




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TILLEY AWARD 2001

**CURFEW TARGETING STRATEGY
AT CHADDERTON**

26th April 2001



GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE



**1. CURFEW TARGETING STRATEGY
AT CHADDERTON**

2. CRIME REDUCTION CATEGORY

3. GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

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Nature of Problem

- 1.1 Integral to the power of the Police and Courts in controlling a criminals activity is the use of a curfew once that person has been charged or appeared before a court.
- 1.2 The curfew is a powerful weapon in the armoury of law enforcement as it severely restricts a persons liberty before conviction. The imposition of a curfew should deter that person from committing further criminal offences by restricting his/her freedom of movement.
- 1.3 If we acknowledge that the curfew is a powerful weapon in law enforcement what do we as a Police Force do to proactively monitor adherence to it or detect breaches of it?
- 1.4 The answer I discovered was NOTHING.

Evidence of the Problem

- 2.1 Crime Management Units throughout Greater Manchester Police stated they had no form of strategy towards the implementation or monitoring of curfews.
- 2.2 The implementation was haphazard often based on subjective rather than objective assessments.
- 2.3 The majority of staff were often unaware that a curfew had been imposed therefore checks on offenders were non existent.
- 2.4 If a curfew was imposed or ratified by a court then only the Crime Management Units were aware of it.
- 2.5 Offenders admitted that curfews were ineffective in controlling them as no physical checks took place.

Response to Problem

3.1 The implications of this neglect are obvious. We needed to put a system in place to take us from A-- B.

A. Known offenders caught.

Charged and placed on curfew

Breach of curfew

Commit offences

B. Known offenders caught

Charged and placed on curfew

Checked

Checked and in breach

Adheres to curfew
(no offences)

Arrested and kept in custody
(reduction of offences)

3.2 I therefore created a system that anyone on the sub-division could contribute to thereby giving ownership to everyone.

3.3 Custody staff were urged to impose curfews if the correct circumstances prevailed.

3.4 Prolific offenders were identified as curfew targets and checked by uniform staff during their night or afternoon shifts.

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- 3.5 Anyone found to be in breach of their curfew and not immediately arrested was arrested the next day by the early staff.
 - 3.6 An administration and intelligence system was created to make sure all offenders were ultimately charged with their breach offence.

Impact of the responses

- 4.1 Detection rates for burglary dwelling offences rose from 10.7 to 16.2 in the period of review (21 months). The reasons for this are highlighted in point 9.7 of the main document
- 4.2 During the evaluation, 139 targets were identified. Of these 118 were arrested for a variety of offences. Eighty (80) of these for breach of curfew.
- 4.3 Staff on the subdivision expressed enthusiasm for the initiative as it was not overly time consuming and they were witnessing prolific offenders being arrested and kept in custody.
- 4.4 An analysis of the crime figures in 1998, 1999 and 2000 as shown in point 9.9 of the main document indicates that such a strategy does have an impact on recorded crime

Background

1.1 The problem that I identified was a very simple one that had existed for many years and still exists for many Divisions and Forces. Over recent years I became increasingly aware that the majority of offences were committed by a minority of offenders who were constantly being caught by the police and placed before the Courts. Linked into this aspect of policing is that when these offenders are caught and knowing that they are prolific offenders the Police and Courts, if the correct circumstances prevail, would impose curfew conditions on these individuals in the hope that these would curtail that criminal's activity. How did the Police enforce these curfew conditions?

1.2 The curfew condition, in the main, relates to offenders who commit offences at night and by imposing a curfew on them they are required to remain indoors during certain hours of the evening or night. Thus imposing a sentence prior to trial let alone conviction,

1.3 The curfew conditions are a logical reaction to night time offenders in that by requiring them to remain indoors then one would infer that they cannot commit crime whilst being in their own home. This imposed restriction is an alternative to remanding someone in custody. My investigations into curfews found that a large percentage of people who had had curfew conditions placed on them had been kept in custody by the Police in the first instance and bailed by the Courts with the imposition of a curfew attached. The imposition of a curfew was usually requested by the Police if the Courts were of a mind to bail the offender.

1.4 However it is at this point that professionalism fades and is overtaken by unintentional complacency. There had developed within the police process a complacent attitude to arrested criminals. The general consensus was that once a criminal had been arrested, charged and given bail conditions then no more proactive work was needed on that person.

