, on repeat victimisation and policing. In this paper, he sets out what the accumulated research evidence to date means for the police in their operations against crime, and what the future holds for making best use of this knowledge.

S W BOYS SMITH
Director of Police Policy
Home Office
May 1998

Acknowledgements

I have spent the bulk of the last decade of my professional life working on repeat victimisation. I am grateful to PRG for providing me the platform for a personal view of the state of the art, and a view of how the future might be shaped to make the best use of rv facts in crime reduction. I am grateful to the many police officers with whom I have worked and discussed these issues. Their imagination, intelligence and dedication to crime reduction makes me optimistic that the vision of intelligence-led policing, incorporating rv concepts, can be realised.

The Author

Ken Pease OBE is Professor of Criminology at Huddersfield University.

PRG would like to thank Dr Ray Pawson at the University of Leeds for acting as independent assessor for this report.

Executive summary

Over the last few years, the writer has talked to many police officers, individually or in groups, about repeat victimisation (rv). Many believed they knew about the available research, but were familiar with only a small proportion of it. Neither had they encountered anything which sought to locate recent rv research in thinking about crime reduction more generally. The intention of this report is, by filling this gap, to help crime reduction programmes with a repeat victimisation component to be carried through with a much fuller awareness of the research, its context and its implications. It complements the PRG publication 'Preventing Repeat Victimisation: the police officer's guide' (Bridgeman and Hobbs, 1997).

Important conclusions justified by the research to date are that victimisation is the best single predictor of victimisation; that when victimisation recurs it tends to do so quickly; that high crime rates and hot spots are as they are substantially because of rates of repeat victimisation; that a major reason for repetition is that offenders take later advantage of opportunities which the first offence throws up; and that those who repeatedly victimise the same target tend to be more established in crime careers than those who do not. Some of the evidence for each of these assertions is provided.

Projects which seek to reduce crime through the prevention of repeat victimisation are discussed. Evidence that good schemes of this type can reduce crime is now clear and substantial. Further, virtually all forces now recognise the problem of repeat victimisation, and with Home Office encouragement are moving towards addressing that problem.

The central virtues of preventing repeat victimisation as a strategy of crime control are summarised as follows:

1. Focusing on repeats automatically concentrates effort on areas of highest crime without the need for any supplementary deployment decisions.

2. Focusing on repeats automatically concentrates on individuals at greatest risk of future victimisation.

3. The time course of repeats suggests that resources can be focused temporally as well as spatially.

4. It fuses the roles of victim support and crime prevention which have been historically separated.

5. Insofar as repeated offences against the same target are the work of the same perpetrator(s), clearance of a series of crimes and linked property recovery is made more likely than was the case when events were seen as independent. It thus explicitly links the police tasks of prevention and detection.

6. Insofar as the provisional evidence is confirmed that repeated crimes are disproportionately the work of *prolific* offenders, the prevention/detection of attempts at repetition provides an uncontentious way of targeting prolific offenders.

Points of contention about repeat victimisation are addressed in the report, including displacement, personal and household differences in liability to repeat victimisation, and differences between swift and delayed repeats. Emerging evidence about patterns of repetition allow more precise allocation of preventive effort to households and individuals at highest risk. The notion of 'virtual repeats' is introduced, which considers offences related through substantial similarity of target and place.

Desirable next steps in the study and use of repeat victimisation are discussed. Apart from the obvious need to improve information systems to incorporate better recording of repeat crimes, some suggestions about the strategy and tactics of defining repeats are made. In particular, the integration of perpetrator, place and victim characteristics is recommended.

Contents

	Page
Foreword	(iii)
Acknowledgements	(iv)
Executive summary	(v)
List of tables	(ix)
1. Not another report about repeat victimisation!	1
Introduction	1
Why another report?	1
Structure of the report	2
2. What rv research shows	3
Victimisation is a good predictor of victimisation	3
Are all victims equally prone to rv?	6
Rv, hot spots and high crime areas	6
Many unhappy returns: the time course of rv	8
Flag and boost accounts of rv	9
Are most repeats the work of the same offenders?	12
Are rv offenders different?	15
3. What to do with rv	16
Drip feeding	16
Major projects after Kirkholt	17
Local successes	17
The advantages of concentrating on repeats	18
4. Frequently asked questions (and one which isn't but should be)	21
Is rv relevant to all crimes in all places?	21
Isn't prevented crime just displaced?	21
Does rv involve victim blame?	22
Is there work in progress to refine the definition of rv?	22
Should we regard a repeat after one month in the same way as one after six?	23
Rv is an over-hyped fashion, isn't it?	24
5. What next in rv?	25
The strategy of defining repeats	26
The tactics of defining repeats	28
A plea for integration	30
References	34
Recent PRG research papers	40

List of Tables

Table No.	Caption	Page
1	Percentage of property and personal offences by number of victimisations: British Crime Survey 1982-1992	3
2	Number of victimisations of retail and manufacturing business: Commercial Victimisation Survey 1994	5
3	Series crime as a proportion of repeated crime and all crime: British Crime Survey 1992	13
4	Temporary silent alarms, before and during Biting Back project	19

1. Not another report about repeat victimisation!

Introduction

Repeat victimisation (hereafter rv) is the recurrence of crime in the same places and/or against the same people. The Home Office definition (Bridgeman and Hobbs, 1997) is that rv occurs '... when the same person or place suffers from more than one incident over a specified period of time'. The extent of rv is known, but its wide implications for crime control remain largely unrecognised. Relevant work has been reviewed by Graham Farrell (1995). Those interested in the early history of rv research should read the Farrell review.

While rv research has proliferated in recent years, its publication has not always been in periodicals where many police officers will find it. Striking a balance between establishing a firm technical foundation for claims about rv and informing practitioners about it has proven difficult. With hindsight, too little has been written in periodicals specifically for police audiences. The reports published by the Police Research Group for a police readership include only a fraction of the relevant research. Moreover, what has been written has tended to concentrate on the specifics of particular projects and perspectives.

Why another report?

Over the last few years, I have talked to many police officers, individually or in groups, about rv. Many believed they knew the research, but in fact were familiar with only a small proportion of it. They had encountered nothing which sought to locate recent rv research in thinking about crime reduction more generally. Most officers who were familiar with rv ideas had relied on the excellent account by Bridgeman and Sampson (1994), which is still a good introductory review, but was written before a great deal of relevant recent research. The more recent and equally excellent guide (Bridgeman and Hobbs, 1997) 'aims to provide practical guidance on addressing rv, within the wider force or divisional crime strategy'. The present report seeks to complement Bridgeman and Hobbs by elaborating on the research background, the middle-term possibilities, and the relationship of rv with other current thinking.

It is important to place rv in the context of other current thinking for very practical reasons. Police officers without the wider view may be prone to implement mechanistic schemes which have less chance of success. Seeing how rv works, and considering it alongside hot spot analysis, offender profiling and proactive policing allows a choice of approach more precisely tailored to local circumstances.

Structure of the repor t

In Section 2, some provisional research-based conclusions are reached about the nature and implications of rv for police work, developing the conclusions of Farrell, and using more recently published evidence. Earlier references will be used where necessary to place the later work in context, or where an aspect different to that emphasised by Farrell is central. Section 3 claims that crime prevention programmes based on rv have met with success often enough for the approach to justify its place in the armoury of crime reduction. Section 4 sets out the issues which have proved contentious in the rv literature, and comments upon them. In the final section, rv is placed in the context of other current issues in crime reduction, and their future integration is envisaged. In particular, the focus on crime sequences which is central to rv work is shown to have implications for our approach to crime reduction generally.

The justification for yet another report is thus to make the full range of recent rv research and thinking available to a police audience. The report also seeks to locate rv conceptually in crime reduction, and to express research-based opinions about how the work might develop.

2. What rv research shows

The important conclusions justified by the research to date are that victimisation is the best single predictor of victimisation; that when victimisation recurs it tends to do so quickly; that a major reason for repetition is that offenders take later advantage of opportunities which the first offence throws up; and that those who repeatedly victimise the same target tend to be more established in crime careers than those who do not. Some of the evidence for each of these assertions will be given.

Victimisation is a good predictor of victimisation

Victimisation tends to recur, so prior victimisation is usable as a predictor of later crime (see for instance Ellingworth et al., 1995a; Miller et al., 1996; Sherman, 1989,1992; for British and US evidence. Very similar evidence from Sweden collected by Malena Carlstedt remains unpublished). Table 1 summarises the distribution of crime victimisation, separating property and personal (primarily violent) crime, and averaging figures across the first four sweeps of the British Crime Survey. It will be seen that, for property offences, the 2% of people who suffer most property crime suffer 41% of all such crime captured by the Surveys. The pattern is even more extreme for personal crime.

Table 1: Percentage of property (excluding vehicle) and personal offences by number of victimisations: British Crime Survey 1982–1992

	Offence Type			
	Property		Personal	
Number of victimisations	Proportion of respondents (%)	Proportion of events (%)	Proportion of respondents (%)	Proportion of events (%)
0	84	0	92	0
1	10	32	5	25
2	3	17	1	12
3	1	10	1	7
4+	2	41	1	59

Notes:
1. Figures are averaged from Ellingworth et al. (1995a), with data from each year being averaged to give each BCS sweep equal weight.
2. The analysis in this table is restricted to non-vehicle property crime. Table A4.1 in the 1996 BCS shows victimisation for burglary, car theft and contact crime (Mirrlees-Black et al. 1996).

