

Tilley Award 2006

Application form

Please ensure that you have read the guidance before completing this form. By making an application to the awards, entrants are agreeing to abide by the conditions laid out in the Guidance. Please complete the following form in full and within the word limit. Failure to do so could result in disqualification from the competition.

Completed application forms should be e-mailed to Tricia Perkins; patricia.perkins@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

All entries must be received by noon on Friday 28th April 2006. No entries will be accepted after this time/date. Any queries on the application process should be directed to Tricia Perkins on 0207 035 0262. Any queries regarding other aspects of the awards should be directed to Michael Wilkinson on 0207 035 0247 or Lindsey Poole on 0207 035 0234.

Please tick box to indicate whether the entry should be considered for the main award, the criminal damage award or both;

Main award

Criminal Damage Award

Both Awards

1. Details of application

Title of the project: **Summer Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaign**

Name of force/agency/CDRP: **Greater Manchester Police**

Name of one contact person with position/rank (this should be one of the authors):

C/Inspector Dominic Scally

Email address: Dominic.scally@gmp.police.uk

Full postal address:

GMP Salford Division
Swinton Police Station
Chorley Road
Salford M27 6AZ

Telephone number: 0161 856 5202

Name of endorsing senior representatives(s)

Alan Green

Position and rank of endorsing senior representatives(s)

Deputy Chief Constable

Full address of endorsing senior representatives(s)

GMP Force HQ
Chester House
Boyer Street
Manchester M16 0RE

2. Summary of application

In no more than 400 words please use this space to describe your project. Include details of the problem that was addressed a description of the initiative, the main intervention principles and what they were designed to achieve, the main outcomes of project particularly in relation to the problem, evidence was used in designing the programme and how the project is evaluated.

In January 2005, a consultation paper was published by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Office of The Deputy Prime Minister, and The Home Office. Entitled 'Drinking Responsibly: The Governments Proposals'. The paper established some disturbing facts concerning the nature and extent of violent crime in Britain.

In the year 2002/03, there were 1.2 million reported incidents of alcohol related violent crime, this representing 44% of all recorded violent crime in Britain. Whilst the physical and emotional cost to the victims is immeasurable, the financial cost in terms of crime and disorder amounts to £7.3 billion per annum.

The consultation paper made it clear that reliance on the maintenance and management of criminal activity associated with excessive drinking was not a viable option, and that a robust policy of eradication was required.

To that end, reference was made to two earlier Home Office publications, the 'Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England' (March 2004), and a 'Public Health White Paper' of that same year. Both these documents made it clear that a partnership approach, embracing both statutory and non-statutory crime and disorder reduction partners, was needed to secure real reductions in alcohol related violent crime.

In achieving this aim, the Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP) was established, with The Home Office Police Standards Unit and The Prime Ministers Delivery Unit taking joint lead. In the first instance, the TVCP focused on the 22 Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships and 24 Basic Command Units experiencing the highest levels of violent crime.

Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and Basic Command Units were organised in groups of 10-15, with the focus on two main violent crime issues, these being violence in the night time economy, and domestic violence.

As the Salford Division accounted for 1% of all violent crime it was allocated to the second tranche, and responded with a series of Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaigns (AMEC) in the summer of 2005.

In considering its direction, the Salford AMEC sought to balance national guidelines with local priorities, as determined by the TVCP and The City of the Salford Community Safety Strategy 2005/08.

Whilst strategies are in place on the Salford Division to address both violence in the night time economy and domestic violence, this project concentrates on alcohol related violence within the night time economy, with the focus on two overarching themes within the Tackling Violent Crime Programme:

- Robust enforcement.
- Effective partnership working.

The project uses three consecutive AMEC operations undertaken on the Salford Division during the summer of 2005 as a means of demonstrating our response to the Tackling Violent Crime Programme. By using the SARA problem solving model and PESTEL analysis to examine the true nature and extent of the problem at a local level, we have developed areas of best practice on which to base future campaigns.

3. Description of project

Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaign

Describe the project following the guidance given in no more than 4000 words

The rise in alcohol related violent crime was identified as a national issue by The Home Office Police Standards Unit (PSU), and The Prime Ministers Delivery Unit (PMDU), both joint leads in The Governments Tackling Violent Crime Programme (TVCP).