1.5 Recent studies have shown that drugs are responsible for a significant percentage of acquisitive crime and therefore if we have the correct intelligence on the criminal fraternity and we are able to identify the prolific offenders and arrest them then logic denotes that because of the severe addiction that some drug abusers have then the imposition of a curfew will not deter them from their criminal activity. The problem was

obvious; we did not have a strategy of any sorts to deal with prolific offenders who were on bail.

1.6 Therefore I realised that just by imposing a curfew condition on a criminal was not enough if we were to effectively prevent that person committing further crime. The curfew was ineffective unless we actively sought to make sure that the offender adhered to it.

Problem Identified

2.1 Bearing the above in mind and realising that my subdivision did nothing proactively to address the problem of offenders breaking their curfews I contacted every Crime Management Unit (now Operational Policing Unit) in Greater Manchester and found that no other Division did anything proactively either. It was down to good luck rather than good management if a person was arrested in breach of their curfew. My problem was how to create a system that encouraged a proactive response to curfew imposition.

Objectives

3.1 My objectives were simple:

- a) To identify prolific offenders who had been arrested.
- b) If circumstances permit get custody staff/Courts to impose curfew conditions.
- c) Put a system of curfew checks in place to monitor adherence to the system.
- d) To arrest those in breach of curfew.
- e) To have prolific offenders remanded in custody if they breach their curfew.
- f) As a result of the above to have a positive effect on the crime rate.
- g) To maintain the integrity and professionalism of Greater Manchester Police.

3.2 The objectives stemmed from an analysis of the situation at that time. Obviously there were no previous facts and therefore I started at point zero. The analysis was based on how to implement a strategy that was resource effective with as few cost implications as possible. It would be of no use creating a highly bureaucratic system that took time and resources away from day to day policing activities. I had to create a system that worked in conjunction with these activities and indeed complemented them.

Considerations

4.1 My initial point of contact was to discuss the idea with the Tasking and Co-ordinating Group led by the sub-divisional Chief Inspector Uniform Operations in conjunction with the Detective Sergeant in charge of the Crime Management Unit. We decided that in order for the system to work it must be:

- a) User friendly.
- b) Not time consuming.
- c) Easily understood and implemented.
- d) Everyone could have an input.

4.2 Therefore in devising a system that conformed to the above four principles this would lead to the Police giving a more professional response to crime by following the criminal from arrest through to conviction. Officers would also feel that they were an integral part of the full justice system and the fact that offenders were directly targeted would have a positive effect in this aspect. It was also hoped that with the implementation of this that reported offences would decline. Officers would get to know prolific offenders and as a consequence detections would rise,

4.3 Once the principles had been decided on then the next stop was to devise the actual system to be used.

Pre-Implementation Factors.

5.1 The Chadderton subdivision is divided into three distinct areas with a police station for each area - Royton, Chadderton and Failsworth. Through discussions it was decided that there would be a maximum of six named offenders (who had had curfew conditions imposed on them as a result of committing night time crime) for each specific area.

5.2 The whole of the sub division was canvassed by memo to inform them what was happening and to obtain any suggestions of likely offenders.

5.3 Part of the problem was to speak to the custody sergeants on each relief so that they knew exactly what was happening and to ensure that they knew their powers in relation to imposing a curfew and that these were fully utilised. I undertook this task.

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5.4 This information had to be effectively 'relayed back to the Crime Management Unit who had the task of composing the curfew target sheets.

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5.5 When I initially analysed the curfew system and found checks to be totally non-existent I also discovered that the Courts imposed curfew conditions on offenders and sent the bail sheets with the conditions on to the respective Crime Management Units on a daily basis. What did they do with this information? They updated the intelligence system and filed it. Nothing proactive was done to monitor such a situation. Therefore, once the strategy was being developed, the inclusion of such information was vital. As the courts had chosen to bail these often prolific offenders rather than remand them in custody it appeared to me that these were exactly the people that warranted some further Police attention.

