



**EVON & ORNWALL  
CONSTABULARY**

**SOUTH HAMS DISTRICT**

**'WHEN THE CORN IS CUT'**

**A SEASONAL APPROACH TO  
PROBLEM SOLVING POLICING**

**TILLEY AWARD 2001  
CRIME AND DISORDER REDUCTION**

**AUTHORISED BY MR I LATIMER ASSISTANT  
CHIEF CONSTABLE OPERATIONS**

**CONTACT**

**PC 3868 J RICHARDSON**

**IVYBRIDGE POLICE STATION  
LEONARDS ROAD  
IVYBRIDGE  
DEVON  
PL210SL**

**Tel: 01752 891970**

**Fax: 01752 891975**

## **WHEN THE CORN IS CUT:**

### **A SEASONAL APPROACH TO PROBLEM SOLVING POLICING**

#### **SUMMARY**

##### **1. INTRODUCTION**

The South Hams has a diverse landscape which includes small towns, villages, coastline and moorland, the district is flanked by Plymouth and Torbay two large urban areas. This paper will examine three of those initiatives, which have developed from each other, and show a link to the seasons of the year.

##### **2. PROBLEMS ADDRESSED**

###### **2.1 THEFT FROM VEHICLES**

During winter the isolated car parks along the 50 miles of coastline are little used, but come summer they are full. It was an easy target for offenders to plunder.

###### **2.2 POACHING AND OVERNIGHT RURAL CRIME**

A seasonal change come winter is that empty car parks along the coast force offenders to become nocturnal and vehicles parked overnight in villages become the new target.

September is the time of year **when the corn is cut** and the deer leave the protection of the woods to explore the now open fields around their habitat. The traditional poacher and the urban cowboys from Plymouth now venture out.

Farms and sheds were easy prey for these nocturnal trespassers.

###### **2.3 MARINE CRIME**

Easter is traditionally the time when boat owners put their boats back on the water, and then fill them with equipment attractive to offenders who specialises in marine crime.

### **3. EVIDENCE**

3.1 Recorded crimes increased, causing members of the public to express concerns at forums such as parish council meetings and letters in local newspapers.

3.2 There was genuine concern from the police, but it was easy to blame the lack of resources for not doing anything, the problems were placed in the too difficult basket.

### **4. RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM**

4.1 Crime pattern analysis completed, including knowledge that poachers preferred the "new moon" and marine crime would occur more often during a high tide.

4.2 Stakeholders identified, meetings arranged, strategy agreed, resources provided by stakeholders and police dedicated to Operations Jeeves, Jackrabbit and Jetsam.

4.3 Media coverage encouraged; this reduced the fear of crime and acted as a deterrent.

### **5. IMPACT OF THE RESPONSE**

5.1 Substantial reduction of reported crime in target areas. Stakeholders achieved their aims and the fear of crime was reduced.

5.2 Measured by ensuring a monitoring process in place, analysis of reported crime, debrief meetings and questionnaire completed, increased usage of car parks, deer herds requiring to be culled and positive feedback from the public.

## **WHEN THE CORN IS CUT:**

### **A SEASONAL RESPONSE TO PROBLEM SOLVING POLICING**

#### **1. INTRODUCTION**

The South Hams has a diverse landscape which comprises of small towns and villages some of which are located along the rugged coast line and others which are found on moor land. The roads that service this area, are generally small country lanes with high hedgerows. Plymouth and Torbay two large urban areas flank the district.

The geography suggests that there is a possibility for a variety of problem solving policing {PSP} initiatives. This paper will examine three PSP initiatives which all have stakeholder partners, Operations Jeeves, Jackrabbit and Jetsam. They have developed logically from each other and are linked to seasonal criminal activity.

#### **2. PROBLEM ADDRESSED**

##### **2.1 THEFT FROM VEHICLES AT ISOLATED COASTAL CAR PARKS**

2.1.1 There are over 50 car parks located along the 50 miles of coastline between Plymouth and Torbay. During winter they are rarely used, but when summer arrives they are frequented not only by local people but many visitors who travel to the South Hams on holiday. Most of these car parks are at isolated locations they are difficult to get to and rarely patrolled by police.