This kind of 'gee-whiz' statistic is good for raising awareness, but one should not get hung up on the precise numbers. The conclusion that 4% of people suffer 44% of crime is the sound-bite from Farrell and Pease (1993) which seems to stick in people's memory, but this kind of calculation is dependent upon various counting conventions, and varies by place and time. As an example of how the numbers can vary, when one tabulates property crime and personal crime separately, the distribution clearly looks more extreme than when the two crime types are not separated. This is because the people most victimised by violence are not always the same people who suffer most property crime. Putting the two crime types together makes the concentration of victimisation look less dramatic.

For those who are suspicious of statistics, scrutiny of the press is recommended for persuasion of the reality of chronic victimisation of a minority of people. At the time of writing, all the broadsheets carried the stories of houses being sold for £1,000 because of repeated burglaries, and of a thirteen-year-old girl who committed suicide after repeated 'petty' crime and harassment. Scrutiny of news stories has the advantage over statistical analysis of showing what is tragically obvious in the second case, namely that what may appear petty as a single incident can be grossly debilitating in the longer term (see also Shaw, 1997 for evidence of this).

The concentration of crime is particularly marked when one considers retail and manufacturing premises (Mirrlees-Black and Ross, 1995). Table 2 sets out data from the Home Office's Commercial Victimisation Survey, which involved systematic sampling of retail and manufacturing premises in England and Wales to yield their experiences of crime in 1993. The survey provides information about levels of crime, losses incurred and reports to the police. As Table 2 shows, in the retail sector 59% of crime was against 3% of premises, and in the manufacturing sector, nearly two-thirds (63%) of crime was against 8% of premises.

Table 2: Number of victimisations of retail and manufacturing business: Commercial Victimisation Survey 1994

Manufacturing			Retail		
Number of events	Proportion of respondents (%)	Proportion of events (%)	Number of events	Proportion of respondents (%)	Proportion of events (%)
0	37	0	0	22	0
1	16	4	1	15	1
2-3	21	11	2-9	37	6
4-9	18	22	10-49	17	12
10+	8	63	50-99	3	7
			100-299	3	16
			300+	3	59

Note: Modified from Mirrlees-Black and Ross (1995).

More recently, a study of small businesses in parts of Leicester carried out for Crime Concern showed that

'17% of businesses suffered 69% of burglaries
11% of businesses suffered 76% of criminal damage
17% of businesses suffered 83% of fraud
9% of businesses suffered 92% of threats, abuse and intimidation
8% of businesses suffered 65% of transport losses
3% of businesses suffered 81% of violent attacks
2% of businesses suffered 60% of employee theft
1% of businesses suffered 45% of robbery'
(Wood et al., 1997).

Prior crime seems to be the best single variable predictor routinely available to the police in the absence of specific intelligence. This has been so even where sophisticated analysis of more extensive information is available. For example, in predicting obscene phone calls, the fact of prior victimisation identifies those receiving calls some three times as well as the best combination of age, parenthood and marital status (Tseloni and Pease, 1997). Crime of one type also predicts crime of other types against the same target (Fienberg, 1980; Reiss, 1980; Ellingworth et al., 1995a).

Are all victims equally prone to rv?

The obvious next question concerns whether all people, once victimised, are equally likely to suffer again. The answer, unsurprisingly, is that they are not. The likelihood of rv differs by personal characteristics with, for example, lone parent households being particularly likely to suffer crime recurrence, and the elderly being among the least likely (Tseloni and Pease, 1998). To anticipate points made later in this report, the key reasons for repeats are believed to be the presence of good, and lack of bad, consequences of the first crime for the offender, and the stability of the situation which presents itself to an offender on the first and subsequent visits to the scene of his or her crime. The failure to change circumstances which led to crime may be a result of many factors; poverty (Wojcik et al., 1997), lack of motivation to prevent crime (as colleagues of the writer found among many small businesses), lack of awareness that a crime has taken place (as in embezzlement and fraud, for example) and perception of the crime as the lesser of two evils (as in domestic violence where escape also means removing from one's children their father's economic support and their removal from a home to the nobly provided but inadequate conditions afforded by refuges).

Commission of a crime *boosts* the likelihood of its repetition. Offsetting that, change in the situation facing the perpetrator on his/her return *diminishes* the chance of crime. The recognition that change in a target after a crime diminishes the chances of its repetition is important. It chimes with the offender accounts presented later, and is exactly parallel to the 'Broken Windows' thesis (see Kelling and Coles, 1996), in which neglect of the first attack on a building or person means that no-one cares, and that the attacks can continue with impunity. The argument for 'fixing broken windows' is precisely the same as for preventing rv by changing what the offender first encountered.

Rv, hot spots, and high crime areas

Crime predicts crime at the area level as well as the individual level. Busy police beats tend (within limits) to remain busy beats (Spelman, 1995b). The individual and area are linked, in that a major reason why beats remain busy is the level of rv against the individual person or place within the beat (Trickett et al., 1992; Johnson et al., 1997). Bennett (1995) showed that just over one third of all domestic burglaries occurring within a 'hot spot' were part of a series of burglaries. This is important, because taking police and other resources to repeat victims automatically takes them to places where crime is high.

Put crudely, the hot spot is a hot smudge of aggregated data, usually presented as an ellipse and cleaving to a statistical, rather than a geographic reality. The repeat victim is the most precise hot spot (see Pease and Laycock, 1996). The level of spatial disaggregation optimal for considering a community crime problem will vary, and will often be a matter of taste. Having identified a hot spot, what does one do when standing in it? Looking at prior victims *within* hot spots could provide one sensible route to prevention. Likewise, having identified a repeat victim, it may prove most sensible to act on the surrounding places and people, rather than on the victim. Conventional hot spot demarcation and rv are *alternative* starting points for problem definition and solution, each of which may be helped by consideration of the other perspective.

The literature does show points of convergence (see, for example, several of the chapters in Eck and Weisburd, 1995). Indeed, in the Minneapolis 'Hot Spots of Crime' experiment, hot spots were defined in terms of small clusters of addresses with frequent crime calls (Buerger et al., 1995), so that the point of departure for hot spot definition was rv. Further, the maximum size of a hot spot was rigidly adhered to. Thus the hot spot problem never got too far from the constituent individual chronic victimisation. Hot spot boundaries were flexible, applying the 'If I were a mugger' rule. This relies on what the perceptions of a potential mugger would be about the limits of his safe range.

The worst outcome for crime prevention would be that the approaches come to be seen as somehow in competition. A turf war between those researching hot spots, those concerned with high crime areas, and those concentrating on rv, would be very stupid. The important issue is what is useful to the police and others who wish to reduce crime. Departmental rivalries, not entirely unknown in large organisations like police forces, are likely to mean that the part of the force responsible for geographic information systems, and that part responsible for rv, will, if different, depict the alternative levels of disaggregation as rivals for money and glory.

Setting aside the link between rv and hot spots, how do rv ideas illuminate area crime rates generally? To understand an area's victimisation, one needs three basic measures. Incidence is the number of crimes per person (or household) available to be victimised. Prevalence is the proportion of available people (or households) which are victimised. Concentration is the number of victimisations per person (or household) victimised. Hope (1994; 1995) shows how the different measures highlight contrasting trends in one small area of Hull, meaning that it would be impossible to comprehend what was happening without using concentration

alongside the other measures. He also shows how the decline of US burglary rates since 1981 is attributable wholly to a decline in prevalence. Concentration remains virtually unchanged.

Farrell and Buckley (1998) show how a domestic violence initiative *increased* the number of women calling the police (prevalence), but *decreased* the number of calls per caller (concentration), so that the *total* number of calls remained unchanged. This makes sense if the initiative served to increase the willingness of victims to approach the police (thereby increasing prevalence) but a more effective service was dispensed, thus reducing the number of calls each victim had to make (concentration) before some resolution of the problem was achieved. The initiative would have appeared to have no effect if its impact had not been analysed in a way which distinguished prevalence and concentration. In short, concentration is a measure which is necessary to understand both area crime rates and crime trends.

Many unhappy returns: the time course of r v

Victimisation, when it recurs, tends to recur swiftly (Polvi et al.,1990; Farrell and Pease, 1993). There are two reasons for this. The first is that crime *flags* people and places where crime was always likely. The lovely house without visible security on the edge of a poor area was, is and will remain a magnet for crime. Under this account, the first, second and third crimes against it are all a result of these same, enduring attributes. The alternative explanation is that the first crime *boosts* the likelihood of later crimes. Thus, a burglar's inability to carry all valuables from a burglary makes a return visit more likely.

Temporary repairs can leave a home or workplace more vulnerable to repeated burglary, with a cornflake packet in a broken window providing no protection against another entry. It will be asserted below that getting away with fiddling expenses, domestic violence, or scratching an ex-wife's car after an acrimonious divorce, *boosts* the chances of repetition.

