

"OPERATION STREET STRIKE"

"A PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING OPERATION"

**THE HERMAN GOLDSTEIN AWARD
FOR EXCELLENCE IN PROBLEM
ORIENTED POLICING**

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"OPERATION STREET STRIKE"

***" THE HERMAN GOLDSTEIN AWARD FOR
EXCELLENCE IN PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING"***

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FORWARD

BY;

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ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE
(OPERATIONS)**

Problem Oriented Policing is beginning to have an impressive impact upon policing on both sides of the Atlantic. The simple but ingenious shift in emphasis from individual incident driven responses to the analysis of incident clusters to identify and tackle underlying problems within the community gives police officers a valuable 'head start' in solving those problems.

Until now, police work has been incident driven with officers regularly returning to the same or related incidents time and time again. This is inefficient costly and has the added effect of bringing the service into dis-repute with the public for a lack of problem solving ability. The public look to the police service to deal efficiently and effectively with their problems and they also look to the service to resolve them.

Operation "*Street Strike*" was borne out of the need to deal with mounting problems of crime and nuisance incidents. Performance was suffering and a means was needed to energise the force towards achieving better policing for the community.

During the summer of 1996, the new Chief Constable Mr Edward Crew, established a working group headed by myself, to examine the underlying problems and make recommendations about the best way forward. He suggested that an autumn initiative to

tackle crime and public nuisance could be impactful. During the following weeks it became clear that the force needed break out of the cycle of incident driven call handling.

The working group knew of Herman Goldsteins work, both his original paper published in 1979 and the subsequent work leading to his book in 1990 and saw this as an ideal opportunity to use the POP techniques as an "engine" for "*Street Strike*." We were all intrigued by the simplistic nature of the philosophy and keen to evaluate the effects over a whole force area. We expected some valuable lessons and some resistance to change but we did not expect *POP* to have the impact it did - *that was a very pleasant and welcome surprise!*

What sets "Operation Street Strike" apart from other *POP* operations is the scale. This operation used every police officer and civilian member of staff in the largest force in the country apart from the Metropolitan Police, for a five week period in a joint effort. It was not limited to a small area or to designated "squads" - it was truly a change in policing philosophy.

Operation "Street Strike" served the West Midlands well and has set the seal for a change in culture to one of "solving problems" not merely attending to them. Other operations have been undertaken as a direct result of the lessons learnt and based upon the same philosophy. A whole patrol strategy is being implemented and another "Problem Oriented Policing" operation on the same scale is in the design stage for this November.

Since the lessons of "*Street Strike*" and following the force re-organisation, we have seen a steady but sure upturn in performance. I look forward to further work in this field and commend "*Operation Street Strike*" to you as an example of what can be achieved.

TIMOTHY BRAIN PhD.
ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE
WEST MIDLANDS
JULY 1997.

ABSTRACT

THE OPERATION

Operation "*Street-Strike*," modelled upon the philosophy and concept of "*Problem Oriented Policing*" was launched on 28th October 1996 to tackle pre-identified problems of street crime and nuisance.

The operation ran until 2nd December 1997 and was the first operation of its kind in the United Kingdom in that it was a "whole force" response.

SCANNING & ANALYSIS

A programme of data collection, both qualitative and quantitative, was undertaken across the whole force area.

RESPONSES

The *targeted use of resources based upon quality Analysis* was the response choice for the initiative to deal with crime and public nuisance offences. This meant a rolling programme of real time intelligence, speedy analysis and prompt targeting of resources to combat identified problems as they arise.

ASSESSMENTS

Daily data returns were completed by each Division to assist in focusing resource activity and monitor performance in the areas impacting upon street crime and nuisance. Daily scanning and analysis to monitor and direct resources was supplemented by qualitative intelligence.

