Problem-Orientated Policing in South Coventry

"Operation Herald": an exercise in "bottom-up" POP

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Abstract:

The sectorisation of the West Midlands Police allowed officers to work in a highly localised environment and develop a deep understanding of their constituent community. This provided an ideal test bed for the concept of a bottom-up Problem Orientated Policing model. Such a model was introduced in the Stivichall sector of Coventry in March 1998 as a result of escalating crime patterns on one particular beat (beat 23).

An analysis of crime records and command and control logs demonstrated that beat 23 had become the busiest beat on the sector, and that the need to react to a constant stream of incidents was eating into scarce police resource. Further crime specific analysis identified domestic burglary as the major local problem.

Clearly, beat 23 required a different approach to the reactive status quo if its worrying crime pattern was to be reduced. Officers used their detailed knowledge of the area to introduce a highly focused operation with the aim of achieving burglary reduction and burglary detection. The SARA model gave structure to the project and allowed for a step by step approach: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment.

Officers first looked to maximise their intelligence data by referring to crime records and by an increased emphasis on community liaison. Simple analytical methods were used to convert this data into valuable information about location, victim and offender. Location profiling indicated that most burglaries took place in specific residential streets, and used geographically specific modus operandi. Victim profiling substantiated a linkage between burglaries and student accommodation. Analysis into offender types helped officers to identify a group of criminally active youths whose behaviour was monitored over the forthcoming months.

Response to the problem also followed the location, victim, offender model. Close relationships were forged with both the council and local traders. Communications with burglary victims were increased rovidin o' with e an· prove • mg vi with the assurance that their case was g given due attention. Officer cted to the target youths with a "zero toleran " . • ►r.. search warrants or bail con ᵢ· as appropriate.

Following the operation, all targets had been arrested and charged on at least two occasions, and the upward household burglary trend in the area had been reverted: the initial objectives of burglary detection and reduction had been met. Equally importantly, "Operation Herald" had demonstrated the impact that a focused POP policing initiative can have when implemented from the "bottom up".

PC 1112 METCALFE

1.0   Introduction

The concept of "Problem Orientated Policing" [POP] is widely attributed to Herman Goldstein, an American academic who first published on the subject in 1979'. Goldstein advocated that police services should adopt an organisational approach which concentrates resources on addressing underlying problems, as opposed to being primarily incident driven. To senior police managers, increasingly faced with trying to meet spiralling demands with finite resources, the notion of focusing on events and addressing their immediate determinants to reduce future demand is attractive.

The potential of POP is enormous, particularly when considered in the light of two recent reports: which found that 4% of respondents suffer 44% of the survey related crime', and that 3% of offenders account for 25% of recorded offences'. Nevertheless, the implementation of POP is not without its obstacles. Goldstein's vision necessitates a wholesale reorientation of traditional policing philosophy where community issues are addressed by "grass roots" local officers employing an imaginative problem-solving approach:

> In handling incidents, police are generally expected to deal with the disruptive,
> intolerable effects of a problem. That requires a response quite different from what
> might be involved with the underlying conditions of a problem... But most policing
> is limited to ameliorating the overt, offensive symptoms of a problem [4].

Goldstien, 1979, 1990.

[2] Farrel & Pease, 19931Wllingworth et al. 1995.

[3] Graham & Bowling, 1995.

[4] Goldstien, 1990: p, 33.

Until the late 1990's, West Midlands Police was cast in a "unit beat policing" mould unconducive to the development of "bottom up" POP initiatives. Constables paraded in large shifts, worked rigid hours and used vehicles to patrol large subdivisions. However, the appointment of Chief Constable Edward Crew in 1997 witnessed the introduction of sector policing to the force, ensuring "that the main responsibility for local policing will go... [to]... the local commanders who are in touch with their local communities."[5]

Sectorisation in Coventry [M Division] saw two sub-divisions transformed into three Operational Command Units [OCU], each headed by a Superintendent. M2 OCU (south Coventry) was divided into four **"sectors" each overseen** by an Inspector. During the period to which this report refers sector operational staff were referred to as "band 1" and "band 2" officers. The former adopted the emergency response role while the latter were allocated "beats" for which they were responsible.