These two basic reasons for rv have been burdened with the names 'risk heterogeneity' and 'event dependence', thus guaranteeing that most people will groan inwardly when the concepts are introduced. The terms are used here only so that those venturing further into the criminology literature will recognise them. The two kinds of explanation will be referred to here as the 'flag' (risk heterogeneity) and 'boost' (event dependence) accounts. *Flag* accounts contend that rv results from an enduring level of risk. *Boost* accounts contend that victimisation educates the returning offender about what he or she will encounter, so that victimisation becomes more likely. Flag and boost approaches can both

explain the fact that repetition tends to occur quickly, but there are ways of deciding the relative importance of the two explanations. In some cases, police work will make things clear. The bitter man who repeatedly vandalises his ex-wife's car will explain his continuing grudge when detected. The first-time drug courier will explain the irresistibility of the easy money to be made (a flag account).

Flag and boost accounts of r v

Research and debate in this area are clearly necessary, and some will be described below. However, it should not be overlooked that the very fact that victimisation predicts victimisation is useful whatever the explanation for the repeated crime. It takes policing effort to the right people (crime victims) at the right time (soon after victimisation). Where the effect is a result of a flag account, it is the right time and place because at that place the time is *always* right. Where it results from a boost explanation, the time is right because an earlier event has *made* it right. For the purpose of getting police attention, the distinction between flag and boost theories is academic. For the purpose of deciding what to do to prevent rv, it is not.

This can be illustrated by an analogy. A sports team loses the first two matches of the season. Why did it lose the second one? Was it because the first result reflected the fact that it was a poor team, and it was still a poor team at the time of the second match? This is a flag account. Alternatively, did the first result destroy its confidence so that it played tentatively in the second match? This is a boost account. What should the coaches do? If the flag explanation is correct, they should draft in new players urgently. If the boost explanation is correct, they should try to build the team's confidence.

Everyone will recognise flag accounts as making sense. Why burgle houses with few contents and good security? Why rob petrol stations where the cashier has no access to money? By contrast, boost accounts have been dismissed (see, for example, Nelson, 1980; and Sparks, 1981). It is important to spell out the evidence for boost explanations of rv, without ever losing sight of the pertinence of flag accounts.

There is statistical evidence suggesting the validity of boost accounts (Spelman, 1995a; Osborn et al., 1995; Ellingworth et al., 1995b; Osborn et al., 1996). In the USA, Lauritsen and Davis Quinet (1995) used a victimisation survey of young people to establish, by appropriate statistical modelling, that both flag and boost factors contribute to rv.

'In other words, prior victimisation predicts future risk in part because it alters something about the individual (victim), and because it indicates an unmeasured propensity for victimisation that persists over time' (p143).

Statistical data, however powerful, are not of themselves convincing for most police officers. The most persuasive and self-explanatory evidence is to be found in offender accounts. Offenders who repeatedly target the same place or person can at least articulate why.

Offender accounts

Around one third of domestic burglars and somewhat fewer bank and building society robbers return to precisely the same place to offend again (Winkel, 1990; Gill and Matthews, 1993). Bennett (1995) interviewed domestic burglars to determine why those who returned did so. They answered in terms of low risks, high rewards and ease of access; the same factors given to explain burglaries generally. Most of Bennett's offenders had gone back. Almost half said they went as a result of other offenders telling them about a home they had previously burgled (a boost account). Farrell et al. (1995) provide speculative accounts of the motivation to return in respect of a variety of offences:

'A burglar walking down a street where he has never burgled before sees two kinds of house – the presumed suitable and the presumed unsuitable (by dint of alarm, occupancy barking dog, and so on). He burgles one of the houses he presumes to be suitable, and is successful. Next time he walks down the street, he sees three kinds of house – the presumed unsuitable, the presumed suitable, and the known suitable. It would involve least effort to burgle the house known to be suitable' (p391).

Ericsson (1995) interviewed twenty-one convicted multiple burglars at a category C prison in East Anglia. She found that

'76% said they had gone back to a number of houses after a varying period of time to burgle them between two and five times. The reasons given for returning to burgle a house were because the house was associated with low risk ... they were familiar with the features of the house ... the target was easily accessible ... or to steal more goods in general ... The reasons for going back for goods were things they had left behind ... replaced goods ... and unhidden cash' (p23).

Ashton et al. (1998) asked 186 people with a burglary conviction and currently under supervision or in custody in West Yorkshire whether they had ever committed repeat crimes against the same target. Eighty-six acknowledged

repetition of some crime type. Fifty-seven of these acknowledged repeated burglary of the same target. Seventy of the eighty-six repeaters were interviewed. Their reasons for repetition were clear, rational, and provide good evidence of the boost account of rv. A few of the reasons, as expressed in interview notes, will be quoted.

'The house would be targeted again 'a few weeks later' when the stuff had been replaced and because the first time had been easy...'

'It was a chance to get things which you had seen the first time and now had a buyer for.'

'Once you have been into a place it is easier to burgle because you are then familiar with the layout, and you can get out much quicker.'

'Keys to the door were usually hanging round, either on a shelf or the top of furniture near to the door in empty houses, so they used the keys to unlock the doors to get out and to use for the next time they broke in.'

Grudges also drive rv.

'X burgled his father's business three nights in a row. X had left home because he could not put up with the rules his father set ... X also burgled his parents' home. He bore a grudge against his parents ... X said he had burgled his parents' home four times.'

The reasoning, both economic and emotional, was the same for crime other than burglary.

'X had stolen the stereo from the same car more than once. He would return to the same street and if he spotted the same car parked on the street he would take the stereo again if it had been replaced ... You get more money for brand new things.'

'X's girlfriend got her father and brothers to threaten X when X had broken down the door of his ex-girlfriend's house. X said they came round and he hit them with a cricket bat. Other times he ended up fighting one of her brothers ... He said he had punched his ex-girlfriend's father when the father had threatened him after trying to get access to see his son.'

In a study of armed robbers, Gill and Pease (1998) found similar reasoning from the 19% of armed robbers who said they returned, as instanced below:

'It was so easy I went back ten days later.'

'If you get a good result, you go back a second time.'

'(I did) a factory and shop twice. It is easy. It's about twenty-five minutes before the alarm goes off, and the shop didn't have one. They didn't learn.'

'It was easy. I knew the woman, and she helped me, so I did it twice.'

Are most repeats the work of the same offenders?

The Ashton interviews, with the other data, clearly show that at least some rv occurs because the first offence against a target educates an offender in ways which *boost* the risk of rv, by making it easier, more attractive or more profitable. It thus shows that the boost account is correct in that a first offence alters offender perceptions of the target. Preventive action at that point seeks to negate that education by making the situation different and more difficult for the offender. Thus, crime *boosts* the probability of repetition. Victim *change* acts against that, and offsets the boosted probability of repetition.

The discussion above does *not* show what proportion of repeats are attributable to the same perpetrators. Offenders themselves will not necessarily know this. They will not know, for example, about burglaries against the homes and businesses they had burgled which were carried out by other burglars.

The evidence about the proportion of rv attributable to the same offenders is not wholly conclusive – but it is consistent across different sources. It comes from the analysis of victim accounts and police statistics of recorded crime.

Victim accounts

The British Crime Survey captures details of crimes against individuals and their homes. A representative sample of people in England and Wales is questioned about all the crimes they suffered during the period covered by the Survey (just over one year). Use was made of a distinctive feature of the British Crime Survey. While surveys like the US National Crime Victimisation Survey define series as simple repetitions of crimes against the same victim, the British Crime Survey uses a narrower definition. Where a respondent suffers more than one instance of a particular crime type, he or she is asked to classify crimes suffered according to their similarity. The precise eliciting question is 'Were any of these very similar incidents, where the same thing was done under the same circumstances and probably by the same people?' Where the answer to that question is yes, the crimes

suffered count as a series. Where the answer is no, crimes of the same type against the same person or household are classified as repeated single events.

If victims are right in their judgement, the proportion of all repeated crime which forms part of a series gives an idea of the proportion committed by the same offenders. The relevant numbers for the 1992 British Crime Survey are set out in Table 3.

Table 3: Series crime as a proportion of repeated crime and all crime: British Crime Survey 1992

Crime	Total number	Series as a proportion of repeats	Series as a proportion of total
Vehicle theft	402	57	11
Theft from vehicle	1582	70	30
Damage to vehicle	2138	74	37
Bicycle theft	395	54	16
Burglary	598	76	21
Break-in with damage	66	50	20
Attempt burglary	667	79	34
Theft from dwelling	121	75	25
Theft from outside dwelling	1244	84	44
Damage to outside dwelling	1086	94	58
Theft from person	504	77	20
Attempt theft from person	238	84	35
Other theft	1308	71	29
Damage to personal property	446	81	43
Assault	1923	74	53
Threats	2749	89	74

Notes:
1. Equivalent analysis using victim form data yields a similar picture. The pattern is similar across weighting alternatives.
2. Modified from Chenery et al., 1996.