OPERATION "STREET STRIKE"

BACKGROUND -*The West Midlands*

The West Midlands Police covers an area of 89,874 hectares, has two City's and a number of large towns. There is a residential population of 2,637,200 and the force employs a police establishment of 7,150 officers. It is the largest urban police area in the United Kingdom and is at the heart of the nation geographically.

It is renowned as the birthplace of the modern industrial revolution where famous names such as WATT and MURDOCH began a science engineering revolution that would go on to change the world. The once heavy industry is now receding and the area is now becoming a fast growing diversified economy in technology, commerce, finance and tourism.

The West Midlands is comparable in size to some of the larger conurbation's in North America and Europe- Like its neighbours on other continents it suffers from an array of social problems. These include areas where there are high levels of unemployment and a multi ethnic and cultural population. As a contrast, there are areas in the south and north of the county where affluent suburbs contain some of the best housing and amenities in the United Kingdom.

The national motorway network flows through the area delivering high levels of private and commercial traffic. The industrial heart- land of the nation is in the grip of urban regeneration and

often competes well with other European Cities and capitals. In 1988 Birmingham, the largest City in the West Midlands, will host the G8 Summit with many of the worlds' leaders and politicians attending the latest in the now famous summits.

SCANNING

During the summer and early autumn of 1996, the force began to experience an upward trend in recorded crime. At the same time the trend in detected crime was disappointing and did not reflect the effort the force was making to satisfy the public in crime and nuisance matters.


Performance

Scanning illustrated a trend of rising crime; some 6% increase on the previous year, detection's per officer were falling; from 6.5% in the previous year to 5.5% in 1996. The detection rate for violent crime, much of which is street crime, fell from 48% to 43%.


A particular cause for concern was that in the late autumn months the force traditionally experiences a seasonal rise in crime. That, added to the late summer trend, gave rise to the concern that the late autumn period, notably November, could see record levels of crime and low detection rates. The following charts illustrate the problems faced.

THE FALLING DETECTION RATE

NOVEMBER 1993 - NOVEMBER 1995



THE FALLING DETECTION RATE - AUG - OCT 1996



ANALYSIS

The working group examined a number of issues in an effort to identify the cause and recommend a way forward. This involved both quantitative analysis of crime, performance and intelligence data and a qualitative assessment of our strategy in tackling crime and public nuisance offences. The group took the view that the "Haw" of policing was being neglected and that "Problem Oriented Policing" could provide benefits in filling this void.


A number of meetings were held with operational Commanders and staff at which the cause and effect of policing strategy was discussed in open forum and the data collected. Public Consultation Committees were consulted as part of our ongoing dialogue about matters of local concern to members of the public.

The Findings

The findings revealed that whilst the service achieved excellent results in terms of responding to incidents timely,¹ there was a lack lustre performance in terms of crime detection and solving problems at scenes visited. Interestingly, there was evidence that arrests "were not keeping pace with crime and nuisance activity and so it was postulated whether officers were attending the right locations. The force was demand lead and needed to focus more on managing, analysing and responding strategically to calls.

ILLUSTRATION OF FALLING ARREST RATE

NOVEMBER 1993 - NOVEMBER 1995



¹ In over 90% of cases, the service was responding to "Immediate Response" Calls within the nationally agreed timescale. In some cases this was even higher. Whilst it enhances response times it was found that it can as a side effect inhibit problem oriented approaches.

When this was explored in detail it was found that both operational officers and operational commanders, in deciding priority tasks, were largely responding without undertaking scanning and analysis to identify problems. *The Analysis revealed that the core problems were ;*

> A failure to seek data widely for scatmbtg

- A failure to scan available data to identify core root problems and repeated incidents*
- The failure to identify the problems meant that there was an inability to target the use of resources to those problems.*
- The failure to identify the problems meant that there was an inability to assess success rates by reference to those identified problems.*

Due to the lack of a "*problem solving approach*" to both strategic and tactical policing problems, the service was failing to address the real issues and problems the public saw in their districts on a daily basis. Local problems were identified on a ad hoc basis with little recourse to proper analysis and planning responses to target the problem.