The programme focuses on two key elements; strategy review and practitioner support, and enforcement within the key crime areas of domestic violence and violence in the night time economy.

Following an evidence based review of violent crime, which used baseline violent crime statistics from 01/01/2003 – 31/12/2003 to research volumes of most serious violence within Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) across England and Wales, a tiered system was introduced whereby Basic Command Units (BCU) were organised in tranches of ten to fifteen.

The Salford Division was found to account for 1% of all violent crime in England and Wales, and was accordingly allocated to tranche two, alongside North and South Manchester, Bolton, North and South Liverpool, and The Wirral.

In considering its response, the Salford Division looked to the TVCP draft guidance document, which promoted rigorous engagement with key stakeholders combined with a robust enforcement policy.

Further direction was found in figures taken from previous AMEC campaigns, which showed that a partnership approach had seen the issue of some 7,750 Fixed Penalty Notices, and had resulted in 11,000 arrests, with alcohol being confiscated from over 12,000 adults and minors.

These factors combined with local priorities to drive the analysis upon which the Salford Division based its response.

Defining The Problem:

Whilst the issue of alcohol related violent crime was raised at a national level by The Home Office, the need to develop a local response lead our analysis of the relationship between alcohol and violent crime in the Salford area.

Our first action was to generate a SARA problem solving package within the Operational Policing Unit (OPU).

Initial scanning and analysis of the problem was undertaken, and a combination of qualitative and quantitative information was obtained from Police crime recording systems, Community Beat Inspectors, and The Department of Trading Standards.

Our analysis revealed that the period 01/12/2004 - 31/05/2005 saw 1640 violent crimes reported in the City of Salford (less crimes of domestic violence). A figure, which translates into 70 serious woundings, and 1570 less serious woundings.

Three separate violent crime hot-spots were identified, two in the Barton Ward, and one in the Langworthy Ward. Identified hot-spot areas were highlighted.

Further analysis revealed a sharp peak in violent crime between the hours of 22:30 – 02:30, with Friday, Saturday and Sunday evenings accounting for 63% of all reported violent crime. The worst affected area was seen to be the Barton Ward, with Eccles town centre showing a peak in violent crime on Saturday evenings. Statistically, 10% of all violent crime in this hot spot area was alcohol related, though a degree of under reporting was suspected, and the actual figure was believed to be significantly higher.

On the basis of this analysis it was decided that Eccles town centre, and main approach route, referred to locally as 'The Liverpool Road Corridor' would be the focus of our operational response.

Analysis of Target Area:

Eccles town centre sits at the heart of Salford, and combines high-rise living for the elderly with a compact shopping precinct, and a high concentration of public houses. The main pedestrian and vehicular access route is via Liverpool Road, which again combines local authority housing with retail outlets, including off-license premises and fast food restaurants.

The economic viability of the area has suffered in recent years due to the success of large-scale shopping centres such as The Trafford Centre and West One Retail Park.

Many of the commercial and retail properties located on the Liverpool Road corridor stand empty, and have been secured with steel roller shutters which contribute towards the Neighbourhood Deterioration Phenomenon.

This serves to increase the fear of crime amongst members of the public and leads to residential abandonment of the streets, which in turn provides the criminal with the anonymity required to commit crime. Such is the case in Eccles town centre where alcohol driven youths, intent on committing acts of violence, have effectively claimed ownership of the night time economy.

Our final analysis concludes that in the months preceding our planned operation, specifically April, May and June 2005, 48 incidents of violent crime were reported in the target area. The peak offending times were between 18:00 and 02:00, with offences being committed by both males and females between the ages of 15 and 25. The majority of offences were committed in the immediate vicinity of on and off-license premises, with primary offences of public order, assault, and damage being recorded.

Our analysis complete, the Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub-Group was formed consisting of representatives from all partner agencies.