2.1.2 They have however, received many visits from individuals who see these vehicles as easy prey. For the period relating to the 1st June — 30th September 1996 there were 169 reported crimes involving theft from vehicles at these car parks. This number was in fact much higher because of the way crimes were recorded at that time. If there had been more than one vehicle targeted as was normally the case, say three attempt theft and only one had property stolen, then these four crimes would be recorded together on one crime record. It would be fair to say that the true number of vehicles targeted would be more than 400.

2.1.3 A large number of these offences were reported over the phone, by the victim to the force call handling service. It was not unusual for officers on duty to be unaware of vehicles being attacked in their area. The delay in getting this information meant that the offender had time to get out of the area.

2.1.4 On the occasions that police attended they would find upset and angry victims stood amongst the scattered fragments of glass which was once a window on their car. This glass was now adding to the pile that was clearly visible when the complainant parked their vehicle. This spread of glass around the car parks caused many people to drive

away, frightened to park there, unable to enjoy the scenery they had traveled miles to experience. This had a detrimental effect on the local economy.

2.1.5 The public would express their concerns about the problem at Parish Council meetings and the letters page of the local newspaper.

2.1.6 Local Police officers raised the matter at section meetings. Supervisors detailed officers to carry out increased high visibility patrols, but this had no effect.

2.1.7 In January 1996 the Section Field Intelligence Officer (SFIO) was tasked by his section Inspector to find a way to reduce incidents of crime at the 10 miles of car parks that Ivybridge was responsible for, they had 4 months to work prepare a response.

**2.1.8** He visited the car parks and noticed that some of the car parks had large hedgerows around them, these would offer cover to offenders.

2.1.9 Local officers were questioned; they believed persons from Plymouth were responsible for most of the crimes.

2.1.10 Crime bureau was tasked to produce a crime pattern analysis, not only in the Ivybridge area but also for the entire South Hams. This produced information that detailed the location, time, date and day for all crimes in 1996. It confirmed most crimes were committed between 1000hrs and 1600hrs in the summer with 40% of crimes occurring during the weekend.

2.1.11 Mapping clearly showed that offenders traveled from one car park to the next but there was no routine to assist in predicting which car park would be the next to be visited. It suggested that the high volume of crime was committed not by many offenders from all over the District, but by a few determined individuals most likely from Plymouth.

2.1.12 The SFIO communicated his findings to supervisors. They agreed to support any initiative that would reduce the recorded vehicle crime in their areas.

2.1.13 Other agencies that deployed staff along the coast were identified. They would benefit from a reduction in vehicle crime and could be described as stakeholders. They were invited to a meeting where options were discussed. It was suggested that as all the agencies wore a uniform and drove marked vehicles they could work with the police in providing a high visibility presence at the coastal car parks.

2.1.14 It was agreed to deploy staff to duties related to the agency function, along the coast on two planned dates a month between 1000hrs and 1600hrs, from June to September inclusive. They would give out vehicle crime leaflets and advise the public not to leave valuables in the car. They did not work weekends.

2.1.15

**OPERATION JEEVES – PHASE ONE – HIGH VISIBILITY OBSERVATIONS**

Five Car Park Inspectors.

Four National Trust Wardens.

Three Coast and Countryside Service Wardens.

Two Dog Wardens

One HM Coast Guard officer.

All wore uniform and drove marked vehicles. They had maps, mobile telephones, see it note it pads and vehicle crime advice leaflets. They were instructed not to tackle any offenders, but contact police by telephone to report any suspicious activity.

The three police stations involved in the operation supplied a dedicated marked police vehicle and one officer. A dedicated traffic unit was also made available. The police units had their meal break at the car parks because it would have taken two hours to return to the police station and have lunch.