RESPONSE

The working group recommended to the Command Team ² that a autumn crime and nuisance initiative should be set up to tackle those offences identified as "Street Crime" and the obvious month to aim the initiative at was November. The broad philosophy of "*Problem Oriented Policing*" and the *SARAH* approach should be used to target problem areas and functions to enhance effectiveness.

² **This is a team of Senior Commanders headed by the Chief Constable and responsible for force policy making.**

Following analysis, the categories of "street crime and public nuisance" chosen for the initiative were;

- Street Robbery - "Bag snatches, bicycles, Taxi Drivers etc"
- Street Violence - "Non-Domestic, drink/drug related, Pubs and Clubs"
- Public Nuisance - "Yobbery, Noise & Gangs"
- Damage - "Graffiti, wanton damage to property"
- Auto Crime - "Theft of Vehicles and Aggravated Taking"
- Drugs - "Crime & Nuisance created by Street Dealing"

The Response Goals were;

- Recorded Crime - Reduce it significantly
- Nuisance Offences and Incidents - Identify, React, Resolve
- Detection Rates - Improve them significantly
- Arrest Rates - Improve them significantly

The aim of the initiative was simple ; a centrally co-ordinated operation based upon the "Problem Oriented Policing Model" designed to move away from a mere response driven philosophy where the organisation was largely concerned to meet the demands of call handling.

This aim was supported by a commitment to an approach which literally empowered and encouraged officers of all ranks, including managers, to adopt a routinely logical problem solving attitude where policing would be driven by scanning available sources of data and information, both inside and outside the organisation, undertake analysis of that data to identify problems, and, most importantly, respond in ways designed to resolve the root cause of the problem.

If the cause was a crime matter then an arrest may be required but where there were other underlying causes other agencies were to be involved. Repeat calls to the same incident type, location or nature was to be seen as a need for further analysis and targeted responses. Nuisance

incidents were to be identified, monitored and resource allocation undertaken in such a way as to bring about resolutions.

One assumption was made at the outset of the design stage of this operation; that crime, social problems and nuisance are inextricably linked in a complex world of human relations and activities. Further, that there is no ultimate solution or formula that can be employed to eradicate these problems although the team was committed to the philosophy that early identification of tensions, public concern, crime information and intelligence, would do much to enable the force to respond in a targeted and logical way to the root causes as well as the effects.

Breaking Down The Barriers To Dynamic Free Thinking & Problem Solving

Policing philosophy had to be dynamic at all levels with officers being encouraged to think strategically and imaginatively to "flush out" the problems and design resolutions to them. Hierarchical top down management was discouraged with Headquarters Staff and the Central Co-ordinating Group having direct access to operational officers and vice versa by the use of Liaison Officers from all operational bases being invited to steer the operation.

Regular meetings and Newsletters aimed at operational officers were arranged to ensure this barrier to "free strategic thinking" was broken down.

Central Co - Ordinating - A Role at Headquarters³

The Central Co - Ordinating Group sat full time every day to provide assistance and advice with analysis, data collection, central resourcesⁱ to operational areas to support, and the provision of financial resources where the operational divisions could justify by analysis the need.

By agreement, on a daily basis, operational areas reported on their progress to the *Central Co - Ordinating Group* using the Data Collection Sheet attached at Appendix A

The Co - Ordinating Group encouraged operational divisions to constantly analyse and evaluate their policing problems and design strategic and tactical responses to overcome them. Original thought and imagination by operational officers resulting success were published in a force wide newsletter. This was published every two days and sent to every operational base in the West Midlands. This was designed to assist in spreading positive imaginative work and "Good Practice."

Was Zero Tolerance An Option ?

"*Street Strike*" was not designed to be a "*Zero Tolerance*" approach to enforcement of the criminal law. Some divisions expressed an interest in undertaking a "*Zero Tolerance*" approach during consultation but after consideration, it was decided that "*Zero Tolerance*" lacked many of the benefits of the imaginative, holistic and targeted problem solving principles that are inherent in "*Problem Solving Approaches*."