For all offence types, it is clear from Table 3 that half or more than half of all repetitions form part of a series. Taken literally, this means that most repeated

victimisation by the same crime type involves a set of similar circumstances and characteristics, and 'probably' the same offender. Series events form a non-trivial proportion of all events captured by the British Crime Survey for each crime type. Interestingly, the proportion of all offences which form series tends to be higher for those offences where the victim is in the best position to know who the offender is (assault and threats). Crudely averaging the Series/Repeats' percentages in Table 3 suggests that some 75% of all repeats probably have the same perpetrator(s).

Official crime clearances

In his as yet unpublished work, Inspector Steve Everson of West Yorkshire Police is looking at patterns in cleared burglary. Specifically, when a crime is repeated against the same target and more than one crime in the sequence is cleared, who is found to have been responsible? Is it typically the same offender, an associate of the offender, or someone with no known link with the offender? The work is in an exploratory phase, but so far it has been found that in some 80% of cases where more than one crime is cleared, the perpetrator is the same person, and in only very few of the remaining cases were the different burglars known associates. This is not an artefact of secondary detection (like offenders admitting extra offences when charged with one, to 'clear the books'), since the pattern is also evident with primary detections.

In short, both victim report and patterns in cleared crime suggest that the bulk of rv is the work of the same perpetrator(s). Ongoing work with the characteristics of MPD burglaries provide further evidence consistent with this perspective. Taken together with the offender accounts, it seems clear that the boost account is both true and probably the major determinant of levels of rv. That established, as a historical curiosity, why were the scholars cited earlier so dismissive of the possibility?

The notion of crime as a recurring feature of a relationship had already been recognised (see for example von Hentig, 1948; Schafer, 1968). What has changed since Sparks and Nelson were so scathing has been attention to crimes like domestic violence, embezzlement, sexual abuse of children and bullying. These offences are typically perpetrated as series of events, with a dynamic in which the consequences of offences early in the series may speed or slow the rate of offending, or halt it altogether. Having considered such offences, the notion that crime events against the same victim are dependent upon each other now seems less 'far-fetched'. We are now much more likely to see crime sequences as the unfolding of a relationship. Being prepared to look at matters in this way through the example of domestic violence, we are now readier to recognise links between apparently one-off events like burglary and robbery.

Are rv offenders different?

The Everson research also suggests that those burglars who victimise the same target more than once are more prolific offenders than other burglars. In the Ashton work described above, repeat offenders had their first official processing earlier in life than others, and had more convictions, although this latter result was not statistically reliable. Gill and Pease (1998) showed that repeat robbers of the same target were more determined, more likely to carry a loaded gun, and more likely to have committed a robbery where someone had been injured. They had longer criminal records, were more likely to have been in prison before, and for a sentence upwards of five years. They planned their robberies more, and were more likely to have worn a disguise.

We thus have three separate research studies, each showing that offenders who committed repeated crime against the same target were in one or more senses more 'criminal' than those who did not. This has implications for offender targeting which will be explored later.

3. What to do with rv?

One of the more gratifying aspects of rv research is that most police officers find no difficulty in answering this question. Knowing perfectly the time and place at which a crime will take place only occurs on the basis of good police intelligence. So-called proactive policing involves the best use of data to estimate the probability of crime occurring in a particular place and at a particular time. Rv directs attention to the victim, time and possible perpetrator of likely future crime. However, it does not tell you what to do with that information. Rv is an efficient way of 'getting the crime prevention grease to the crime squeak', but only by locating the squeak more precisely. The effect of the grease on the squeak depends on how good the grease is. The effect of applying resources to rv depends on how intelligently it is done. Bridgeman and Hobbs (1997) help to elaborate thinking on this point.

Working with rv does not require an uncritical view of the victim. Some repeat victims will be insurance fraudsters (Litton, 1996). The overlap between offenders and victims is a criminological commonplace (see, for example, Mayhew and Elliott, 1988). Many victims of chronic violence may well also be its perpetrators. This is not a reason to blame the victim and walk away. It is with the people identified that the problem of violence resides, and it is in action with and around them that it must be addressed. In short, rv takes one to the heart of crime problems, whatever their origins.

Drip-feeding

The study which raised awareness of the possibilities of repeat prevention as a crime control strategy was the Kirkholt Project (Forrester et al., 1988; 1990). The work was carried out in public housing north of Manchester which suffered historically high levels of domestic burglary. The extent to which this reflected high levels of repeated crimes against the same homes surprised its authors. It was such that, if one started counting in the January of the pre-implementation year, by December of that year most of the month's burglaries were of dwellings which had already been burgled at least once since January. Given limited funds for implementing a crime prevention scheme, the best practical option was to concentrate on those dwellings which had just been burgled.

This had the further and crucial advantage that a constant low level of resourcing would suffice, because people became victims at a constant or declining rate. For instance, one joiner was employed long-term on Kirkholt work. If the second favoured target group (single parents) had been chosen for security uprating, three joiners would have been put on short-term contracts. Longer-term response geared to crime rates (as used in Kirkholt) rather than the prior specification of groups at risk, came to be called 'drip-feeding' crime prevention.

The Kirkholt project's implementation was followed by a reduction of domestic burglary to one-third of its previous level, and repeat burglaries to almost zero. It was also followed by controversy, with claims that general estate improvements were responsible for the reduction. Secondary analysis showed that the decline tracked the homes protected after burglary rather than the general improvements. Some of those who conceded the project's relevance attributed it entirely to one or other of its elements. The most popular single-factor accounts involved the removal of pre-payment fuel meters or the establishment of 'cocoon watch', whereby those living in the neighbouring dwellings were recruited to be vigilant against repeats.

Major projects after Kirkholt

Despite the controversy, the practical advantages offered by the strategy of preventing repeats were such as to generate 'replications' of Kirkholt, with varying degrees of precision and success (Tilley, 1993). The attempt to prevent offences against the person followed, with studies of domestic violence (Lloyd et al., 1993) and racial attacks (Sampson and Phillips, 1992; 1995). The domestic violence evaluation remains incomplete, but the evidence does suggest reductions in attacks against those chronically victimised. The racial attacks study can be summarised as showing reductions contingent upon efficient collaboration among agencies involved.

In Crime Concern's Direct Line Homesafe projects, a large and impressive programme of work, those which concentrated on the prevention of rv showed the greatest amount of burglary reduction per home protected (Webb, 1997). The Huddersfield 'Biting Back' project showed reduction in domestic burglary and thefts from vehicles in a project which aimed to extend across a large police division (Chenery et al., 1997).

Local successes

More heartening than the larger scale funded work on rv are the emerging local initiatives. In the writer's home town, Stockport (chosen for reasons of civic pride rather than uniqueness) in the financial year 1996-7, with a divisional programme to prevent rv, domestic burglary fell by 21%. This decline was greater than that in the remainder of the force (5%), and to a statistically significant degree. Stockport showed a 44% reduction in the number of repeats, demonstrating that the overall reduction had indeed been largely achieved by the reduction of rv.

In addition to such initiatives, others target rv as part of wider projects (see Bridgeman, 1996; Webb, 1997). Such achievements give confidence that one can have a degree of control over rates of crime by reducing the revictimisation of those places and people suffering crime.
Each of the demonstrations of apparent success in limiting crime through the prevention of repeats can, with effort, be criticised. However, the point of accumulating evidence has now been reached at which such criticism loses its force. Two changes, other than mounting successes of rv work, have generated a climate shift over the last five years, bringing with them increased interest in and attention to rv. First, as police forces have interrogated their own data about repeats, fewer and fewer have denied the basic phenomenon – although some rural forces continue to take the view that the scale of the problem is slight in their areas. Second, the Home Office has introduced repeat victimisation as a key performance indicator for the police.

The advantages of concentrating on repeats

The central virtues of preventing rv as a strategy of crime control are summarised as follows:

1. Focusing on repeats automatically concentrates effort on areas of highest crime without the need for any supplementary deployment decisions;

2. Focusing on repeats automatically concentrates on individuals at greatest risk of future victimisation;

3. The time course of repeats suggests that resources can be focused temporally as well as spatially;

4. It fuses the roles of victim support and crime prevention which have been historically separated;

5. Insofar as repeated offences against the same target are the work of the same perpetrator(s), clearance of a series of crimes and linked property recovery is made more likely than was the case when events were seen as independent. It thus explicitly links the police tasks of prevention and detection;

6. Insofar as the provisional evidence is confirmed that repeated crimes are disproportionately the work of *prolific*offenders, the prevention/detection of attempts at repetition provides an uncontentious way of targeting prolific offenders;

7. It should lead to improvements in the information collected about crime and thus ultimately to a better understanding of crime problems generally.

The following illustrates some of these points. In the Huddersfield study, silent alarms were allocated to those who had suffered two or more burglaries during the previous twelve months. Elsewhere in the force, allocation was made on the basis of individual officer assessment of risk, as was hitherto the case in Huddersfield. Table 4 sets out the pre-project and project experience from Huddersfield and elsewhere in West Yorkshire.