Following a transition from a five shift system to a four shift system in late 1997 the author was allocated to "band 2" duties, This phase of sectorisation resulted in eight officers being allocated to a community policing role within the Stivichall Sector (one of the four M2 OCU sectors). The officers were assigned "beats" and adopted a reactive role to deal with command and control logs requiring further police-public liaison and crime enquires pertaining to incidents on their beats. Officers were overseen by a Sergeant and permitted to adopt a flexible working pattern. It became apparent that one beat, beat 23 (Lower Stoke), generated a workload considerably in excess of the remaining five areas. To address this issue the author was transferred from a quieter beat to assist the beat 23 officer, PC McCormack.

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[5] Home Office, 1993, a: 3.

In January 1998 it became clear that the "reactive" approach to came management was failing Lower Stoke and that beat 23 was the Stivichall sector 's crime "hot-spot" [6]. Unfortunately there was little relevant intelligence as to the identity of offenders. Consequently, and in light of the then imminent Crime and Disorder Act 1998, it was decided to develop a proactive, multi-agency initiative to address the high levels of victimisation suffered by the residents of beat 23. No additional resources were allocated to this project.

What follows is a description of this initiative which was referred to as "Operation Herald". The report owes its structure to the SARA model used to develop responses to policing problems, and begins with an account of the scanning process used to identify the "problem" to be addressed'. It goes on to detail the analysis and response phases before evaluating the operation in the assessment stage. The latter section of the report briefly comments on the SARA model within the context of the organisation, before being brought to an end by a conclusion.

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[6] Bottoms & Wills, 1997.

[7] Leigh, Read and Tilley, 1996: 17.

2.0   Introducing SARA to Lower Stoke

Beat 23 predominantly comprises terraced housing built at the turn of the century. There are no specific council areas and council houses are randomly interspersed with private sector housing. There are also numerous properties managed by absentee landlords and a number of premises used as "halfway house" hostels.

The beat contains two schools, two small industrial estates, a hospital and two night-clubs. There are numerous shops and pubs located mostly in Far Gosford Street which serves as the area's high street and is a focus for the local night life. There are also a number of "second hand" bric-a-brac shops and "late night refreshment houses" situated in Far Gosford Street. Ethnically the area is predominantly white European, although a number of Asian families also live locally.

Lower Stoke has a large transient population. Situated on the edge of the city centre, it is a favoured area of residence for students studying at Coventry University. Perhaps partly due to the area's popularity with students, there seems to be little discernible sense of "community" and active neighbourhood watch members are rare.

Despite Lower Stoke's proximity to Coventry City Centre (Ml OCU), the area is policed from Fletchamstead police station (M2 OCU) and forms the northern-most boundary of the Stivichall Sector'. The area had attained the reputation of being a troublesome area to police, and was perceived by local officers as the busiest beat within the Stivichall sector. Prior to this initiative, the general consensus of opinion at Fletchamstead police station attributed these problems to members of two well-established local families with criminal histories.

' **Appendix** A

In early 1998 the author was posted to beat 23, thereby doubling the human resources allocated to the area. With the sector Inspector's support it was decided to address the high level of criminal activity in Lower Stoke through a proactive operation. This was allocated the operational name "Herald".

Previously, local proactive police strategies focused crime detection to the exclusion of all else, resulting in a negligible reduction of criminal activity. This emphasis on detection eclipsed the issues of prevention and community safety, which are arguably mutually reinforcing core elements of any crime reduction strategy. Beat 23 therefore required an approach incorporating reduction and detection in a co-ordinated, problem orientated and focused way to reduce its high incidence of crime.

The strategy used for this purpose was based on the acrynoymn SARA which provides a logical four stage structure that can be applied to a variety of policing problems, and is summarised as follows:

SCANNING: Identifying the problem

ANALYSIS   Examining the problem's determinants and characteristics

RESPONSE: The "solution" - what action can be taken and by whom

ASSESSMENT: Evaluation of the response and possible return to the scanning phase'

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[2] Leigh, Read & Tilley, 1996.