**A total of 19 vehicles deployed to patrol the 50 car parks.**

2.1.16

**OPERATION JEEVES – PHASE TWO – COVERT OBSERVATIONS**

A local car dealer was approached he supplied second hand cars to be used as "bait vehicles" at locations not subject to high visibility patrols. The Special Operations Group {SOG} staffed this phase. The garage volunteered to pay the cost of any damage to these cars. The force insured them to be driven by police and supplied the fuel.

2.1.17

**OPERATION JEEVES – PHASE THREE – WEEKEND ACTIVITY**

The crime pattern analysis identified that 40% of vehicle crime occurred on the weekend when other agencies were not available. This period was covered by police stations in the South Hams who arranged officers to do high visibility patrol, or covert observations on the weekend following each weekday operation. The use of Special Constabulary Officers was encouraged.

2.1.18

**OPERATION JEEVES – PHASE FOUR -- CASCADE**

Intelligence relating to suspect and stolen vehicles detailing colour, make and registration was cascaded to agencies and police at 0900hrs.

The cascade system was available to front office support staff at the three stations and the force enquiry unit. They often receive information relating to crimes or suspicious activity. They would alert partners and police on normal duty to the risk of offenders moving from one car park to another. Staff would then if available, divert to the car parks even on non-operational days.

### 2.1.19

#### **OPERATION JEEVES — MEDIA COVERAGE**

The media exposure was planned to give maximum coverage in the first month, detailing the large number of agency staff and police involved. Special emphasis was made to the fact that **agency staff wore uniform and had marked vehicles**. It was believed this would create a **perception** that every time the public or a possible offender saw other agency staff or vehicles they would **associate it as being involved in law enforcement**. This coverage was used to deter offenders and reduce the fear of crime.

It was important to keep the media interested. A story with a different angle was released each month. It was released in local newspapers in the first week, television the second and radio the third week. Stories went into detail about car parks protected by miniature covert cameras, bait vehicles and the early warning cascade was explained. This was intended to create a **belief** amongst potential offenders that they could be under observation every time they visited a coastal car park.

### 2.1.20

#### **OPERATION — JEEVES — CONTROL**

The SFIO at Ivybridge was bronze commander he created an operational log, which detailed the agency involved, car park patrolled name and mobile telephone number of individuals. All PNC and CIS checks were attached to the log.

### 2.1.21 ASSESSMENT

Following the first deployment all partners attended a meeting. This ensured that problems experienced could be sorted before the second deployment. It was mentioned that the briefing that all staff had to attend before deployment on every operation was not worthwhile. Contact by bronze commander by telephone and fax message to police and partners would suffice. The daily briefings were therefore cancelled.

Observations on the bait vehicle were completed on four occasions without success; the SOG sergeant questioned the requirement to deploy the bait vehicle on every operation. It was agreed that the bait vehicle would now only be deployed when a specific hot spot was identified.

There was immediate feedback from the public using the car parks, the contact with partners and police was well received. These comments confirmed that the fear of crime was reducing.

It was thought that the sight of broken glass on the ground at the car parks caused people to fear that their vehicle will suffer the same fate. Arrangements were made to pick the glass up at car parks to reduce the fear of crime; over the season there was very little new glass to collect.

The hedgerows in the car parks were cut, and the design of new car parks reviewed.

Recorded crime was monitored every week; contingency plans were prepared to target known offenders or hot spots.

The quantity of vehicle crime advice leaflets issued was monitored; the agencies regularly requested further copies. This indicated good distribution at the target areas.

The frequency of stop checks and PNC checks was monitored to ensure officers were actively stopping vehicles. This would deter offenders and reassure the public.

An intelligence business account was opened to record details of nominal stopped in target areas. Due to the small number of nominal placed on this account in the first season the business account was closed and not used in following years.

End of first season, vehicle crime reduced by 57% in the South Hams coastal car parks. In Ivybridge area **69%**. These figures continued to drop and in the **summer of 2000** there was **no reported vehicle crime** along the **Ivybridge area coastal car parks**.

Staff had been nominated to cover operations at the start of the season, but due to sickness, training and annual leave requirements on occasion police had problems supplying officers. Funding was sought and granted, all police officers involved in the operation from 2001 will now be on overtime payments.