5.6 The initial need of such a strategy was to gain the confidence of the staff who would implement it. So in the discussions with the Tasking and Co-ordinating Group we decided to erect specific notice boards at each station. These boards would only contain the photograph of each curfew target for that given week. Also included would be the offenders home address, their date of birth and the specific curfew conditions that related to that specific person. No other information was to be placed on the boards. Later feedback on this proved positive. Staff were going to addresses armed not only with all the facts but with the certain knowledge of what the offender looked like. The Crime Management Unit were responsible for updating the photographs when a target changed.

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Curfew System.

6.1 The actual target list, as compiled by the Crime Management Unit, would be included in the 'night package' given to the shift Inspector at the start of their night week; which in our case was Friday night.

6.2 The night relief would be responsible for checking the targeted offenders at least twice during their set of nights.

6.3 The curfew list would be updated as to the result of these checks.

6.4 If a targeted offender did breach his/her curfew and could not be arrested immediately then the checking officer would write out a statement identifying the breach and leave it for the morning relief to arrest the offender.

6.5 It was the responsibility of the initial checking officer to update that particular offenders intelligence on the computerised intelligence system.

6.6 If the morning staff were unable to arrest the offender then the statement was submitted to the Crime Management Unit who held a file on outstanding offenders. The intelligence system was updated as to the location of the statement so that if they were arrested anywhere else and their intelligence file checked, as it should be, then the arresting officer would know that that person was wanted for a breach of curfew and they would also know exactly where the statement of evidence was to prove the offence.

Initial Problems Identified and Resolved.

7.1 During the course of the strategy regular updates were sought by the Tasking and Co-ordinating Group as to the progress of the initiative. Some problems were identified early on.

7.2 Officers did not update the computer re breaches of curfew.

7.3 Offenders were arrested for crimes after they had breached their curfew and the breach of curfew file nor intelligence were checked and therefore offenders escaped being charged.

7.4 In order to deal with these items as part of the regular review mechanism I had to retain control of the system and implement subtle changes.

7.5 In dealing with 7.2 staff were given memos as to the correct procedure to follow. I regularly required reports of officers who had failed to charge with an historical breach of curfew offence.

7.6 In dealing with 7.3 I decided to move the breach of curfew file into the custody office where the custody staff would have full knowledge of who is in the file. This would

assist officers not only on our Division but also officers on other Divisions as the custody office is staffed 24 hours a day and. the Crime Management Unit is not staffed at night.

Further Problems.

8.1 The results of the curfew checks identified that initially the majority of offenders did not adhere to their curfews. It was if they had never been imposed. However, as the initiative gained momentum several things needed to be adjusted as we reviewed our position.

8.2 I found that a small hard core of the more prolific offenders just stopped themselves or their families from answering the door to the Police. Therefore we were unable to tell whether they were in or out and thus we could not breach them. As the legislative power in relation to curfews does not include a power of entry into that person's house then this did and still does cause problems. On a positive note from this I found that it was generally the case that officers 'knew' when an offender was in or out of the house. If they got no answer and they felt the offender was actually out then they alerted other patrols to this possibility so that the whole shift knew whom to keep an eye out for.

8.3 The custody staff at the inception of this initiative made it a condition of the curfew to 'make yourself available to Police during the hours of curfew' i.e. allow the Police to see you when they check up on your adherence to the curfew. When the Human Rights Act came into force the Crown Prosecution Service informed me that we could not enforce such a condition as it would breach the offender's rights. Therefore we cannot make an offender show themselves to the Police. If we attend an address and a parent/spouse or partner say that the offender is in then we are obliged to believe them. An obvious flaw in the system that needs a legislative remedy.

8.4 One of the major concerns that did arise with this initiative was that when an offender breached their bail and was not arrested prior to attending court the breach offence was lost if he appeared at court. The Crown Prosecution Service initially stated that they would not accept charging at court as an option and if we wanted to proceed with the breach offence then the offender must be arrested at Court prior to the case. This left us with a delicate situation. Did we send someone to Court and arrest the person prior to their court appearance thereby creating confusion in the administration of the judicial

system or did we allow them to attend court and ignore the breach of curfew offence? At the start of the initiative we took the latter option for two reasons:

- a) The administrative problems an arrest at Court would cause.
- b) Could we afford an officer to go to Court?