³ This group comprised Assistant Chief Constable, Heads of Uniform and CID Departments, Media Liaison, Community Affairs & Crime Prevention, Force Crime Co Ordinator.

⁴ This included Operational Support Unit, Traffic Officers and vehicles, Horses, Drugs Squad, Dogs.

Another reason for rejecting "*Zero Tolerance*" was that it was a poorly defined methodology. It also had the effect of articulating a narrow enforcement response. Another area of concern was that it may erode the philosophy of "*applied discretion*" - something the "*British Bobby*" is famous for. Engaging the public not alienating it was a key feature of the operation. One division suggested that "Cautioning Offenders" should be suspended during the operation but again, this was felt to diminish the doctrine of "applied discretion" and not in tune with engaging the public in a joint problem oriented venture.

Engaging The Community & The Media

Engaging the community was extremely important in gaining real time intelligence and evidence of criminal activity. This was achieved by early use of the media and encouraging operational officers to blend with local contacts and communities. Regular updates on regional radio and television of successes and further appeals for assistance resulted in some very encouraging feedback from the public. It took us by surprise the level of support personally voiced by members of the police authority to the Chief Constable about how pleased local resident groups were with the operation. This was real evidence of the way the approach adopted by *the whole force* had on confidence. We found that the "feel good factor" came very much quicker and perhaps more subtly than we expected. See Appendix B - Examples of Media Clips.

Engaging The Force

The emphasis for the Force was on *Team Policing and Directed Patrol* based on analysis of local problems and crime & problem analysis. The effectiveness of the initiative depended upon receiving

high amounts of quality information from the community to be utilised to "Hotspot"⁵ crime and nuisance areas for police targeting.

The public were needed as an "alarm system" for intelligence and as providers of evidence for use in court. The police were expected to engage in supporting positive community spirit - a role of particular importance for Community Beat Officers, Special Constables and Traffic Wardens within the community.

A Whole Force Response - Not A Limited or "Ring Fenced Option.

Another important feature of "Street Strike" was that it was intended to focus the *whole force* in a co-ordinated effort. Other "Problem Oriented Policing" initiatives undertaken within the United Kingdom had been local or "ring fenced" operations using small teams of dedicated officers. This operation sought the whole force to be involved as a pilot for a given period of time. If successful it could be used to form the basis of further force wide operations.

Information Technology - Crime & Problem Pattern Analysis

Information technology was used to identify times, dates and locations of persistent problems of crime and disorder at a local level. This had a number of advantages but chiefly it rendered the ability to pinpoint problems early and could be used in appropriate circumstances to provide evidence of previous activities of criminals.⁶

⁵ This term became common place among all staff to describe Analysis and Response functions.

⁶ Not only does this have management utility, it can also be used as Real Evidence. In English Law this is referred to as "Evidence of Similar Fact" or "System Evidence." *The proof of serial crimes such as burglary, auto theft and sexual offences can be investigated using this type of evidence to prove links between cases and criminals. POP has multiple uses.*

The Central Co - Ordinating Group gave considerable thought to the role of computational technology within the force especially in the area of analysis. The benefits of using "Crime and Incident Pattern Analysis"⁷ technology, which was available to the force, was emphasised as being of the utmost importance in the furtherance of directed response initiatives. However, there are many other databases available within the force which were clearly under-used as rich data sources. These were also recommended as sources of vital patterning data.⁸

Real Time Analysis and Response

The Central Co - Ordinating Group emphasised the importance of undertaking "Real Time Analysis" to ensure that directed strategies were timely and intelligible to the public and officers engaged in delivery.

Any applications for additional funds from Headquarters to finance special or directed operations had to be supported by analysis and evidence. See Appendix C. This is an example of analysis of a local street crime problem. The analysis was detailed, imaginative and directed at answering the times and days when targeted patrols and detection initiatives should be mounted. Technology aided analysis was vital to achieve this in "real time."