It will be seen that the proportion of installations based on prior victimisation which lead to an arrest was much higher than for installations based on officer assessment of risk. The rate of arrests in Huddersfield rose during the project, in contrast with a decline elsewhere in West Yorkshire. Combined with true misses (where an offence occurred, but the police did not arrive in time) some 21% of silent alarms installed, for six weeks each, were activated by a real crime. This was substantially higher than elsewhere in the force before or during the project, and Huddersfield before the project. The suggestion here is that knowing the place and time of heightened risk of crime can lead to the efficient deployment of aids to detection, like silent alarms.

Table 4: Temporary silent alarms, before and during Biting Back project

	Pre-Project Period		Project Period	
	Huddersfield	Rest of force	Huddersfield	Rest of force
Installations	104	616	171	713
Arrests	4(4%)	50(8%)	24(14%)	31(4%)
True misses	2(2%)	21(3%)	12(7%)	19(3%)

Note: Taken from Anderson et al. (1995b).

A similar story could be told of the work of the force's technical evidence gathering (TEG) team. Ten CCTV installations by the team in Huddersfield have resulted in five arrests at four incidents. Seven other offences were admitted by the offenders arrested at a targeted garage, and eight other offences were admitted by the offender at a sweetshop. These fifteen other offences yielded a total of nineteen detected crimes from the ten installations.

An additional advantage for operational detectives concerns what extra information is sought when an offender is identified for a particular crime. In Huddersfield, a check is now made on what was taken in previous offences against the same target. This has produced an increase in recovered goods, and secondary detections from prior offences.

4. Frequently asked questions (and one which isn't but should be)

Is rv relevant for all crimes and all places?

It is not relevant for offences which end in the death or departure of the victim, although it might have been relevant in the sense that murder or manslaughter may have been preceded by a series of sub-lethal attacks. Its relevance to 'victimless crimes' like drug use and consensual but illegal sexual acts is questionable. As a minimum, such use would involve a change of vocabulary. There are parallels with rv in victimless crime, since such offences entail the repetition of similar exchanges between the same people. Demand reduction among drug users is analogous to victim behaviour which reduces the chance of rv. With these exceptions acknowledged, for all crime where there is a recognisable victim and where research has been conducted, the basic patterns are reproduced, even where it is difficult for them to show themselves (as in car theft, where a proportion of vehicles remain unrecovered, and hence not liable to rv). There has been an over-emphasis on burglary in crime control efforts based on rv principles, although it is difficult to criticise this while burglary remains a volume crime.

As for area differences, as noted earlier, it is well established that rates of rv are highest where crime is highest. A resource deployment pattern based on rv may well move resources from low to high crime areas. I regard this as a good thing.

Police in some rural areas have decided that an rv strategy is not justified for them, because of the modest absolute number of repeats. However, even in such areas, it *may* still be worthwhile taking preventive action in the wake of a crime. To illustrate the point, consider an area of 10,000 homes of which 100 are burgled during the course of a year. Of that 100, ten are burgled again during the year. Given those numbers, by choosing at random 100 unburgled homes to protect, one would prevent (on average) one burglary. If one chose to protect the 100 previously burgled homes, one could prevent ten burglaries. The key figure is not the absolute number of repeats, but their *rate*, i.e. the preventions which could be garnered per action taken. There may be areas where the rate of repeats is no higher than the rate of first victimisation, but I haven't seen one yet. This is not to claim that the risk of repetition is invariably high enough to justify action to reduce it. Suggestions about how to approach decisions of this kind are set out later in this report.

Isn't prevented crime just displaced?

The research evidence suggests that displacement is never total (see Hesseling, 1994), so there seems always to be a net gain in crime reduction terms. Often the opposite to displacement occurs, where reductions extend beyond the boundaries of

a project area. This is known as 'diffusion of benefits'. It has been argued that rv projects are less likely to suffer from even partial displacement than other kinds of initiative (Bouloukos and Farrell, 1997). Despite great efforts to find displacement, the Huddersfield project failed to do so. The use of anticipated displacement as an argument for not putting crime prevention measures in place for the benefit of chronic victims in hard-pressed areas not only runs counter to the evidence. To me, it is also immoral.

Does rv involve victim blame?

No, but victim blame is a clear and ever-present danger in rv work. The emphasis of writers about victim services and rv has been upon the integration of victim support and rv prevention, since the same people need both of these, and at the same time (Davis et al., 1997; Farrell and Pease, 1997). The points which merit stress are:

1. Victims are chosen by offenders because of the attributes of their possessions or of themselves. Protection of victims in their lives as they choose to live them should be offered, but there seems no reason in principle why the factors believed to make them vulnerable should not be mentioned, so long as this is separated from any offer of help. Victims may choose to change, and have the right to the information on which that choice may be based. Help should not be contingent on that choice.

2. A special case may exist in which the commercial decision to tolerate a high rv level by a business has the consequence of reducing the level of police service available to other local businesses and citizens. In such cases, it may be acceptable to offer lower levels of service to the business in question.

3. Some people who present themselves as repeat victims are in truth blameworthy, as insurance fraudsters or colluders with offenders. Pat Dromey of San Diego Police Department describes the installation of covert cameras in convenience stores in three cities. The cameras led to a dramatic reduction in robberies of these stores, although only store staff were told about them. This suggests collusion of the staff with the robbers, or that the robberies were fictional. Rv approaches do not preclude reconsideration of victim status.

Is there work in progress to refine the definition of rv?

The previous chapter touched upon the definition of rv, but contended that the strategy of defining rv should be driven by the crime control purposes to which it

can be put. A provisional discussion of rv definition is found in the next chapter. To take forward ideas in this area, it may be helpful to think about how similar repeats are.

We may think of rv as representing one extreme, one end of a continuum of similarity of crime targets. My house is identical to my house! Whatever attracts an offender to my house in the first place will also attract him to my house again. Someone mugs an identical twin. The next day he mugs the other twin, believing the victim to be the same person. Does the mugging of the second twin count as rv? If Ms. Smith's Ford Cosworth is stolen twice from the same place, that is rv in every detail. The theft of Ms. Smith's Cosworth followed by Mr. Brown's Ford Cosworth from a nearby car park is rv in most respects. The Cosworths are near-identical twins in terms of appearance and performance. These are virtual repeats, as would be the successive mugging of two identical twins. One relevant point emerged from the Ashton et al. (1998) interviews with burglars. One pointed out that the floor plan of all new petrol stations belonging to one major chain was identical, so that having burgled one, the burglar had acquired the knowledge to burgle any. These too, are virtual repeats.

Any pair of crimes has some points of similarity and some of difference. Repeat racial attack is (from the perpetrator's viewpoint) an actual or virtual repeat, since the ethnic identity of the victim is perceived by the perpetrator as his or her only relevant attribute. Thus discussion of rv shades into a debate about which dimensions of similarity are relevant in an offender's choice of target (Eck, 1993). This is a development to be welcomed in refining our understanding of rv and target choice more generally. It may well allow a more sophisticated approach to offender targeting.

Should we regard a repeat after one month in the same way as after six?

Evidence is beginning to emerge that quick repeats are more similar to the original offence than repeats after some time. This does not mean that one kind of repeat is more 'real' than another, just that preventive packages which seek to have enduring effects should be more complete in what they protect against. Anniversary repeats (i.e. repeats which take place after exactly one year) are of special interest. They may reflect annual cycles. Supt. John Holt tells of a burglary rash that took place every spring when the grass dividing public space from homes was cut, allowing easy routes to burgle. It may also reflect the movements of perpetrators who return annually.

Rv is an over-hyped fashion, isn't it?

This is the question that is not frequently asked, but which should be. I tend to be a pessimist, but only in my very darkest moments do I doubt the importance of rv. However, inflexible and unimaginative use of rv information will lead to its failure as an aid to crime reduction. The question in the heading should be asked often, which is why it is important that those who are able to act on rv should know as much about the background to the concept as possible. One of the motives for writing this report was to give police enough background to conclude that rv is not a fashion, and that its integration with good and innovative policing practice is worthwhile.

Holt (1996) – the crime manager for the Huddersfield project – provides a basic implementation model for divisional crime management which illustrates the hard-headedness and practicality which can characterise rv work. The economics of crime prevention will have to be addressed, to confront the reality that insurance and indifference combine to produce rv which the victim is not motivated to reduce, while direct and opportunity costs in police time continue to be exacted. More generally, as will be argued in the next chapter, if the links between rv and other approaches are neglected by the police service, the full benefits of each approach will not be realised.

5. What next in rv?

In this section of the report, I suggest immediate and more visionary possibilities for developing our understanding and use of rv, and some obstacles to that. The discussion takes into consideration crime reduction strategies generally.

During the early 1990s, the police in England and Wales started to become officially aware of rv. In early 1993 a paper on the subject was appended to a Home Office Circular which each Chief Constable received. A series of meetings throughout the country advanced the discussion and a Home Office document reviewing the evidence (Bridgeman and Sampson, 1994) was distributed to all police forces in considerable numbers. Soon after that, the first suggestion was made that rv was usable as a police performance indicator (Tilley, 1995). One argument used was by analogy with health facilities and the prevention of heart attacks. While the health services could not be blamed for the rate of first attacks, the rate of second attacks was arguably linked to the quality of care at and after the first attack.[1]

[1] *The analogy is imperfect. Health services allowing (or helping) all first-time heart attack sufferers to die could not be assessed unfavourably in this way Likewise, police forces who made first-time victims so unhappy that they never reported anything again would look good.*

In 1995 and 1996, the police in England and Wales became aware that their performance would indeed be scrutinised in terms of their reduction of rates of rv. Specifically, in 1996/7 forces were asked to develop a strategy demonstrating:

- how they had identified or intended to identify rv;
- how they intended to reduce rv in offences where it is significant; and,
- how they proposed to evaluate their intervention.