Our Objectives:

In defining our objectives we took direction from The Police Standards Unit publication 'Lessons From the Summer 2004 AMEC', and sought to achieve a balance between national guidelines, and local priorities as determined by the City of Salford Community Safety Strategy 2005-08:

Home Office TVCP	City of Salford Community safety Strategy 2005-08.
Reduce volumes of violent crime in England & Wales.	Reduce crime by 21% by March 2008.
Improve Police & wider CDRP performance, & partnership working.	Reduce Assaults & Wounding by 6% by March 2006.
Focus on CDRP's with largest proportion of more serious violence (MSV).	Reduce juvenile nuisance by 7% by March 2006.
ID best practice & support mechanisms to improve local strategies, funding to implement strategies, & enforcement campaigns.	Reduce the number of licensed premises selling to under 18's by 50% by March 2008.

“Ensure that local priorities and challenges inform central policy”

[Home Office TVCP].

Our Overreaching aims:

Achieve a 25% reduction in alcohol related violent crime within a three month period, specifically July, August and September 2005.

Develop a robust enforcement policy, with the flexibility to transfer to alternative hot-spot areas.

Engage with all relevant partner agencies, and develop effective working protocols.

Identify and secure funds through which to support the campaign.

Build positive links with the licensing community [prior to enforcement of new licensing legislation under The Licensing Act 2003, as amended 24th November 2005]

Identify and develop areas of best practice.

Work towards a sustainable exit strategy.

Our success criteria:

A reduction in alcohol related violent crime in the target area.

The development of a robust enforcement policy, which secures the confidence and support of all partners.

The development of a Summer AMEC campaign, which is proven to be rich in resource, and which flows into a sustainable end effective exit strategy.

Conclusive analysis to demonstrate that the Division has maximised the potential of its physical and financial resources, thereby providing a sound evidence base for future funding applications.

Our Response:

Our response followed two key themes:

Lessons learned from the Summer 2004 AMEC.

Analysis of the issue at a local level.

The Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub-Group initially met to establish the aims and objectives of the Salford Summer AMEC; thereafter their purpose was to monitor its direction and progress, and to identify and address problems as they arose. A specimen agenda and draft action plan from the group is attached at Appendix D.

The Divisional lead for the TVCP was identified as CI Dominic Scally, with our Local Authority Liaison Officer, Insp Alan Smith, taking the lead on partnership issues through the Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub-Group.

Operational planning issues were addressed by Insp. Glenn Jones and Sgt. David Henthorne, both based at the Operational Policing Unit at Swinton Sub-Divisional Headquarters. In this manner, all aspects of the campaign were managed by key personnel, with accountability being secured through the Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub-Group.

Our initial application for Home Office funds was completed by Sgt Henthorne.

Essentially, the bid required the Home Office to fund two-thirds of the summer AMEC campaign, with the remaining costs being met from BCU funds. Sgt Henthorne calculated that the sum of £4,659.18 would be required for each of three proposed operations. The total bid amounted to £13,977.54, and included a contingency factor of 10% to cover any unforeseen circumstances.

The success of our funding bid allowed us to plan a series of summer AMEC campaigns, the logistics of which were

determined by The Tasking and Co-ordinating Group through The Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub-Group, and driven by our analysis of the problem at a local level:

Summer AMEC Campaigns

The campaigns were run over three weekends, specifically:

Friday – Sunday 29/07/05 – 31/07/05

Friday – Sunday 26/08/05 – 28/08/05

Friday – Sunday 23/09/05 – 25/09/05

During the course of the campaign a combination of overt and covert tactics were employed by police and partner agencies. Operational Orders were published outlining the campaign.

The thrust of the weekend activities was as follows:

Friday and Saturday evenings – Parade 18:00 hrs / Stand down & Debrief 01:30

Two overt police teams (PSU) were deployed, each consisting of one Sergeant and five constables.

Sunday evenings – Parade 17:00 hrs / Stand down & Debrief 12:30.

One overt police team (PSU) was deployed, consisting of one Sergeant and five constables.

All briefing and debriefing was undertaken by an Operational Inspector.

Overt Arm of the Operation:

Deployment of PSU's was intelligence lead, with the focus on different areas of policing as the evenings progressed:

18:30 – 20:30 Engaged on high profile foot patrol, liaising with members of the public, and paying special attention to off-license premises on the Liverpool Road Corridor.

Officers were also directed to provide immediate support to test purchasing officers if required.

21:00 – 23:00 PSU supervision were to conduct VLP visits with partner agencies.