2,1   <u>Scanning</u>

The proposition that Lower Stoke had a long term crime "problem" was explored through the adoption of two basic forms of analysis utilising data held on separate force data bases. The first data resource was provided by records maintained by Stivichall sector's local intelligence officer and listied recorded offences by type, classification and beat. The collation and examination of this information permitted an accurate comparison between each Stivichall Sector beat in terms of the volume of crime recorded in each area over twelve months period (April 1997-March 1998). The average Stivichall Sector ..h <u>crime</u> <u>rate</u> <u>of</u> 22.92 offences during this period; the residents of <u>beat</u> <u>23</u> <u>lived with a considerably higher average of</u> 56.7_. offences.

Recorded crime is an indicator of local demand on the police. However, changes in counting rules and "recordable" offences make the sole use of such figures inadequate, as incidents may absorb scarce police resources yet go unrecorded on the crime recording system[3]. Therefore command and control data may represent public demand on the police more accurately. It was decided to interrogate Stivichall Sector incident logs over a four month period to ascertain the sector's most resource-intensive areas. This was accomplished by obtaining logs created over the period December 1997-March 1998 and dividing them beat[4]. This process confirmed that beat 23 was considerably busier than the other five beats'.

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[3] The institutionalist school of **thought** dismisses crime figures as being a record keeping process geared towards organisational aims and needs, concluding that such figures are worthy of study only to understand the agency producing them. (Wiles, 1971: 188). Moreover the 1994 British Crime Survey suggested that only 57% of crime is actually reported. (Loveday, 1997)

[4] There are four categories on the MDIS system; traffic, crime, miscelaneous and disorder. Traffic was considered largely irrelevant for the purposes of this study and therefore omitted.

[5] West Midlands Police's command and control system was not designed for such use and its data has its limitations: the classification of lags reflects the call handler's interpretation of the incident and more than one log may relate to an incident.

Incident Logs by Beat
Stivichall Sector: April 1997-March 1998

Local intelligence data was then used to identify which particular type of crime to address. Officers were aware of their limited resources, and conscious that any over-ambition in respect of the initiative's aims could compromise the project from its inception. Moreover, it was felt that the identification and prioritisation of a particular category of offence would permit a focused approach when developing an ambitious and varied "response" strategy.

The 627 recorded crimes committed on beat 23 during April 1997-March 1998 were studied within the context of the thirteen crime classifications used by the local intelligence officer. This demonstrated that the most common reported offence in the area was criminal damage (21.85%) followed by domestic burglary (20.26%). Further examination of local crime figures for the same period established that beat 23 alone accounted for 46.4% of all domestic burglaries in the Stivichall sector.

<u>Beat 23 Crime by Type</u>
April 9997-March 1998

Domestic burglary is the most widely feared crime in Britain,' and its reduction and detection is Home Office a national key objective'. The West Midlands Police 1998-1999 Policing Plan highlighted the importance of tackling domestic burglary by making it a force priority'. Considering the organisation's emphasis on burglary, the seriousness of each offence in terms of victimisation, beat 23's high burglary rate and the finite resources available, officers decided to address the area's burglary problem in preference to that of criminal damage.

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[6] 1994 British Crime Survey.

[7] National key objective 5 for the year 1998-99 was ¯to increase the number of detections for burglaries of peoples homes".

[8] West Midlands Police policing plan 1998-99 sought to reduce domestic burglary by 4%, reduce domestic burglary repeat victimisation to 13% and increase the proportion of domestic burglaries detected by primary means to 18%.

2.2   **Analysis**

An analysis of domestic burglaries committed from November 1997 to February 1998 examined their characteristics and identified potential responses to the problem. A three tier approach consisting of, location, victim and offender was adopted'

2.2.1   Location

The identification of burglary hot-spots was considered a priority by officers who utilised traditional pin maps and an electronic mapping system for this purpose.