In 1997/8 it was expected that forces would implement their strategies, or if not yet ready would continue to develop them for implementation in 1998/9. This process changed police perceptions of the issues surrounding rv, and brought definitional points to the fore.

The immediate next step should be the improvement of police computer systems to identify repeats. Steps have been taken in this direction in recent years. The problems of counting repeats using police crime data have been described before (Farrell and Pease, 1993; Anderson et al., 1995a). An example will suffice here. A small engineering company in an industrial estate may appear in a computerised crime information system as:

Smith Bros., Honley Industrial Estate;
Smith Brothers, Honley Industrial Estate;

Smith Bros., 4 First Street, Honley Industrial Estate;
Smith Brothers, 4 First St., Honley;
and any other of the multitude of possible variants of the company name and address.

The point is that crime information systems were devised with priorities which excluded the need to link rv against the same place or person. In this, it reflects the whole process of official data-gathering in relation to crime. Five volumes of 'Criminal Statistics' are published each year in England and Wales, containing massive amounts of data. One half of the first volume comprises crime counts by type, police force area, crime trends and the like. The remaining four and a half volumes contain information about the progress of offenders through the criminal justice process. Nowhere in the five volumes is there any indication of the distribution of victimisation amongst victims, reflecting the extent of official neglect of facts about the distribution of crime which could be of great practical significance. Rv thus exposes a major weakness in what we record about crime, and what we have traditionally considered worth recording. I envisage movement towards remedy of this situation.

Other factors, beside Crime Information System difficulty, conspire to mask rv from an interested police officer. Most importantly, the extent of non-report to the police means that one (or none) of a series of offences is reported. There are good reasons for non-report by the repeat victim, including the wish not to invite attention from one's insurer, and the general unpleasantness of the experience of reporting crime and being involved in the processing of offenders. In unpublished analysis of the 1992 British Crime Survey, it seems that some 40% of crimes suffered by one-time victims are reported, down to 28% for six-time victims.[2] Thus number of victimisations and inclination to report seem inversely related, increasing further the under-representation of multiple victimisations in police records. Other reasons for failing to recognise the number of repeats include shift patterns, officer extraction and the like, which leads to a situation where no individual police officer accumulates the experience which allows the extent of rv to be recognised.

The strategy of defining repeats

If police computer systems and working practices are to be developed to the point at which the scale of rv is known, should the repeat be defined in terms of place, person or both? If in terms of place, how closely should the place be specified? In general, definitions should flow from purposes. The Inuit have so many words for snow because they do so many different things with it. What are the consequences

[2] *This conclusion is tentative. A single question about reporting to police is asked, even about a series of offences. Thus someone reporting one offence in a series of ten would appear as though all ten had been reported. The decline in reporting rates with increasing numbers of offences is thus probably understated. When very large numbers of offences are suffered by a victim, the reporting rate appears to increase, presumably because when victimisation is that chronic, at least one of the series is reported to the police.*

for how we define rv of emphasising prevention as the primary reason for finding out about it?

Insofar as prevention is the reason for identifying a repeat, the answer should probably be thought of in terms of prevention scope. A motorist parks her car in a safe area, but leaves the doors unlocked and the key in the ignition. She has her car stolen three times. The preventive scope for the victim's changed behaviour in such a case seems particularly great. By contrast, another car is left secure and immobilised, but it is nonetheless also broken into three times. In this case, the scope for place change seems to the fore. In brief, both person and place merit inclusion when exploring patterns of repeat, because victimisation of the same place across diverse people using it, or of the same person (or vehicle) across places, is an indicator of where preventive scope might be found. The benefits of a police information system which provides adequate information in respect of victim, place of victimisation and offender (where an offence is cleared) would be substantial. This point will be elaborated upon later.

A general criterion for choice of rv intervention would be that the unit receiving attention:

- has a non-trivial probability of a relevant occurrence within a short time of set-up; and,

- has limits such that preventive action need not be complicated or resource-intensive.

The precise probability and what constitutes a 'short time' obviously depends upon available resources and the distribution of risks in an area. Let us (arbitrarily) set a probability of .25 and a period of two weeks. Consider a multi-storey car park. If a particular vehicle (say a Ford Cosworth belonging to Ms. Smith) has, based upon past experience, a risk in excess of .25 of suffering crime over the next two weeks wherever she leaves it within the car park, it would be prudent to take protective measures focusing on that car. If a particular bay of the same car park had a .25+ probability of rv, action should concentrate on the bay rather than its temporary occupant. If no particular bay has this level of victimisation, but the floor as a whole does, action should concentrate on the floor. If a particular bay has a probability of crime of .3, and the floor as a whole a probability of .6, a judgement call is required. If the effort of protecting the floor as a whole is less than twice that of the effort of protecting the single bay, it may be prudent to protect the whole floor. However, there comes a point at which the area (or number of cars) gets so

extensive before yielding a probability of .25 that protection is impracticable. If one has to cover the whole car park and three surrounding streets before there is a probability of .25 of a vehicle being subject to crime in the next two weeks, the effort required to protect such an area seems unrealistic.

If no sufficiently small unit has a non-trivial probability of crime, it may still be the case that individual citizens may wish to make their own arrangements for security or changed lifestyle, and information to enable them to be prudent should be available. To be practicable this approach requires precise knowledge of complainant identity, vehicle identity and place of offence.

The tactics of defining repeats

Strategic thinking about measuring repeats – what is the measurement useful *for* – should be emphasised. However, the tactics of measurement will not wait for clarification of the big picture. The practical measurement issues which police are confronting now are:

- whether a repeat necessarily involved the same people, place, or both;
- what was the period over which a repeat counted as such;
- over what range of offences would a repeat be counted, i.e. would an assault and a motor theft against the same person count as a repetition; and,
- how could officers become aware of earlier offences (by asking) and not then be required to record them officially?

Other anxieties which could have been voiced concern offences better thought of in terms of their rate than their occurrence or non-occurrence against a given target, instances where a crime victim is an agent of another, and the classification of attempts.

Rate offences

The obvious example is shop theft, where a large store will suffer a number of thefts every day. If these count as repetitions, and a force considers as success the number of repetitions prevented, it would make sense for the force to concentrate its resources upon the prevention of shop theft. A store with 200 incidents of shop theft has 199 possible preventions of repeats. If the total number of repeat house burglaries in the same area is 150 (which will be spread among many homes) the

force could be forgiven for concentrating on the prevention of shop theft, because the scale of possible reduction would be so enormous that performance indicators could best be achieved by addressing 'rate' offences, like shop theft, exclusively.

The agent problem

When a shop or factory is burgled, offences against whom count as repetitions? Should an employee be asked about offences that occurred outside the work context? Should the proprietor? Should the shareholders? More subtly, if an adult child is the person who discovers a burglary at home, against whom are personal victimisations counted? For whom is the adult child an agent (if anyone)?

Attempts

The third problem concerns the inclusion of attempts along with completions. If they are included, instances will be defined as repeats where completed offences are thwarted. If they are excluded, the attempt as a marker of risk will be overlooked. The status of repeats is especially crucial for the way in which data may be distorted. The line between criminal damage to the outside of a home and an attempted burglary is fine indeed, and will be moved according to the consequences of the measurement conventions for the individual officer and his or her force.

Tentative suggestions

What follows is a suggestion about the writer's current preferred approach to tactical problems of rv measurement. Current *presumptions* based on a mixture of principle and practicality, would be as follows:

1. Only offences of the same type should be sought when an officer questions someone about prior victimisation. Ideally, however, a supplementary question should be asked of the kind 'Have you suffered any other type of crime during the last year which you think might be connected to this one?' This version at least asserts the centrality of understanding any relationship which might underpin rv. The major limitation of this approach is to exclude as repeats events capable of different interpretations (notably criminal damage and attempted burglary).

2. The period over which information about prior victimisation is sought should be six months or one year, and should coincide as closely as possible with the recall period for the relevant national victimisation survey (in Britain, one year).

3. Attempts should contribute towards counts of repetition because they are predictive of the possibility of later completions.

4. Repeat reduction should not be aggregated across crime types, since that would conflate rate offences like shop theft, where many repeats can be prevented with relative ease, with other offences of which that is not true.

5. People should be asked about their own prior victimisation when they are representatives of households, but not when they are agents of others. For business crime, the unit of analysis should be the branch not the owner. Thus two branches of the same store, victimised once each, would not constitute a repeat victim. For the purposes of repeat measurement, the person responsible for a car at the time of an offence should be asked about prior victimisation.

6. Place information should be included in police data sets at the most disaggregated practicable level. Vertical location (e.g. floor of multi-storey car park) should also be included.