At the end of season debrief meetings agencies involved expressed their pleasure at being involved in this operation. **Their aims** have been achieved and they agreed continued support, "**prevention is better than detection**"

The Area Support Team and the District Commander carried out independent evaluations. They recommended this operation be highlighted as an example of best practice. Since then other Districts have shown interest in mounting similar operations.

## **2.2 POACHING AND OVERNIGHT RURAL CRIME**

2.2.1 A seasonal change come winter is that the empty car parks along the South Hams coast force offenders to become nocturnal and vehicles parked overnight in villages between Plymouth and Ivybridge become the new target.

2.2.2 September is the time of year **when the corn is cut** and the deer leave the protection of the woods to explore the now open fields around their habitat. The traditional poacher and urban cowboys from Plymouth now venture out.

2.2.3 Ivybridge is located next to the A38 the main route from Plymouth to Exeter. This road splits the Ivybridge "patch" in two with the coast to the South and Dartmoor to the North. Each area covers about 50 square miles and has many small villages and farms. The center of Plymouth is 15 miles from Ivybridge; Criminals from Plymouth have regularly been arrested for overnight crime in both areas.

2.2.4 In the winter of 1996 the community constable for the area North of the A38 was approached by the local deer management society. They expressed concern about poachers who were destroying the local deer herds. It was believed that very soon the

herds would be wiped out. He offered to help, went out overnight with this group and carried out observations to try and capture the poachers without success.

2.2.5 The nature of crimes committed in autumn and winter were examined. It was noticed that not only vehicle crime increased in rural areas at this time of year, criminal damage, burglary and thefts from farms and sheds also increased.

2.2.6 Officers stated that during the autumn and winter night duty they would normally be called to one or two incidents each week relating to the sound of gunfire.

2.2.7 Farmers and gamekeepers stated that poachers are known to "gate hop". They will drive along country roads overnight stopping at every gate which they will climb and check the location for wildlife. They often leave signs, body parts relating to kills, empty cartridges and footprints in the field. This trespass is never reported to the police. They were frightened that they might meet someone armed with a weapon trespassing on the farm in the middle of the night.

2.2.8 A crime pattern analysis was completed, but was unable to provide information relating to poaching. There was no pattern to the crimes reported other than most crime occurred overnight, between 1<sup>st</sup> Sept 96 and 31<sup>st</sup> Jan 97 there were 62 burglary elsewhere, 79 theft from vehicles, 24 theft of vehicles and 63 criminal damage offences reported.

2.2.9 Intelligence reports suggested that a group from Plymouth were stealing cars in Plymouth. Driving overnight into Cornwall committing a circuit of rural crime returning through the Ivybridge part of Dartmoor back into Plymouth.

2.2.10 Local police officers had limited knowledge in relation to poaching legislation. A briefing pack was prepared by the SFIO that simplified legislation relating to poaching.

2.2.11 It was now the end of July and Operation Jeeves was achieving good results. This encouraged the SFIO with support from his section inspector to identify other-agencies that would benefit from a reduction in poaching and rural crime; a meeting arranged and options discussed. It was agreed that the operation would cover the period September to January inclusive. Briefing before each operation to be held at Ivybridge Police Station at 2200hrs, staff would be deployed until 0200hrs. There would be two operations each month. The dates were planned around the "new moon", a time favored by poachers, deer would freeze when illuminated.

2.2.12

**OPERATION JACKRABBIT – PHASE ONE – NORTH OF THE A38**

Two National Park Ranger teams.

Three Environment Agency teams.

Three Gamekeeper teams.

Two National Trust teams.

One Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals team }RSPCA} .

Three Deer Management teams.

All partners used their own vehicles to get to designated observation points surrounding a 50 square mile area North of the A38 between Ivybridge and Plymouth. They would take off road positions and use a their mobile telephone to give the registration number of vehicles entering and leaving the target area to a communications room at Ivybridge Police Station. Three teams would be sent to high ground and rivers using their own night sights to view the area from persons on foot.