%of Houses Burgled per Street on Beat 23
**November I997-Feburary 1998**

The incidence of burglary by street was also examined and, suggested that Bramble Street (11..5%) and Vecqueray Street (10%) residents were at a particularly high risk of victimisation.

This structure is based on the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) as described in Leigh, Read & Tilley, 1996: 18.

Having identified geographical hot-spots, each road was analysed in terms of the method used by the offender to enter the premises. In Bramble Street 72% of burglaries were committed through the front door. Yet in adjoining Gulson Road, 87% of entries were achieved via the rear of the premises. The assumption, that some of the individuals responsible for burglaries in Gulson Road would have committed similar offences in neighbouring Bramble Street, but employed a different method of entry at each location, suggested a focused course of localised target hardening may have some impact in achieving a local domestic burglary reduction.

Points of Entry for Burglary Dwellings
November 1997-Feburary 1998

Bramble Street
14.0%

14.0%

72.0%

Gulson Road
13.0%

49.0%

38.0%

■ Front door
■ Rear window
■ Rear door
❏ Front window

Beat 23
6.1%

15.2%

50.5%

28.3%

Location analysis also identified geographical weaknesses that made certain areas particularly vulnerable. For example; odd numbered houses in St Georges Road back onto a disused and overgrown railway line which runs from Gosford Green to Charterhouse fields [.] This route provided a means of moving from one end of the beat to the other unseen, and when methods of entry for burglaries in St Georges Road were analysed it was shown that substantially

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[1] ◦Appendix B.

more odd numbered houses were burgled than even numbers, and more often than not from the rear.

2.2.2   <u>Victim</u>

Crime is a transaction in which both victim and offender play a role. Victimologists suggest that certain individuals are "victim prone" ['']. It is therefore important to identify characteristics that make some individuals more susceptible to victimisation than others when considering the adoption of any crime prevention strategy.

Beat 23 domestic burglaries committed between November 1997 and March 1998 found to exhibit an uneven distribution of risk. Rented student accommodation was particularly vulnerable to burglary, suffering 44% of burglaries committed,.d   g the survey period'. Further analysis of repeat victimisation' reinforced this finding, highlighting that of the twelve incidents of repeat victimisation between November 1997 and March 1998, seven were against student households. Students were therefore identified as a distinct social group requiring a targeted preventative response.

2.2.3   <u>Offender</u>

Owing to a lack of intelligence officers were initially unable to nominate persons that should be targeted by the operation. An examination of the four domestic burglary offences detected between August 1997 and March 1998 also failed to suggest any likely candidates. Confronted with the stark reality that little quality intelligence was available in relation to the

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[''] **Van Hentig, 1948** quoted in Fattah,1989:44.

[12] This mirrors research 'demonstrating that rented accommodation per se is more venerable to attack then other forms of housing (Mirles-Black et al 1996:45/Strathclyde research).

[13] A "repeat victim" was considered to be a premises that had been burgled within the period of one year.

Sector's busiest beat, officers decided to dedicate the first two months of the initiative solely to developing a sound intelligence base.

The intelligence gathering phase adopted a traditional "high profile" foot patrol approach to develop local confidence and identify useful sources of information, who were often revisited in plain clothes. This process proved particularly productive and led officers to identify thirteen criminally active youths. Out of the group;

eight were "unknown" to police

- ten were under 17yrs old

- eleven were associates and could be described as a "gang"

- five were excluded from school

- nine resided within the beat 23 area

2.3   Response

Recently a plethora of research has urged the police to tackle problems with the aid of the community and other agencies[14]. This has manifested itself in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, which creates a requirement for Local Authorities and police to produce a common strategy for tackling crime and disorder. Herald provided the ideal opportunity to forge links with other agencies prior to the full implementation of the new legislation.

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[14]Home Office Circular 811984 and Morgan: "Safer Communities   the local delivery of crime prevention through the partnership approach" [Home Office, 1991]

2.3.1 Location orientated responses

* Far Gosford Street Traders Association

The Far Gosford Street Traders Association was established with the help of Coventry City Council to address the concerns of local shopkeepers and generate support for CCTV in the street. The regular meetings provided a lively forum for the airing of trader's concerns and proved a useful intelligence source for officers. The successes of operation Herald had had a substantial impact on the street, and the head of the association attributed a decline of interest from the traders to the fact that "the street has never had it so good".