7. It should be made clear that any information gathered by an officer about unrecorded prior victimisations should have the status of intelligence, not crime report. Not to do so would be unforgivable, in that it would give the police a major incentive not to know about relevant context.

A plea for integration

This final section discusses the complementary roles of prevention and detection in crime reduction, and calls for the *integrated* development of information on offenders, victims and places to improve our understanding of all three.

Prevention and detection

Traditionally, crime prevention and detection have been treated as separate entities. Focusing on repeat victimisation draws the two functions closer together and demonstrates that *prevention and detection are only distinct if one considers one crime at a time* If a crime is not prevented, it happens and an attempt at detection is made – end of episode. The age-old distinction is unhelpful once one considers sequences of the kind demonstrated by rv, where knowledge about previous crime must involve and inform action to prevent the next. This agenda for prevention should be modified as more crime in the sequence is committed and more information becomes available. The attempt at detection is itself a contribution to future prevention and must be seen as part of the prevention agenda, not separate

from it. Rather than separate out prevention and detection in relation to a single event, it must be better to think of them as complementary elements in a *sequenced* crime reduction process.

One can see that prevention therefore becomes the sole purpose of policing, to be achieved over time through deflection and detection. Prevention (by deflection and detection) is always based upon a fund of prior information. It assumes high importance when the anticipated event is either of enormous consequence (a bomb in a nuclear facility) or less serious but of such high probability as to justify action. The relative practicality of prevention by deflection and detection depends upon the degree to which the future event is predictable in time, perpetrator and place.

Offenders, victims and places

Information on offender, victimisation event and place need to be brought together more systematically to enable preventive strategies of this kind to be formulated more effectively. Offender profiling, rv and hot spot analysis are three recent foci of research and attention corresponding very roughly to the three types. Like earlier research fashions, the 'Key Three', while inviting integration in their original presentations, have tended to be reviewed, adopted and espoused as alternative rather than complementary approaches. Exciting work, like that of Kim Rossmo (1995a, 1995b) integrates place and offender characteristics in crime investigation and demonstrates the benefits of doing so. In a similar way, the links between repeat offenders and rv suggest that bringing them together more systematically could pay high dividends in crime reduction. For example, offender profiling has until now generally focused on a closely circumscribed crime or series of crimes with little attention paid to victims. Equally, rv studies have so far sought to know virtually nothing about offenders.

Research shows, however, that those who commit rv are more criminal than those who do not (for readers interested in this topic, Sherman, 1995 makes more detailed connections). If particular effort is made to detect rv, we know that those who will be detected are disproportionately more committed criminals. This knowledge can therefore be used to improve the effectiveness of both offender profiling and rv.

A key step to facilitate this work is to reconcile offender, victim and location characteristics into a single database with the greatest possible flexibility of interrogation.

Implications for police information systems

In short:

- Prevention should be thought of as the single purpose of crime-related policing, to be achieved by deflection or detection.

- The relative attractiveness of deflection and detection depends upon the probability and consequences of a crime occurring, and the degree of circumscription of time and place possible in its prediction.

- The best analysis requires the simultaneous consideration of victimisation, place and perpetrator information.

These conclusions have profound implications for how the police collect, store and analyse information on crime and offenders. Currently police information systems depart hugely from what would be suggested by the above.

Despite the clear demonstrations of the value of place information by the Blocks, Dennis Roncek, Lawrence Sherman and many others (see Bottoms, 1994), there is in the UK at least only halting and localised movement towards the routine and precise identification of places where crimes happen. Similarly, there must be a revolution in the quality of crime report completion to get such victim information (e.g. weapon, method of entry etc.) as it is proper to gain routinely.

Also, the separation of Crime Information Systems from Offender Information Systems means that the simultaneous analysis of victim and offender characteristics is intrinsically limited. Furthermore, linking these data can be a very complicated process. It is no accident that offender profiling and geographic profiling are common only in the case of serial crimes of great seriousness. The manual resourcing of such an enterprise is otherwise unrealistic.

The question arises whether it is better to be promulgating single perspectives like rv or offender profiling now, or to advocate the delay of implementing approaches based on them until the fully integrated strategy is possible. The danger of present promulgation is that the approach becomes organisationally ossified, with resistance to future integration. In fact, delay is impossible, since the genii are already out of their respective bottles. Police forces are using offender profiling, with intermittent success and varying levels of satisfaction (Jackson et al., 1993; Canter, 1995). They are working towards precise identification of place (Read and Oldfield, 1995) and are developing strategies to prevent revictimisation.

Attempting to stop the process would lead only to its idiosyncratic local manifestation, and in consequence make inter-force harmonisation of information even more difficult. Perhaps the best approach is to develop and widely disseminate a prevention literature based upon the co-ordination of place, perpetrator and victim components, and to argue more explicitly for the integrated approach, and to lobby most vigorously for the development of the next generation of police IT to avoid the segmentation of information which has dogged all its predecessors, and hope that the National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) will help in this regard.

References

Anderson, D., Chenery, S. and Pease, K. (1995a) *Biting Back: Tackling Repeat Burglary and Car Crime*. Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 58. London: Home Office.

Anderson, D., Chenery, S. and Pease, K. (1995b) *Preventing Repeat Victimisation: A Report on Progress in Huddersfield*. Police Research Group Briefing Note 4/95. London: Home Office.

Ashton, J., Brown, I., Senior, B. and Pease, K. (1998) 'Repeat Victimisation: Offender Accounts', *International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention* (in press).

Bennett, T. (1995) 'Identifying, Explaining and Targeting Burglary Hot Spots', *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research* 3, 113-123.

Bottoms, A.E. (1994) 'Environmental Criminology', in Maguire, M., Morgan, R. and Reiner, R. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bouloukos, A. and Farrell, G. (1997) 'On the Displacement of Repeat Victimisation', in Newman, G., Clarke, R.V. and Giora Shoham, S. (eds) *Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bridgeman, C. and Sampson, A. (1994) *Wise After the Event: Tackling Repeat Victimisation*. London: Home Office.

Bridgeman, C. (1996) *Crime Risk Management: Making it work*. Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 70. London: Home Office.

Bridgeman, C. and Hobbs, L. (1997) *Preventing Repeat Victimisation: the police officer's guide*. London: Home Office.

Buerger, M.E., Cohn, E.G. and Petrosino, A.J. (1995) 'Defining the Hot Spots of Crime', in Eck, J.E. and Weisburd, D. (eds) *Crime and Place*. Monsey NY: Willow Tree Press.

Canter, D. (1995) 'Psychology of Offender Profiling', in Bull, R. and Carson, D. (eds) *Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts*. Chichester: John Wiley.

Chenery, S., Ellingworth, D., Tseloni, A. and Pease, K. (1996) 'Crimes Which Repeat: Undigested Evidence from the British Crime Survey 1992'. *International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention* 1, 207-216.

Chenery, S., Holt, J. and Pease, K. (1997) *Biting Back II: Reducing Repeat Victimisation in Huddersfield* Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 82. London: Home Office.

Davis, R., Taylor, B.G. and Titus, R.M. (1997) 'Victims as Agents: Implication for Victim Services and Crime Prevention', in Davis, R.C., Lurigio, A.J. and Skogan, W.G. (eds) *Victims of Crime* (2nd ed). London: Sage.

Eck, J.E. and Weisburd, D. (1995) (eds) *Crime and Place*. Monsey NY: Willow Tree Press.

Ellingworth, D., Far rell, G. and Pease, K. (1995) 'A Victim is a Victim is a Victim: Chronic Victimisation in Four Sweeps of the British Crime Survey'. *British Journal of Criminology* 35, 360-365.

Ellingworth, D., Osborn, D., Trickett, A. and Pease, K. (1997) 'Lifestyle and Prior Victimisation: A Logit Analysis of Crime Risk'. *International Review of Victimology*

Ericsson, U. (1995) 'Straight from the Horse's Mouth'. *Forensic Update* 43, 23-25.

Farrell, G. (1995) 'Predicting and Preventing Revictimisation', in Tonry, M. and Farrington, D.P. (eds) Building a Safer Society. Crime and Justice 19. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Farrell, G. and Buckley, A. (1998) 'Prevalence, Incidence and Concentration of Domestic Violence in Merseyside'. *Howard Journal* In press.

Farrell, G., Phillips, C. and Pease, K. (1995) 'Like Taking Candy: Why Does Repeat Victimisation Occur?' *British Journal of Criminology* 35, 384-399.

Farrell, G. and Pease, K. (1993) *Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat Victimisation and Its Implications for Crime Prevention* Crime Prevention Unit Paper 46. London: Home Office.

Farrell, G. and Pease, K. (1997) 'Repeat Victim Support' *British Journal of Social Work*, vol 27, *103-113*. .

Fienberg, S.E. (1980) 'Statistical Modelling in the Analysis of Repeat Victimisation', in Fienberg, S.E. and Reiss, A.J. (eds) *Indicators of Crime and Criminal Justice: Quantitative Studies* Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Forrester, D., Chatterton, M. and Pease, K. (1988) *The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, Rochdale*. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 13. London: Home Office.