**Police supplied;**

One dedicated traffic car for pursuits.

Two Ivybridge officers each in a marked police car, with a Special Constabulary Officer.

One dedicated Police Dog Handler to track persons if required.

One officer to staff the Jackrabbit Control Room.

One bronze commander, the SFIO from Ivybridge in unmarked vehicle.

**A total of 14 other agency teams deployed with 5 dedicated police units.**

2.2.13

**OPERATION JACKRABBIT – PHASE TWO -- SOUTH OF A38**

As per Phase One but in another location.

2.2.14

**OPERATION JACKRABBIT – PHASE THREE – GAME DEALERS**

Police would visit game dealers and check that records were being kept relating to the supply of game. This was a good source for intelligence relating to poaching.

Environmental Health officers were also partners in the operation. They would inspect hotels and restaurants and inform, police of any suspect poached meat found. Game supplied to these locations was normally vacuum-packed.

2.2.15

**OPERATION JACKRABBIT – PHASE FOUR – INTELLIGENCE DATABASE**

An intelligence business account was opened which detailed information relating to poaching. The force wildlife liaison officers made good use of this account and a number of search warrants were executed with positive results.

2.2.16

**OPERATION JACKRABBIT – MEDIA COVERAGE**

All local and some national newspapers, radio and television stations ran stories about the operation. The interest nationally in rural crime and the link with animals created a desirable topic. BBC 2 regional current affairs program "Close Up" filmed a documentary on the operation in the first season. Channel 5 filmed the operation for the series "Wildlife Police" in the second season, that series was also transmitted on Sky Television. During the third season interest continued and BBC 1 series "Crime Squad" filmed the operation.

The media interest suited our needs, we used it to deter offenders and reduce the fear of crime.

#### 2.2.17 ASSESSMENT

A target criminal from Plymouth was arrested in a stolen vehicle and a known poacher arrested disturbing a badgers set.

Police officers increased their knowledge of powers relating to poaching offences. This was demonstrated in the execution of a firearms act warrant following the discovery of parts of a deer in a skip in Plymouth. With it was other rubbish from the suspects home including an envelope with the name and address of a known poacher, BASC arranged for a vet to establish the cause of death, it was believed a section 1 firearm was used and the suspect was only a shotgun certificate holder. Meat from the deer was found in the house.

The deer herd is now back to full strength and salmon and pheasant stocks are better protected.

There are fewer reports of firearms being discharged and farmer's state that "gate hopping" has decreased.

Reductions in overnight crime in first season;

Burglary elsewhere 32%

Thefts from vehicles 25%

Thefts of Vehicles 42%

Criminal damage 40%

Positive feedback from partners who see benefit in being part of the operation and offer continued support.

At parish council meetings the public and officials comment on how pleased they are with the reduced crime rates and the presence of police and other agencies. The fear of crime has been reduced.

It's not just supervisor who see the benefits of this operation. Individual police officers and members of the other agencies have volunteered to change their duties to the unsociable hours covered to ensure the success of the initiative.

The decision on deploying staff to the North or South was linked to intelligence and criminal activity recorded in the area.

Police officers are reaping the benefit of lower crime levels by being proactive rather than reactive, moral is high.

The Area Support Team and District Commander both carried out independent evaluations and recommended that the operation be recognized as best practice. Two

officers from other Districts came out on the operation. They now run successful Operation Jackrabbits and share the intelligence database relating to poachers.

Funding was requested to reward officers who regularly changed shifts. It has been granted and from this year all officers on duty will be on overtime payments. This will assist supervisors maintain section duty strength requirements.

The need for observation equipment was established and a successful bid for binoculars for every police car in the South Hams, and a night sight for the four police stations will this year improve the officers ability to perform the duties required.

## **2.3 MARINE CRIME**

2.3.1 Both Jeeves and Jackrabbit were now up and running, the work required to maintain them was much reduced, it was January 1999 and spring was heading our way. With it comes the offender who specializes in marine crime. Easter is traditionally the time when boat owners put their boats back on the water and fill them with expensive equipment. Therefore the planning and analysis of this problem must start now to enable a suitable response.