8.5 However there has been a change of heart at the Crown Prosecution Service since August 2000. They will now allow offenders to be additionally charged at Court if all the requisite paperwork is attached to the original file: This will now ensure that every person who breaches their curfew will go before the Court to answer a charge for that offence.

Evaluation of the System.

9.1 It can be seen that the administration of the system was put in place relatively quickly and has been subject of a constant review throughout. Once the system was in place and had been so for several months the sub division was visited by the Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police in August 1997. He noted that the initiative was a potential source of good practice and directed that a full evaluation was carried out by the Development and Inspectorate Department. The evaluation was conducted by Inspector Peter Woods. The evaluation involved checking the system as to its workability; speaking to officers of all ranks and examining the records in relation to the system.

9.2 The results Inspector Woods published were quite eye catching. The main results are listed in his evaluation report that is attached, notably items 3.1 to 3.7. Perhaps the two most prominent points are listed at 3.1 and 3.7:

3.1 "Between 20/1/97 and 24/5/98 139 targets were identified. Of these 118 were arrested. Eighty (68%) were arrested for breach of curfew

3.7 relates to the detection rates for burglary dwelling. In the 30 months prior to the initiative it was 10.7% this increased to 16.2% in the 21 month period following the introduction of the initiative.

9.3 One particular offender was identified for mention in the evaluation. This offender named Shane, who's arrest resulted in 500 various offences being taken into consideration. The story behind this arrest is worth relating. Officers attended at his address in order to check on his curfew adherence. His mother stated that he was out but

when we caught him we could ask him questions about a load of property that he had just dumped in her kitchen! Officers recovered the property and found it stemmed from a local burglary. Shane was arrested shortly after and decided to unburden himself of all his crimes. This result may well have been lost if the officers had not conducted the initial curfew check.

9.4 Inspector Woods identified the perceived benefits of the system:

- a) Keeping local criminals under threat of arrest.
- b) Removing active criminals from circulation.
- c) Keeping crime down by targeting recidivists.
- d) Someone is arrested each week for breach of bail.

9.5 The system utilised several members of the Crime Management Unit who described their work on the initiative as only taking up a small amount of their time.

9.6 The advantages of the initiative were identified in the report from 5.1 to 5.4:

- a) Very successful in terms of breach of bail arrests.
- b) Impact of arrests were difficult to quantify but some had a clear on detection rates (Shane).
- c) In view of the high percentage of targets arrested then it is likely to have had an impact in terms of prevented crime as the targets are the most active criminals.
- d) It had the support of the officers. It did not displace their work but rather was accommodated beside it.

9.7 Other advantages are:

- a) Officers get to know active criminals in their area.
- b) Officers in meeting active criminals could cultivate them as informants.
- c) The whole initiative has very minimal cost implications.

9.8 Inspector Woods recommended the enforcement of curfew conditions should be adopted as good practice throughout the Force.

9.9 In relation to the prevention of crime I looked at the recorded crimes for 1998, 1999 and 2000 from January to December in each year for certain offences:

OFFENCE	1998	1999	2000	d °(99'- 0)
Burglary in a Dwelling	1,931	1,686	1,674	-0.7%
Burglary other than in a Dwelling	1,738	1,747	1,599	-8.5%
Theft of motor vehicle	1,815	1,895	1,574	-16.9%
Theft from motor vehicle	1,870	2,081	1,694	-18.6%
Wounding	70	58	62	+6.8%
Assaults	1,202	1,287	1,374	+6.7%
Robbery	214	292	369	+26%

These figures obviously make good reading in certain aspects and are not totally attributable to this initiative but it is an intricate part of the whole strategy that the sub division employs to combat crime. Logic would denote that if you incarcerate the active criminals then it has a knock on effect on the crime rate. The high robbery figures are commensurate with the rise in robberies over the whole country however the figures read in a more positive light when the results of two robbery operations are looked at namely Toon and Fishboume. These two offenders were targeted in specific operations and arrested. They have been charged with many offences and were believed to have committed over 100. Toon himself admitted in excess of 35 robberies which were drug related. This would indicate that the overall robbery situation is in fact much better than the figures read. The rise in minor assaults is almost certainly as a result of new counting and recording procedures and not as a result in any specific rise in violent crime. Many crimes that used to go unrecorded are now recorded as crimes with no further action needed other than recording as generally the aggrieved person does not wish to assist a prosecution,

Unavoidable Problems Highlighted By The Initiative.