Forrester, D., Frenz, S., O'Connor, M. and Pease, K. (1990) *The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II*. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 23. London: Home Office.

Gill, M. and Matthews, R. (1994) *Raids on Banks*. Centre for the Study of Public Order: University of Leicester.

Gill, M. and Pease, K. (1998) 'Repeat Robbers: How Are They Different?', in Gill, M. (ed) *Crime at Work: Studies in Security and Crime Prevention*. Leicester: Perpetuity Press.

Goldstein, H. (1990) *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hesseling, R.D.P. (1994) 'Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature', in Clarke, R.V. (ed) *Crime Prevention Studies*. 2. Monsey NY: Willow Tree Press.

Holt, J.F. (1996) *Repeat Victimisation: A Basic Implementation Model for Divisional Crime Management*. Unpublished. Wakefield: West Yorkshire Police.

Hope, T. (1994) *'Unpacking the Crime Rate'*. paper to the American Society of Criminology, November 1994.

Hope, T. (1995) 'The Flux of Victimisation'. *British Journal of Criminology*, 35, 327-342.

Jackson J.L., van Koppen P.J. and Herbrink, J.C.M. (1993) *Does the Service Meet the Needs?* NSCR 93-05, University of Leiden.

Johnson S.D., Bowers, K. and Hirschfield, A. (1997) 'New Insights into the Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Repeat Victimisation'. *British Journal of Criminology*, 37, 224-241.

Kelling, G. and Coles, C.M. (1996) *Fixing Broken Windows*. New York: Free Press.

Lauritsen, J.L. and Davis Quinet, K.F. (1995) 'Repeat Victimisation among Adolescents and Young Adults'. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 11, 143-166.

Litton, R.A. (1997) 'Crime Prevention and the Insurance Industry', in Felson, M. and Clarke, R.V. (eds) *Business and Crime Prevention*. Monsey NY: Willow Tree Press.

Lloyd, S., Far rell, G. and Pease, K. (1994) *Preventing Repeated Domestic Violence: A Demonstration Project on Merseyside*. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 49. London: Home Office.

Mayhew, P. and Elliott, D. (1990) 'Self-reported offending, victimisation, and the British Crime Survey'. *Victims and Violence* 5, 83-96.

Miller, T.R., Cohen, M.A. and Wiersema, B. (1996) *Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look*. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.

Mirrlees-Black, C. and Ross, A. (1995) *Crime against retail and manufacturing premises: findings from the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey*. Research Study 146. London: Home Office RSD.

Mirrlees-Black, C., Mayhew, P. and Percy, A. (1996) *The 1996 British Crime Survey*. Home Office Statistical Bulletin 19/96. London: Home Office RSD.

Moore, M.H. (1995) 'Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Prevention', in Tonry, M. and Farrington, D.P. (eds) *Building a Safer Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nelson, J.F. (1980) 'Multiple Victimisation in American Cities: A Statistical Analysis of Rare Events'. *American Journal of Sociology* 85, 870-891.

Osborn, D., Ellingworth, D., Hope, T. and Trickett, A. (1995) *The Puzzle of Victimisation: Are Multiple Victims Different?* School of Economic Studies, University of Manchester. Discussion Paper 9512.

Pease, K. and Laycock, G. (1996) *Reducing the Heat on Hot Victims*. Washington: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Polvi, N., Looman, T., Humphries, C. and Pease, K. (1990) 'Repeat Break and Enter Victimisation: Time Course and Crime Prevention Opportunity'. *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 17: 8-11.

Read, T. and Oldfield, D. (1995) *Local Crime Analysis*. Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 65. London: Home Office.

Reiss, A.J. (1980) 'Victim Proneness in Repeat Victimisation by Type of Crime', in Fienberg, S.E. and Reiss, A.J. (eds) *Indicators of Crime and Criminal Justice: Quantitative Studies* Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Rossmo, K.D. (1995a) 'Place, Space and Police Investigations', in Eck, J.E. and Weisburd, D. (eds) *Crime and Place* Monsey NY: Willow Tree Press.

Rossmo, K.D. (1995b) 'Targeting Victims: Serial Killers and the Urban Environment', in O'Reilly-Fleming, T. (ed) *Serial and Mass Murder: Theory, Research and Policy* Toronto: Scholars Press.

Sampson, A. and Phillips, C. (1992) *Multiple Racial Attacks on an East London Estate*. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 36. London: Home Office.

Sampson, A. and Phillips, C. (1995) *Reducing Repeat Racial Victimisation on an East London Estate* Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 67. London: Home Office.

Schafer, S. (1968) *The Victim and his Criminal: A Study in Functional Responsibility* New York: Random House.

Shaw, M.K. (1997) *Fear of Crime in Greater Manchester: The Relative Importance of Repeat Victimisation and Gender* Unpublished PhD Thesis. Manchester University: Department of Geography.

Sherman, L. (1989) 'Repeat Calls for Police Service: Policing the Hot Spots', in Kenney, D.J. (ed) *Police and Policing: Contemporary Issues* New York: Praeger.

Sherman, L. (1992) 'Attacking Crime: Policing and Crime Control', in Tonry, M. and Morris, N. (eds) *Modern Policing* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sherman, L. (1995) 'Hot Spots of Crime and Criminal Careers of Places', in Eck, J.E. and Weisburd, D. (eds) *Crime and Place* Monsey NY: Willow Tree Press.

Sparks, R.F. (1981) 'Multiple Victimisation: Evidence, Theory and Future Research'. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 72, 762-778.

Spelman, W. (1995a) 'Once Bitten, Then What? Cross-sectional and Time-course Explanations of Repeat Victimisation'. *British Journal of Criminology* 32, 81-89.

Spelman, W. (1995b) 'Criminal Careers of Public Places', in Eck, J.E. and Weisburd, D. (eds) *Crime and Place*. Monsey NY: Willow Tree Press.

Tilley, N. (1993) *After Kirkholt: Theory, Method, and Results of Replication*. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 47. London: Home Office.

Tilley, N. (1995) *Thinking about Crime Prevention Performance Indicators*. Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 57. London: Home Office.

Trickett, A., Osborn, D., Seymour, J. and Pease, K. (1992) 'What is Different About High Crime Areas?' *British Journal of Criminology*, 32, 81-89.

Tseloni, A. and Pease, K. (1997) 'Nuisance Phone Calls to Women in England and Wales'. *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research*.

Tseloni, A. and Pease, K. (1998) 'Repeat Victimisation and Policing: Who Gets Burgled, Where and How Often?', in Wikstrom, P.O., Skogan, W. and Sherman, L. (eds) *Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention*. New York: Wadsworth.

Von Hentig, H. (1940) *The Criminal and His Victim*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Webb, J. (1997) *Direct Line Homesafe: An Evaluation of the First Year*. Nottingham: Janice Webb Research.

Winkel, F.W. (1991) 'Police, Victims and Crime Prevention: Some Research-Based Recommendations and Victim-Oriented Interventions'. *British Journal of Criminology*, 31, 250-265.

Wood, J., Wheelwright, G. and Burrows, J. (1997) *Crime Against Small Business: Facing the Challenge*. Swindon: Crime Concern.

RECENT POLICE RESEARCH GROUP CRIME DETECTION AND PREVENTION SERIES PAPERS:

73. **Forensic Science and Crime Investigation.** Nick Tilley and Andy Ford. 1996.

74. **Policing Problem Housing Estates.** Sheridan Morris. 1996.

75. **Problem-Orientated Policing: Brit Pop.** Adrian Leigh, Tim Read and Nick Tilley. 1996.

76. **Shop Theft: Improving the Police Response.** Helen McCulloch. 1996.

77. **Solving Residential Burglary.** Timothy Coupe and Max Griffiths. 1996.

78. **Armed Robbery: Two Police Responses.** Roger Matthews. 1996.

79. **Tackling Cross Border Crime.** Mike Porter. 1996.

80. **Tackling Local Drug Markets.** Mark Edmunds, Michael Hough and Norman Urquia. 1996.

81. **Tackling Rural Drug Problems: A Participatory Approach**. Norman Davidson, Louise Sturgeon-Adams and Coral Burrows. 1997.

82. **Biting Back II: Reducing Repeat Victimisation in Huddersfield.** Sylvia Chenery, John Holt and Ken Pease. 1997.

83. **Keeping Track? Observations on Sex Offender Registers in the U.S.** Bill Hebenton and Terry Thomas. 1997.

84. **Policing Racially Motivated Incidents.** Warwick Maynard and Tim Read. 1997.

85. **Getting the Grease to the Squeak: Research Lessons for Crime Prevention.** Michael Hough and Nick Tilley. 1998..

86. **Clubs, Drugs and Doormen.** Sheridan Morris. 1998.

87. **Tackling Street Robbery: A Comparative Evaluation of Operation Eagle Eye.** Janet E. Stockdale and Peter J.Gresham. 1998.

88. **The Nature and Extent of Light Commercial Vehicle Theft.** Rick Brown and Julie Saliba. 1998.

89. **Police Anti-Drugs Strategies: Tackling Drugs Together Three Years On.** Tim Newburn and Joe Elliott. 1998.