2.3.2 The coastline and estuaries in the South Hams are busy waterways crowded with pleasure craft and fishing boats. I was certain that they must be suffering high levels of theft and had personal knowledge of marine crime in the Ivybridge area. I had difficulty assessing the problem because our method of recording marine crime was user-unfriendly; thefts from boats were being recorded as theft from vehicle other, or theft unspecified.

2.3.3 Supervisors were approached but were not enthusiastic, marine crime was not a Force priority, it was not thought to be a problem and even if it was we did not have suitable resources to deal with it.

2.3.4 Having discussed the problem, supervisors requested a business case be prepared, to include full detail in relation to offences, location, suspects and a planned response. With these instructions came the warning that authority to proceed with any initiative against marine crime would not be a priority.

2.3.5 Crime bureau were tasked to do a crime pattern analysis for marine crime for what was "J Division". It was discovered that in 1998 there were over **600 marine crimes valued at over £600,000.00**. The spring and summer months were the busiest and most crimes occurred over night. The South Hams were identified as owning most of these crimes.

2.3.6 following this request crime bureau amended the way marine crime was recorded to make the extraction of information easier.

2.3.7 Further research suggested that most thefts occurred on evenings when it was a **high tide**. This gave a window of opportunity; there were only a few evenings each month and they could be targeted:

**2.3.8** Stakeholder partners were identified and a 5 Phase multi-agency response was devised. The business case was presented to senior management who agreed to support the operation.

2.3.9 A meeting was arranged, agencies invited all had specific legal powers and were unable to adequately patrol the Coast of the South Hams. They were convinced that by pooling staff and boats that their objectives would be catered for. It was agreed to allow a police officer on their boats. Health and safety and communication issues were addressed. It was agreed to patrol together once a month between Torbay and Plymouth.

2.3.10

#### **OPERATION JETSAM – PHASE ONE – BOAT PATROL**

Environment Agency boat – Torbay

Devon Sea Fisheries boat – Torbay

Torbay Harbour Authority boat – Torbay

Two Dart Harbour Authority boats- Dartmouth

Two Salcombe Harbourmaster boats – Salcombe

Yealm Harbourmaster boat - Newton Ferrers

Two MOD Police boats – Plymouth

Environment Agency boat - Plymouth

HM Customs & Excise boat – Plymouth

Two D&C Police boats – Plymouth {small boat taken on trailer as required}

**14 boats deployed with police on board giving all partners the ability to patrol 50 miles of coast adequately for the first time.**

Using police and agency powers boats would be stop checked and boarded as required.

**2.3.11**

#### **OPERATION JETSAM – PHASE TWO – SHORE PATROL**

The following agencies supply staff for the operation they are regularly part of the shore patrol some will go out on other agency boats;

Plymouth Harbour Authority

MAAF

Maritime Coastguard Agency {safety at sea}+{emergency communication for operation}

HM Immigration

Two dedicated traffic cars patrol the coast with each of the five police stations involved supplying one marked police vehicle crewed by the Special Constabulary. Making a total of **7 marked police cars dedicated to patrolling the coastal boatyards, marinas and spot-checking vehicles especially those with boats on trailers.**

2.3.12

#### **OPERATION JETSAM – PHASE THREE – OPERATION RIGID**

Police officers not directly involved in Operation Jetsam requested to stop-check all vehicles towing boats. Operation Rigid format adopted for intelligence gathering.

2.3.13

#### **OPERATION JETSAM – PHASE FOUR – INTELLIGENCE DATABASE**

An intelligence business account opened for marine crime so offenders are easily identified to enable targeting of offenders.

2.3.14

#### **OPERATION JETSAM – PHASE FIVE – WARRANTS AND INSPECTIONS**

Actionable intelligence would be monitored and tasked, theft act warrants executed and businesses that sell second hand equipment will be inspected for stolen property.