10.1 The police have to arrest and charge the offenders before they can impose curfew conditions. This in effect can cause a peak and trough effect, The active criminal commits crime which causes that person to come to the attention of the Police (peak). They are eventually arrested and placed on a curfew. They will either conform to the curfew or get arrested for breaching it (trough). This is why the crime figures can never be wholly predicted as the whole initiative is dependant on an offender committing crime and eventually being arrested and being placed on a curfew. The essence of the initiative only targets night time crime.

10.2 An examination of the particular effects of the initiative also highlighted the problem of juveniles and the inability of the system to effectively deal with such miscreants. The following two case histories highlight the problem:

Case1: Stephen aged 13 years

08.6.00 Commits violent robbery on pensioner. Charged with curfew
12.9.00 Breaches bail, arrested, charged. Court bail with same curfew
29.01.01 Arrested for car theft, court. Given bail with same curfew.
30.01.01 Breaches bail, arrested, charged. Court bail with same curfew.
03.02.01 Breaches bail, arrested, charged. Court bail with same curfew.
12.02.01 Arrested car theft plus breach, charged. Court bail with curfew.
14.02.01 Breaches bail, arrested, charged. Court bail with same curfew.
Case still on going.

Case2: Sebastian aged 16 years

Oct 00 Arrested burglary, charged. Given bail with curfew.
Nov 00 Arrested car theft. Charged. Bail given with curfew.
Nov 00 Breaches bail, arrested, charged. Court bail same conditions.
12.12.00 Breaches bail, arrested, charged. Court bail same conditions.
14.12.00 Breaches bail, arrested, charged. Court bail same conditions.
Late December, 2000 given 8 months at Young Offenders Institute.

Both these cases highlight the problem of juvenile crime and how to effectively deal with it, There are 'many examples of this in relation to juveniles. Juvenile crime often covers such areas as theft from motor vehicle and burglary other (sheds). It makes enforcement of the law more difficult if persistent offenders see arrest as a minor irritation as in the short term nothing appears to happen to them.

Conclusion.

11.1 Having identified a problem with the policing strategy on my subdivision a course of action was taken to implement an initiative whereby offenders were proactively targeted if they were released on bail either by the Police or Courts with curfew conditions attached. A system was devised and implemented to assist this targeting. The whole initiative was created from scratch and would appear to have been successfully implemented,

11.2 The independent evaluation of the initiative shows that it worked as it was desired to do in that:

- a) it was user friendly.
- b) it was not time consuming.
- c) it was easily understood and implemented.
- d) everyone can have an input.

11.3 The results of the analysis strongly indicate that prior to the initiative's inception offenders paid little heed to the imposition of a curfew as so many were arrested in breach of it.

11.4 Logic denotes that if prolific offenders are incarcerated then the resultant crime trends may change for the better. Therefore, to arrest an adult offender in breach of a curfew gives rise to the chance that a court will remand that person in custody thereby inhibiting his chances of committing further crime. There is also the chance that the offender receives a greater punishment than they would have otherwise have got.

11.5 As the system has progressed it has become apparent that fewer people are being arrested for breach of bail conditions which means that the word has got round the recidivist element that the Police will check on those people with curfew conditions. This has caused many offenders to observe their curfews therefore reducing overnight crime. The large fall in burglary dwellings since 1998 is partly attributed to this initiative as it is

those type of offenders who commit night time burglaries that we can have a direct impact on when caught.


11.6 There are obvious drawbacks to this initiative in that offenders have to be arrested in the correct circumstances before proactive enforcement can come into effect but the essence of the initiative is that it compliments other Police work and it is not overly resource intensive,

11.7 The cost implications are minimal - three notice boards; up to date photo sheets and a small amount of administrative work by the Crime Management Unit staff are all that is needed to initiate the strategy.

11.8 The main aspect is that it has the backing of the people that matter; that is the patrol officers. They see that their initial work in arresting offenders is carried on so that ultimately the community they serve will gain the benefit.

11.9 The initiative was under constant review from its inception thus when problems arose they could be dealt with quickly. The main thing was someone had to have ultimate control to ensure that things got done. If the initiative was taken up anywhere else I would ensure that one person has responsibility for the initiative.