Measuring Progress and Responses

Measuring progress of the initiative was seen to be of utmost importance in undertaking the operation and assessing how successful the force could be using the *SARAH* principles. This served a number of purposes;

⁷ The force has access to a software package to assist with Inferential Analysis.

⁸ An example is the *Command & Control Computer*; this has data about every incident the force responds to and the *Search Facilities* can be used to identify repeat problems of crime and nuisance. One division made very wide use of this source.

Firstly, the Central Co-ordinating Group could evaluate performance and where necessary give advice and guidance on initiatives and ideas.

Secondly, it served to measure success against a background of historical data for similar periods.

Thirdly, it provided a gauge for assessing which of the operational areas required further assistance and whether their applications for additional resources could be justified. Resources are valuable and expensive therefore they must be used to resolve identified problems to prevent repeat calls.

Target Rich Locations

Local plans to meet the objectives of the initiative but, within the overall aim of reducing crime, reducing nuisance incidents, enhancing detection rates and using problem solving approaches to intelligence lead tactics, were designed to ensure officers worked within "target rich" locations. In order to achieve this it was imperative that continued scanning, analysis and priorities were cascaded to operational staff, and, further, that those operational staff had an unrestricted input into imaginative reasoning in prioritising responses.

Quantitative Data Measurement

A "Daily Data Return Sheet" See Appendix A⁹ was used by every operational division to return details in particular fields to the Central Co - Ordinating Group. This information was analysed and fed back out to the whole force. See Appendix D - An example of the comparative data analysis undertaken, this was done on a daily basis and in appropriate forms depending upon what issues and questions were relevant at the time. This facilitated each operational division a means of evaluating their performance against similar areas within the county. The "Daily Data Return Sheet" was designed to meet a number of purposes:-

- *ensure "real time management information" could be used to analyse and identify problem areas*
- *allocate central resources to the operational Areas where they were most needed*
- *feed back best practices which were found to produce best outcomes.*

Measurement criteria were set in a number of key areas designed to support the strategy and to enhance performance in achieving the goals set. The categories were :

- *The number of arrests made in the crime and nuisance categories*¹⁰
- *The number of persons charged or cautioned*¹¹
- *The number of referrals to other agencies in an attempt to treat root social causes*¹²
- *The number of primary detection's*¹³
- *The number of resolved Nuisance Incidents*¹⁴
- *The number of street offences recorded*¹⁵

⁹ The Data Sheet was completed and analysed daily. Cumulative data was also prepared in order to keep the data "Real Time." The example in the Appendix is one of those completed every day for the whole of the operation.

¹⁰ The categories of street crime and nuisance designed as the focus of the operation.

¹¹ See 3. above.

¹² Social Services, The House Department of the Council, The Probation Service, The Education Department.

¹³ Charged or Cautioned.

¹⁴ Resolved in line with SARAH principles.

¹⁵ This provided a backdrop of the level of crime pertaining during the period of the operation.

- *The number of Stop & Search powers used for street and nuisance incidents*
- *The number of arrests from Stop & Search¹⁶*
- *The number of persons entered onto One National DNA Database¹⁷*
- *The number of searches conducted of premises for evidence^M*

Qualitative Measurement - A Real World View

A "NewsLetter" was published every two days to the force with details of distinguished work and best practice initiatives. The "Newsletters" served to illustrate a more qualitative view of the initiative and it's success in a "real world" sense.

ASSESSMENT

Methods of Evaluation

The evaluation of the initiative was part of the initiative itself. From the outset the Co - Ordinating Group felt that it was important to evaluate effectiveness both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In order to assess how effective strategic plans were, the group felt that it was important to be in a position to continually evaluate progress. The Co - Ordinating Group, the Liaison Officers and the operational staff all had a part to play in evaluation. Exchange of data and information in the form of the Data Sheet, Newsletter, E Mail and informal meetings served this purpose well.