2.3.15

#### **OPERATION JETSAM - MEDIA COVERAGE**

As with Jeeves and Jackrabbit the media played an important role reporters regularly came out on the different phases of the operation. Good coverage was guaranteed.

2.3.16

#### **OPERATION JETSAM – CONTROL**

A silver control room was set up at Paignton Police Station; all agencies used mobile telephones for communications, and a dedicated radio channel for police on shore patrol was provided. Coastguard provided emergency ship to shore radio contact if required.

SFIO at Ivybridge was bronze commander and the duty inspector was silver commander.

#### **2.3.17 ASSESSMENT**

It became apparent that some police officers and skippers were not communicating properly each waiting for the other to nominate a boat to be boarded. This was addressed following the first deployment.

All stop checks were recorded on the OIS log updated at silver control; these were monitored by senior management after every deployment.

**Health and Safety** concerns were addressed to ensure the continuation of the operation.

The intelligence database provided information that suggested locations for warrants, **over £10,000.00 worth of identifiable property recovered.** At one warrant over **60 outboard engines** were recovered from one dwelling house.

Action taken to promote **a free database** to record details of owners to boats and equipment in the Southwest managed by the MOD Marine Section.

It was confirmed that only a few individuals were responsible for much of the marine crime, a test purchase operation resulted in on individual being charged for a number of offences.

The first operation in the South Hams between 1<sup>st</sup> April — 31<sup>st</sup> October 1999 reduced the **theft of boats by 25% and theft from boats by 45%**

Over **£1million pounds worth of cocaine washed up** on local beach the day after the first deployment in 2000, it is believed this was thrown overboard by persons believing they were going to get caught.

The 2000 season saw the operation extended to cover from Plymouth to Exmouth, **a total of 100 miles.**

Funding granted to cover deployment of police officers as overtime and more funding has been made available to provide training and specific clothing for these police officers.

Independent evaluation carried out by District and Area found the operation to be an example of best practice. Caradon District in Cornwall has attended the preseason meeting and intends to join the operation with more resources in 2001.

## **2.4 CONCLUSION**

2.4.1 PC 3868 Richardson the Author of these operations managed to drive them when he was the SFIO at Ivybridge. Now that he has changed role the operations have been handed to others to manage. The additional funding and the sound structure of the operations, together with the enthusiasm of all partners to remain involved, should ensure that Operations Jeeves, Jackrabbit and Jetsam continue well into the future.

2.4.2 The figures relating to all recorded crime in the Ivybridge area have seen a reduction of over 50% in the last 5 years. The South Hams has this year been awarded beacon status, these operations have contributed to that success.

2.4.3 All three operations have been presented together to demonstrate the link between seasonal crime and the benefits of partnership working to achieve long-term sustainable reductions in crime.

2.4.2 Attached to the report are flyers relating to the operations, and a three-minute video relating to Operation Jetsam. These were prepared for a presentation at the ACPO Conference at Birmingham during October 2000.

**EEVES**



**STLINE**

**PARKS**

**IC UNIT**

**ROUP**

**LICE  
POLICE**

**RYSIDE  
ENS**



**TWO DISTRICT COUNCIL  
DOG WARDENS**




**ONE NM COAST GUARD  
OFFICER**

KRABBIT


AR



THREE  
GAMEKEEPER TEAMS



TWO NATIONAL  
TRUST TEAMS



CONTROL ROOM

RES -  
GE  
630  
348  
013  
889  
877

West  
Path  
Erme  
Mouth



ENVIRONMENTAL  
HEALTH  
OFFICERS



ONE POLICE DOG  
AND HANDLER

**ETSAM**

**ARS**



h m n



h m n



h m n



**ASTER**



**SALCOMBE HARBOURMASTER**



**ENVIRONMENT AGENCY**



**DEVON SEA FISHERIES**



**TORBAY HARBOUR AUTHORITY**



**DART HARBOUR AUTHORITY**



**DART HARBOUR AUTHORITY**



**SALCOMBE HARBOURMASTER**