11.10 In essence then I have to conclude that the initiative is not a panacea for all our crime problems but it does have its place in the armoury of law enforcement and if used properly can have very positive results.



APPENDIX



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DEVELOPMENT AND INSPECTORATE DEPARTMENT

AN EVALUATION OF THE CHADDERTON

CURFEW INITIATIVE

INSPECTOR PETER WOODS

1. introduction

- 1.1 Inspector 1347 S. McGarry, proposed a strategy for targeting criminals on Chadderton Sub Division. The proposal was submitted in a report dated 6th January 1997. (Appendix A).
- 1.2 The strategy involved targeting the small number of persistent criminals, believed responsible for a large percentage of crime.
- 1.3 The strategy was to include:
 - checking vehicles used by target criminals
 - issuing HOIRT/l's
 - using stop search powers
 - enforcing curfew conditions imposed by courts.
- 1.4 Enforcement of curfew conditions assumed a prominent role in the strategy.
- 1.5 During the Inspection of the Q Division in August 1997 the initiative was noted as a potential source of good practice and the Deputy Chief Constable directed that a full evaluation be carried out by the Development and Inspectorate Department.

2. Features of the curfew initiative

- 2.1 When dealing with prisoners, officers requesting curfew conditions also ask for a further condition, that the target present themselves to police officers enforcing the conditions.
- 2.2 A list of six targets is identified for each of the townships on the sub division. These targets are selected from a group of offenders who have been allowed bail with curfew conditions. The targets will be those offenders within this group who intelligence suggests are also the most active criminals.
- 2.3 Targets are usually identified by CMU staff but there are some nominations from patrol officers and members of CID. These are included if the CMU validate their status.
- 2.4 The list of targets, which also acts as a log sheet, is passed by the CMU to the night relief inspector at the start of the night week. (Appendix B).
- 2.5 The list is used to record visits to curfew addresses.
- 2.6 An information sheet containing details of the target, the curfew conditions and a photograph is placed on a dedicated notice board at each township police station on the sub division. (Appendix C).

- 2.7 The strategy specifies that all targets should be visited at least twice during curfew hours to check compliance with curfew conditions.
- 2.8 Breaches of curfew or other conditions are recorded on the log sheet.
- 2.9 Pro-forma statements are prepared providing evidence of the breach and they are lodged in the CMU.
- 2.10 The intelligence record is endorsed and officers on the section are informed of the breach of bail conditions and the target's liability for arrest.

3. Results

- 3.1 Between 20th January 1997 and 24th May 1998, one hundred and thirty nine (139) targets were identified. Of these, one hundred and eighteen (118), (85%), were arrested.
- 3.2 Details of the reasons for arrest, recorded in the CMU are shown in the table below.

Breach Curfew	UTMV	Public Order	Burglary	Rob	Disqual Drive	Criminal Damage	Theft	Warrant	Arson	Assault Police	Drink drive	Total
80	5	2	15	1	1	1	5	5	1	1	1	118
68	4.2	1.7	12.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	4.2	4.2	0.8	0.8	0.8	4.

- 3.3 Examination of a sample of weekly log sheets showed that more than 50% of curfew checks were always conducted.
- 3.4 Most weekly log sheets show that between 70% and 100% of visits that should have been carried out, were carried out.
- 3.5 There have been individual arrests which have resulted in significant short term impacts upon detection rates. The arrest of Shane Ogden in January 1997 resulted in a total of 500 various offences being taken into consideration.
- 3.6 There is a trend of increased detection of burglary dwelling offences on the sub-division which is concurrent with the life of the curfew initiative. It is probable that the trend is partly attributable to this initiative, but the influence of a sub divisional burglary unit, is also thought to be substantial.
- 3.7 The average number of detection's for burglary dwelling per month on Q2 Sub-division in a thirty month period prior to this initiative was 10.7. This figure increased to 16.2 in the twenty one month period following the introduction of the curfew initiative and the burglary unit. (NB Two months in the post implementation period with exceptionally high detection rates have been excluded from the data to prevent the results from being skewed). The overall increase in burglary dwelling detection's, (+66%) therefore reflects the underlying trend.