● Coventry City Council Environmental Services

The SARA model identified that premises in Bramble Street were prone to attack through the front door during the hours of darkness. This finding caused officers to compare the street with other local roads for which the favoured method of entry was invariably via the rear of the house. This highlighted the fact that Bramble Street suffered from comparatively poor street lighting, and it was suggested to the City Council that improving lighting could contribute significantly to the target hardening process.

Similarly, location analysis of command and control logs identified areas of overgrown waste ground used by the target group to meet, drink alcohol and smoke cannabis'. Once located, City Engineers were contacted and requested to cut back the overgrown vegetation used by the group to mask their activities.

Such logs were usually created following reports from concerned members of the public and classified under the "disorder" heading. Had MDLS logs not been examined these spots would have gone unidentified as although they often resulted in police attending the scene they never resulted in the creation of any crime statistics.

2.3.2   Victim orientated responses

- Liaison with Coventry University Students Union

    Crime pattern analysis demonstrated that a high proportion of burglary victims on beat 23 were students who ran a disproportionate chance of repeat victimisation. The Coventry University Students´ Union was approached with a view to mounting a crime prevention campaign designed to reduce student burglaries. Sabbatical officers were supportive and published an article entitled "As safe as houses" in the student newspaper'. However, the response from the students was disappointedly non-existent". In retrospect, the timing of the initiative (June) was poor and in future should be scheduled to commence at the beginning of the academic year. This process would have been made more effective through liaison with the Ml OCU crime prevention officer as part of a city-wide approach.

- Victims

    Police reliance on victims to report crime, furnish evidence and attend court is fundamental to the successful functioning of the criminal justice system. Every effort was made to keep victims fully informed throughout the investigative process, and emphasis was placed on the fact that any witness intimidation would be fi mly dealt with. Injured parties were updated regularly about whether suspects were cautioned or charged, bail conditions, bail dates, trial dates, verdicts and sentences. This process was welcomed by victims and repeated contact also generated intelligence and increase public confidence.

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[16]Appendix C

[17]This experience was mirrored by Strathclyde Police's "Secure Student **Accommodation** Scheme" which also experienced a "limited response" from students.

2.3.3 Offender orientated responses

- "Zero Tolerance"

Although often considered diametrically opposed to POP, a "zero tolerance" approach was adopted in respect of the target group[ie]. The offenders were aggressively targeted and no form of criminal or antisocial behaviour was tolerated. This approach reimposed police authority on the area, and early successes increased the confidence and enthusiasm of other agencies for the initiative, thereby creating a positive environment in which POP could thrive.

- 'Search Warrants

As the operation progressed, officers sought to identify persons through whom stolen property was disposed. The intelligence process suggested that many items were sold "door to door" by offenders. One shop, however, was identified as having received stolen car radios. Consequently, a search warrant was executed at the premises in conjunction with HM Customs and Excise. Although no property was positively identified as being stolen, a large quantity of alcohol (£7,000) was seized. The resulting press attention turned the initiative into front page news.

Almost without exception, targets admitted they regularly used cannabis and intimated that crime funded their habit. This information reinitiated the scanning and analysis phases and resulted in the identification of a house from which the youths were regularly purchasing cannabis resin. A successful search warrant was executed at the address, resulting in the seizure of a quantity of cannabis and the conviction of the occupier for supplying the drugs.

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[18]Dean, 1997,

2A **Assessment**

At its inception it was agreed that the success or otherwise of Herald would be decided by two recognised performance indicators; "burglary reduction" and "burglary detection". Consequently the initiative will be evaluated under these headings.