¹⁶ This provided a backdrop of the level of successful searches undertaken. Searches should be directed by proper suspicion and analysis of circumstances not merely upon a vague hunch.

¹⁷ The DNA Database in the United Kingdom collects DNA profiles (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) from persons charged or cautioned with "Recordable Offences." All street offences are "Recordable." DNA serves the purposes of public safety, crime detection and prevention because it identifies the donor of material left at the scene of a crime or on the victim with relative ease. The DNA Database allows excellent analytical work to link crimes and suspects thereby facilitating rapid and effective responses.

¹⁸ Under Section 17, 18 and 32 of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Problems - In Implementing The Response

Implementing the plan in the early days was to some degree difficult. There was a degree of resistance to the response culture to one of a problem solving culture.

This meant a special effort had to be made by the Central Co - Ordinating Group and the organisation as a whole to procreate the benefits that could be achieved.

Almost to the end there were opponents who had to be listened to and counselled towards the response. However, as the initiative progressed and the results were seen to be developing positively, most were converted to the philosophy of the initiative and problem oriented approaches. Finally, when the results were published to the force and the national media, the results spoke for themselves.

De Briefing Sessions

During the personal de - briefing sessions held on operational divisions and with the Co Ordinating Group, there were clear signals from the operational staff, the Constables and front line staff, that "*Street Strike*" had empowered them to do the job they joined the service to do - *to deal with problems in the community for the community in areas where there was most need.*

Qualitative Assessment

It was agreed that assessing the initiative by means only of numeric data would lose some of the finer "holistic and human qualities" impacting upon progress. In order to achieve this, the Co - Ordinating Group maintained contact with the operational divisions by a variety of means to

informally discuss progress and barriers. Where necessary, the findings of these meetings and discussions were published to all other operational divisions. These were intentionally informal open discussions and officers were encouraged to influence their own and others thinking both locally and centrally to generate better or alternative ideas.

A Message From The Criminal

During the mid stages of the operation, the Co Ordinating Group received a message from an "under cover" Drugs Squad detective who admitted that at first he too was sceptical.

This officer was undertaking sensitive work in infiltrating illicit street trading in drugs and had been party to several conversations where known drug dealers had voiced their intention not to trade in the West Midlands due to the new effective style of targeted policing taking place. They had become aware of the high likelihood of arrest!

Personal visits to operational bases were undertaken, E Mail with all operational divisions was established and regular meetings were held with liaison officers established for the purpose on each operational division.

Quantitative Evaluation

This was done by collecting data on a daily basis from the operational divisions and evaluating it daily. Spreadsheets were prepared from the data returns from operational divisions and following analysis using a software package ¹⁹ it was fed back out to the operational divisions for their information. The data was also subject to informal discussion and assessment against the

¹⁹ Microsoft Excel.

background of knowledge gained by personal contact with the operational divisions and the Liaison Officers.

The Results


The results of the initiative in terms of the response goals were as follows;

- Arrests in November 1996 were 35% higher than November 1995 - *the trend was reversed.*
- 78% of Nuisance Incidents were Resolved - No previous data was available but qualitative feedback was encouraging.
- Primary Detection's were up 21% on previous November - *The trend was reversed.*
- Recorded Crime was down by 16% on previous November - *The trend was reversed.*


In other areas there were significant upturns in performance;

- Over 16,500 suspects were stopped and searched as a result of targeted problem solving.
- Over 7,000 arrests were made for "Street Crime" as a result of targeted problem solving.
- Over 1,800 premises were searched using problem solving philosophy to discover evidence after arrests were made.
- Over 4,000 DNA Samples were placed onto the National DNA Database from offenders.
- 6234 Nuisance Incidents were identified of which 4861 were Resolved. (78% Resolved.)