Constables were to provide a high profile presence on Church street (town centre) and around the Eccles interchange (bus station).

One officer was to work alongside town centre security in the Local Authority CCTV control room.

23:00 – 01:30 Officers concentrated their high profile patrols on flash-points such as the Taxi Rank on Church Street, and CCTV was used to gather intelligence and evidence.

Initially, the mounted section were to provide a high profile presence in Winton Park, however, they were redeployed at short notice, and foot patrols were deployed to this anti-social behaviour hot spot. Their remit was to confiscate alcohol from underage youths, obtain names and addresses, and identify the point of sale.

VLP's were carried out in partnership, both at identified top-ten premises, and at all other licensed premises on the Liverpool Road corridor, thereby negating the potential for displacement.

Two Polaroid cameras were made available to officers to support the evidence gathering process.

On each occasion, officers were instructed not to enter the immediate area of ongoing test purchase operations unless specifically required to do so, and one team of officers remained in the target area on the Sunday evening, to maintain a high profile presence.

Covert Arm of Operation

Plain clothes test purchasing officers were briefed independently of uniform personnel. Their briefing commenced at 17:00 hrs which effectively allowed one hours grace to begin test purchasing prior to the arrival of high profile police units.

Partners involved in the test purchasing and VLP visits were Trading Standards, HM Customs & Excise, the Local Authority Licensing department and the Police. Over the three month period a combined approach to off and on-licence visits secured the following positive results:

Trading Standards Returns

Test Purchasing & Underage Sales at Off-License Premises

	July	Aug	Sept	Total
No. of visits	46	13	11	70
No. of attempts	46	13	11	70

Type of Premises:

	July	Aug	Sept	Total
Convenience Stores	8	-	4	12
National Chains	3	-	-	3
Supermarkets	-	11	4	15

Trading Standards Returns

Test Purchasing & Underage Sales at On-license Premises.

	July	Aug	Sept	Total	
Joint visits		9	6	4	19
Police only visits		11	1	-	12
Visits to top 10 prems		5	4	-	9
Attempts at top 10 prems		4	-	-	4

This information was collated by the Operational Inspector during debrief sessions

Communication was considered an essential element of the campaign, with covert and overt teams using a combination of muted personal radios and mobile telephones to co-ordinate the evenings. Despite some briefings being made independently of others, the Operational Inspector ensured that all staff remained aware of their colleague's actions.

As there was no generic risk assessment available for partnership working within licensed premises, Sgt Henthorne undertook an operation specific risk assessment, which was acceptable to all partner agencies.

Problems Encountered During The Summer AMEC:

A number of problems were encountered during the course of the Salford Summer AMEC campaign. These were identified as short and medium-long term issues and addressed as follows;

Short Term:

Funding:

The original funding bid had included a 10% contingency factor, though as the campaign progressed it became clear that this figure was too high. Despite police officers being offered rest day overtime to resource the operation, an unforeseen number reported unfit for duty and did not therefore require remuneration. With this in mind, our subsequent funding bid for the November campaign was reduced to include a contingency factor of 2 ½ %.

Intelligence Gathering:

In preparing for the summer campaign, it was acknowledged that very little information was held on the police intelligence system in relation to on and off-license premises. Whilst details of all licensees were held by the Police Licensing Officer, the lack of historic information regarding actual premises made risk assessment very difficult.

To overcome this problem, the Licensing Officer, PC Allanson created an SRN on the police intelligence system for each of the target premises. Intelligence gathered during the course of the VLP's and test purchasing operations was handed to the Operational Inspector during debrief sessions. This was subsequently entered onto the intelligence system by PC Allanson, and will greatly assist officers in preparing for the November AMEC.

Lack of Ownership:

Feedback from our partners indicated that the first briefing seemed to lack co-ordination and ownership. It appeared that the test purchasing phase of the operation took longer than anticipated, and as other partners were scheduled to follow Trading Standards Officers in a second wave of visits, they felt that much time was wasted. This problem was easily rectified through consultation with all partners, and ownership thereafter was undertaken by Insp Jones and Sgt Henthorne of the OPU. These officers had written the Operational Orders, and were able to use their operational planning experience to effectively co-ordinate the campaigns.