2.4.1 Reduction

When compared with the corresponding eight months in 1997 (Mar-Nov) beat 23 experienced twelve less domestic burglaries in 1998, a reduction of 12A% [19].

incidence of BDH on Beat 23

Nov. 1997 - May 1999

This decrease seems quite disappointing, however Herald was initiated as a response to a steady rise in burglary dwellings that began in December 1997. Consequently when comparing the

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[19] Caution must be exercised when comparing statistics of this nature. Crime figures will be *subject to a* number of influences, not least recording criteria. Recent changes to recording rules relating to **multi-occupancy** houses work aEninst the effective evaluation of Herald (pre November 1998 , rules are used for the evlailition of this project).

three months prior to Herald with the last three months of the initiative there is a substantial drop of 47% in the number of burglary dwellings reported [20]. As the above graph demonstrates there has been an overall downward trend in the beat 23 burglary figures since Herald began in March 1998.

2.4.2   Detection

The three officers working on operation Herald during the period March - November 1998[21]:

- arrested twenty seven persons for burglary

- arrested nineteen persons for domestic burglaries

- arrested eight persons for "burglary other" offences

- cleared thirteen "burglary dwelling" offences by primary means

- cleared six "burglary other" offences by primary means

- recovered stolen property to the value of four and a half thousand pounds.

A number of other offences were also detected by this initiative. A substantial proportion of those targeted by Herald as domestic burglars were also involved in vehicle crime and violent crime.

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[20] During the period Dec. 1997 to Feb. 98 there were a total of 47 domestic burglaries reported on beat 23. The final three months of operation Herald witnessed 25 such offences; a reduction of 47%

[21] PC Metcalfe and PC 2033 McCormack were joined by PC Rosher in August 1998.

Op. Herald Target Arrests by Type
March 1998 - November 1998

The above graph summarises the overall involvement of the thirteen targets in crime by detailing the arrests made by the initiative (all arrests counted resulted in a charge). Thus, despite being designed to address domestic burglary only 21.3% of the total arrests made by the initiative were arrests for this offence[22].

The below graph details the operation's monthly primary detection rates. In terms of arrests and detections the initiative only really began to bear fruit in August 1998, five months into the enterprise. This can be attributed to the fact the first two months of the operation were dedicated to proactive foot-work and intelligence gathering

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[22]Out of a total of 89 arrests made as a direct result of this initiative, 13 (21.3%) were arrests for domestic burglary offences. These figures include "non-recordable" arrests such as arrests made for bail offences etc.

Op, Herald Detections
May-November 1998

Out of the 63 offences detected by Herald,. thirteen (20.6%) were domestic burglaries and six (9.5%) were burglary other buildings.

It proved easier to increase detections and arrests than to reduce burglaries. The reduction of burglaries is a long term process and is just beginning to manifest itself after a number of months. This can partly be attributed to the fact that the majority of the targets are juveniles. Adults were arrested once or twice and received custodial sentences.

Attempts to develop preventative roles for Coventry University Student Union and the Far Gosford Trader's Association within the initiative proved unsuccessful. Efforts to target Coventry University students residing in Lower Stoke by approaching the Student's Union were flawed because the audience immediately became city wide and there was no way of isolating beat 23 students. Although general advice was given through the "As Safe as Houses" article, no offers of crime prevention surveys were made as officers would have run the risk of over committing

Association was moderately successful in terms of developing police community links and generating intelligence.

In contrast, liaison with Coventry City Council's housing department proved highly productive. This relationship was enhanced by an inter-agency protocol entitled "The Safer Estates Agreement" which outlined a shared commitment to addressing antisocial behaviour and formalised the partnership between council and police[23]. The drawing up of tenancy agreements and the threat of eviction proved to be a powerful tool and focused the minds of juveniles and their families on their behaviour considerably more than (yet another) court appearance.

The imposition of bail conditions was an effective means of disrupting the criminal activities of the target group. Bail conditions were strongly resented by targets who either adhered to them or ignored them at their peril. Curfew checks were regularly conducted and non-association conditions were unpopular but effective because offences were invariably committed when the targets came together. Two youths were made the subject of geographical bail conditions which successfully excluded them from the beat, however both came to police notice elsewhere in the city.