4. Attitudes of key personnel

Inspectors

- 4.1 Shift Inspectors on Chadderton Sub-division expressed some enthusiasm for the initiative, seeing it as an effective use of resources which is not unduly time consuming.
- 4.2 Important perceived benefits include:
- "keeping local criminals on their toes and aware of the threat of arrest"
 - "removing the most active criminals from circulation"
 - "keeping crime down by targeting the recidivists"
 - "we arrest someone for breach most weeks"
- 4.3 There was unanimous support for continuing the initiative.

Crime Management Unit Staff

- 4.4 Several members of the CMU staff have a role in the administration of the Curfew initiative. They described the work involved as only taking up a small proportion of their time. Their view was that their effort was worthwhile.

5 Advantages of the initiative

- 5.1 The curfew initiative may be regarded as very successful in terms of the detection of breached bail conditions.
- 5.2 The impact of some arrests is difficult to quantify. Others evidently had a clear impact on detection rates, (paragraph 3.5).
- 5.3 In view of the high percentage of targets arrested and the fact that they had been identified as the most active criminals on the sub division, it seems likely that there has been an impact in terms of prevented crime.
- 5.4 The initiative has the support of patrol officers on the sub division and from staff in the Crime Management Unit. It is regarded as a priority, but rather than displacing other work, it is accommodated alongside response policing and other proactive effort.

6. Perceived problems

- 6.1 If the target is not arrested and the breach of conditions is not brought to the attention of the court before the next date of appearance, the value of the work done can be lost. It is important that there is a structured and effective follow up to secure arrest when conditions have been breached.
- 6.2 The judicial system does not always provide outcomes which support the initiative, there have been instances of targets who have breached bail conditions being allowed further bail.
- 6.3 The absence of a power of entry into premises, to verify absence or to make an arrest can be a source of frustration to officers attempting to enforce curfew conditions. This is mitigated to some extent by the application of the "presenting" condition, (paragraph 2.1) though it does not solve the problem.
- 6.4 There are reports of occasional difficulty in obtaining photographs from GMPCRO.
- 6.5 Whilst photographs are part of the information posted on dedicated notice boards, they do not appear on the log sheets which would be carried by officers making enforcement visits. Inclusion of photographs with the log sheet would facilitate identification.

7. Electronic tagging pilot

- 7.1 On 1st July 1998, a pilot scheme began whereby courts in the Manchester City area can impose bail conditions involving a curfew with tagging. The pilot will last for three months or until one hundred defendants have been tagged. Unless difficulties are experienced, it is anticipated that tagging will go force wide by the end of 1998.
- 7.2 Electronic tagging will initially only be used to allow courts to bail defendants who would otherwise have been remanded in custody. Extension of electronic tagging to all cases where bail is allowed with curfew conditions seems likely to follow if the pilot proves successful. The timescale for such an extension is not yet known.

8. Observations

- 8.1 Similar initiatives are running on J and L Divisions. Whilst these have not yet been evaluated, the early indications are positive.
- 8.2 The results produced by this initiative are compelling. There seems little doubt that the resource input is both efficient and effective.
- 8.3 The initiative has the support of the officers who administer and implement it.
- 8.4 The involvement of patrol and CID officers in nominating targets confers a degree of ownership which should contribute to levels of commitment.

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- 8.5 This initiative is a good example of the successful application of proactive policing and it is in the spirit of the Crime and Disorder Act.
 - 8.6 The enforcement of curfew conditions by patrols is closely related to the electronic tagging pilot being conducted in the City of Manchester. Inspector Steve Crimmins, Criminal Judicial Services 'S'ⁱ, who is the liaison officer for the pilot, is aware of this evaluation.
 - 8.7 There are elements of the initiative which may benefit from further support from other agencies such as the Crown Prosecution Service, the Magistracy and Judiciary. This support may be best sought by Criminal Judicial Services Section.

9. Recommendations

- 9.1 The enforcement of curfew conditions imposed by courts should be adopted as good practice on all sub divisions in the force.
- 9.2 The principle features of the Chadderton initiative should be adopted as a model.
- 9.3 Promulgation of the good practice should be undertaken by Criminal Judicial Services Section 'S', so that they can take account of wider issues which may affect implementation.

PETER WOODS
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