VLP Feedback Forms:

A VLP feedback form was designed using an example of good practice from the Manchester City Centre 'Think-Safe, Drink-Safe' campaign. It soon became apparent that the Salford version was too lengthy and time consuming, and a second more comprehensive version was developed.

Sunday Evenings:

The partnership felt that their time and expertise were somewhat wasted on Sunday evenings when Eccles town centre and the Liverpool Road Corridor were relatively quiet. It was felt that this was due in part to the robust enforcement of the previous two nights. It was decided that a high profile police presence would be the more cost effective and risk commensurate option for future Sunday evenings, as this would provide the required exit strategy for each weekend's activities.

In looking towards the November campaign, best practice was taken from the Home Office publication 'Lessons from the Summer 2004 AMEC' which advocates a series of "sting operations – concentrated on Thursday, Friday and Saturday..."

Mounted Police:

The mounted section were to provide a high profile presence in Winton Park, and had been booked via the Force OPU for this purpose. Unfortunately, they were redeployed at the last moment, and foot patrols were required to patrol this anti-social behaviour hot spot. In undertaking the remit of the mounted section, foot patrols issued a number of Fixed Penalty Tickets, confiscated alcohol, and obtained parental details from underage youths in the area.

In retrospect, it was felt that whilst utilisation of the mounted section may have been a good public relations exercise, foot patrols were equally effective at achieving a high profile presence, whilst securing our operational aims. The mounted section have not been invited to support the November AMEC.

Taxi Rank / Taxi marshals:

Having identified the taxi-rank on Church Street in Eccles as a flash point for alcohol related violent crime, and in seeking to use examples of best practice, we considered the use of Taxi Marshals.

However, as Salford has no city centre per se, and as only one taxi rank was affected, this was considered neither viable nor cost effective. Policing this flash-point was achieved through a combination of high profile policing, and CCTV monitoring which came into effect from 23:30 hrs onwards. In this manner, valuable intelligence and evidence was gathered, under the direction of police personnel.

As an added deterrent, a liveried PSU vehicle was parked within sight of the taxi rank.

Risk Assessment:

There was no generic risk assessment for partnership working in licensed premises, and concerns were raised with regards to underage test purchasers working alongside police officers in potentially volatile situations. Whilst the nature of the operation itself was non-confrontational, it was acknowledged that underage test purchasers were being introduced into an environment conducive to violent crime, and issues of proportionality were considered.

Following consultation with Mr David Butterworth, Senior Trading Standard Officer, Sgt Henthorne prepared an operation specific risk assessment, which was included in all Operational Orders.

Internal Politics / Communication:

Problems arose within the Police and Fire Services where the diversion of duties was required. Initially, Police personnel were not given sufficient notice to change their duties. This was due in part to the timescales involved in planning the operations, and was identified as a potential weakness in early planning. Subsequent operations concentrated on forward planning and the use of rest day overtime to overcome this problem.

Fire service personnel were not offered the appropriate remuneration for diverting their duties to the weekend evenings. Initially, it was felt that they lacked commitment to the campaign, though subsequent liaison has revealed practical restrictions preventing their involvement in the joint visits to on and off-license premises.

Essentially, the Fire Safety Inspections undertaken by the Fire Safety Officers are lengthy inspections requiring the full attention of the licensee. It was not practical from a Fire Safety point of view to attempt such a high volume of visits when the premises were fully occupied, and the licensee distracted.

In addressing this problem, the Fire Service will continue to support the campaign through attendance at the Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub-Group, and will receive an intelligence driven list of top-ten target premises. The Fire safety Officers will then prioritise these targets during the normal course of their duties, and feed all information back through the sub-group.

Media Coverage.

Whilst well defined media coverage may have complimented our Summer AMEC campaign, we felt that it would compromise the covert side of our operations. Media coverage will therefore reinforce our impactful Christmas alcohol message, and will promote the positive results of both our Summer and November AMEC campaigns.

Medium – Long term Problems:

Historic Enforcement / Culture:

Historically, there was a lack of partnership activity and Police enforcement in the target area, and this combined with weak licensees to create an environment conducive to anti-social behaviour, underage sales, and the potential for violent crime. A culture had evolved whereby assaults and violence were accepted within the night time economy, and many incidents were not reported.