Bail conditions were also set to compel a persistent truant, who was committing offences during school time, to attend his place of education when required to do so. Unfortunately these conditions were not upheld by Coventry Magistrates Court[24]. However, the development of an inter-agency protocol to support the use of bail conditions in this manner would be invaluable to police when seeking to address youth crime through a multi-agency approach.

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[23]Appendix D

[24]This individual was arrested for a non-association breech of police bail. On being placed before Magistrates the bench decided not to continue with the element of police bail making school attendance a condition.

Bail conditions were enforced by Stivichall Sector "band 2" officers, partly because the majority of the youths were unknown to the "band 1" officers, and partly because the youths were active in the early evening, a time when response units are often heavily committed. Consequently, bail conditions were only successful because officers were available to actively monitor and implement them; enforcement was unexpectedly enhanced by the analysis stage which identified a number of quiet locations used by the group to "hang out".

3.0   SARA and the Organisation: wider observations

POP offers a common sense approach to addressing volume "quality of life" issues that are important to the community and a considerable drain on reactive police resources. However it is only one approach to modern policing and must function within a wider organisational context. This section draws on the lessons learnt from Herald to suggest internal critical success factors to the implementation of POP.

The below model will be used to summarise the creation of an organisational environment favourable to the application of POP' ;

Problem Orientated Policing organisation chart

1. *Strategy:* The. SARA model provides a simple structure which, although easily dismissed as an unnecessary formulation of basic thought processes, focuses attention and quantifies issues

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This model is an adaptation of the McKinsey & Co "Seven S" corporate strategymodel.

that might otherwise be ignored or overlooked. The basic nature of the acyroymn makes it adaptable yet the process generates considered responses open to critical evaluation.

2. *Shared Values: The* inter-agency approach is hindered by a police culture that is predominately detection orientated and the legacy of "fire brigade" policing has yet to be overcome. Successful initiatives and the emphasis placed on reduction by recent national objectives should encourage initially sceptical officers to accept the centrality of POP.

3. Skills: Response policing has conditioned officers to act on quickly made decisions and "hunches". Forces will need to invest in the delivery of comprehensive training packages to convince officers of the merits of **POP** and to develop the use of reflective models such as SARA if a "bottom-up" approach is to be encouraged.

4, *Structure:* The decentralisation of the West Midlands Police, through the sectorisation process, has resulted in a devolvement of local operational decision making. This process of empowerment is highly conducive to realising the potential of "bottom-up" **POP** initiatives creating a more energised and motivated organisation..

5. *(Management) Style:* The implementation of POP is neither structured from above nor wholly self-organising (bottom-up), but adopts both approaches. Officer empowerment changes management as many people become innovators and assume the accompanying responsibilities. The need for an overhead control structure is reduced and the service becomes more dynamic and responsive to local needs as a result. However managers have an important role to play as facilitators in developing an environment in which POP can flourish. POP's success is dependant on the development of mutually beneficial inter agency relationships. It is felt that senior officers have an important role to play in establishing such relationships and ensuring that they remain productive.

G, Systems: To effectively apply the SARA system officers must have access to good quality information.

7. *Staff* The POP concept has been dismissed as being unrealistically resource intensive, yet no extra resources were allocated to Herald and officers continued to perform their usual duties. Although it is felt that increased manpower would have resulted in greater success officers simply prioritised approaches and dismissed some reduction techniques such as security surveys as being too resource intensive.

4.0   Conclusions

- **Herald delivered measurable benefits, but** with the caveat that the units of performance measurement could have been influenced by external factors.

- The sector policing model is conducive to the SARA based POP approach.

- An interagency protocol considerably enhanced the partnership process.

- The willingness of external groups and organisations to become involved in "self-help " POP initiatives cannot be taken for granted.

- POP is not an alternative to "response" policing but may be a means of reducing the public demand for such services.

- The Crime and Disorder Act will assist **POP** and encourage a more holistic and less resource intensive approach to postmodern social problems. Senior officers, are ideally situated to adopt a leadership role in promoting the significance of POP both internally and externally by emphasising the collective responsibility implicit in the notion of "community safety".

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