In facing this challenge, the Summer AMEC was used as a means of engaging with members of the public and licensees prior to the introduction of new licensing legislation on 24th November 2004.

The summer message was clear, support and education prior to the November deadline, when zero-tolerance and enforcement would be key to the campaign.

Local Shortage of Underage Test Purchasers:

It should be remembered that our test purchasers are volunteers working only with parental consent; parents who see daily news items concerning binge drinking and violence in the night time economy. Understandably, they are increasingly concerned for the safety and wellbeing of their children, and this has led to a shortage of underage test purchasers at a local level.

Whilst financial remuneration may not be appropriate, schemes are being considered by The Department of Trading Standards whereby test purchasers will receive reward vouchers, police certificates, and accreditation towards the Duke of Edinburgh Award, as a means of encouraging their continued support.

Evaluation:

In evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of our summer campaign we return to our overarching aims:

Whilst we did not achieve a 25% reduction in alcohol related violent crime in the target area, we are confident that the figures presented in Appendix J represent the positive benefits of a policing presence:

A positive culture change whereby violence and assaults are no longer acceptable.

An increase in reported crime due to the high profile police presence.

A reduction in the fear of crime, and increased public confidence as seen in the increased reporting figures.

A true picture of the nature and extent of alcohol related violent crime.

A sound evidence base upon which to plan the November AMEC.

A robust enforcement policy was effectively delivered; statistical evidence of which was derived from Trading Standards Returns. We engaged with all relevant partner agencies, and developed effective working protocols through The Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub-Group, for example the new working agreement with the Fire Service.

We also secured the support and confidence of our partners, a point confirmed in writing by Steven Sibbering, Senior Officer with HM Customs & Excise,

A successful Home Office funding bid, complimented by BCU funds, has enabled us to support this campaign, and meet all contingencies as they arose. Effective management of our financial resources during the summer AMEC has informed and enhanced our Home Office bid for the November AMEC campaign.

By adopting an educational and supportive approach to our Summer AMEC campaign, we forged positive links within the licensing community, leaving licensees and retailers better placed to meet the demands of the new licensing legislation, which will drive the November AMEC campaign.

Forward Strategy

We identified and developed areas of best practice on which to base future campaigns. These included:

- * The development of operation specific risk assessments.
- * The creation of SRN's on which to record premises based intelligence.
- * The development of Operational Orders with the flexibility to accommodate the varied requirements of our partners.

Wherever possible we developed areas of established best practice, such as our adaptation of the 'Think-Safe, Drink-Safe' VLP pro-forma, and have embraced the 'Lessons of the Summer 2004 AMEC' publication in our November AMEC campaign by concentrating our resources on the recommended days.

We continue to work towards a sustainable exit strategy:

Neighbourhood Management Teams have been briefed with all aspects of the summer AMEC campaign, and will continue to support the programme of education required to ensure compliance with The Licensing Act 2003 (as amended 24th November 2004).

Enforcement will be by means of police personnel working within the Neighbourhood Management Teams, using the skills and experience gained through the partnership, whilst retaining the support and guidance of The Alcohol and Violent Crime Sub Group.

The Police Operational Support Unit, which consists of one Sergeant and ten constables, will be deployed during the November AMEC and beyond, in a series of co-ordinated sting operations intended to execute warrants on known violent offenders.

Conclusion:

In concluding, we must return to our initial success criteria and accept that we were not successful in reducing alcohol related violent crime in the target area. However, considering the lack of historic enforcement and partnership activity, it may have been unrealistic to believe that such an established culture could be eradicated in a three month period.

What we have achieved is a greater understanding of the nature and extent of violent crime in the target area, and a more accurate picture on which to base future operations.

We were also successful in developing a Summer AMEC campaign rich in resource, partnership experience and insight, which can easily be transferred to alternative threat areas, and which flows easily into a sustainable exit strategy.

Our analysis of this campaign concludes that we have maximised the potential of our financial and physical resources, and have developed a strategy, which not only embraces national guidance, local priorities and changing legislation, but also proves our commitment to reducing crime in the night time economy.