Recorded Crime - A Significant Drop in November 1996




Total Detection's as a Percentage of Recorded Crime - A Significant Upturn in November 1996



Total Arrests - This was the Highest Number Ever Recorded By The Force



Primary Detection's as a Percentage of Recorded Crime



Displacement

One of the fears associated with any targeted police operation is the effect of displacement. The advantage with "Street-StriW" was that it was implemented across the whole force area and involved every officer and civilian member of staff. This had the effect of alleviating displacement effects. Contact with surrounding forces did not reveal any significant effects of displacement.

The Police Authority Meeting - Post "Street Strike"

The Police Authority²⁰ meeting held after the initiative discussed the operation as part of the Agenda for that day. Many of the elected members ^ gave positive messages of congratulations to the force from their constituents and requested further operations in the future. There was evidence that public confidence and safety had been improved as a direct result of the operation.

A Way Forward For The Future

Operation "Street Strike" was so successful that it has changed the culture of the force towards a more "Problem Oriented Response" to both crime and public nuisance matters. The effects are continuing;

1. Operation "Wheel Strike," a targeted operation based upon the principles learnt in "Street Strike" was undertaken early in 1997. The results were another success for "Problem Oriented Responses." &
2. The force has designed a patrol strategy based upon the lessons learnt from "Street Strike" and modelled on SARAH. This is being distributed to all operational officers with SARAH principles highlighted and strategies to deal with problems explained.

²⁰ **The Police Authority is a body established in every police area by statute law to oversee the operational efficiency of the force. They meet regularly and the Authority is comprised of both elected and government appointed persons.**

²¹ **Local Government Council members.**

²² **Significant upturns in the identification of patterned problems resulted in enhanced detections and lower crime levels.**

3. After "*Street Strike*," the force recruited •"Intelligence and Evidence Analysts" for every operational unit in the force area to assist in problem oriented approaches. These Analysts all work with software packages and force data bases to assist operational staff to identify problems and responses.
4. In November 1997, the force will launch Operation "***Burglary Strike***" to again benefit from the lessons learnt. This will again be a "*Problem Oriented Response*." The author is currently working on the Scanning and Analysis stages of the forthcoming initiative and there is a marked enthusiasm from officers awaiting the "Response" stage.
5. Each of these initiatives is built upon the philosophy of problem oriented approaches and apply across the whole force in an effort to avoid "ring fenced" initiatives and displacement problems.

CONCLUSION

"Problem Oriented Policing," delivered a simple logical process of analytical problem solving where patterning and clustering incidents allowed the force to respond in ways to resolve those problems.

This did much to change a culture where previously there was duplication of effort, a lack of clarity about local crime and nuisance problems and a correspondingly disappointing set of results.

"Street Strike" illustrated that analytical fact management and analysis is central to the successful use of problem oriented approaches delivering order where previously there might easily have been confusion and even chaos.

Probably the greatest benefit to come from the operation was a realisation within the force that logical problem solving by clearly identifying problems and matching those problems with workable solutions is not only desirable, it is also achievable and successful.

RICHARD M. LEARY. LLB (Hons)

CO - ORDINATOR (INSPECTOR)

"OPERATION STREET STRIKE"

APPENDIX "A"

DATA COLLECTION SHEET

OPERATION 'STREET-STRIKE' DAILY DATA COLLECTION FROM DIVISIONS TO FORCE INTELLIGENCE

28/10/96

STREET STRIKE	A1	A2	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	L	M	TOTAL
Arrested for												
a) Street Robbery	0		7	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	12
b) Theft from Person	1		1	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	1	9
c) Street Violence	0		4	9	5	5	0	0	0	0	2	25
d) Sexual Offences	0		1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
e) Public Nuisance	4	2	11	1	17	22	2	5	0	1	5	64
f) Damage	0		4	0	1	6	2	1	0	1	1	16
g) Drugs	1		7	2	1	2	0	2	0	1	1	18
h) Auto Crime	6		12	4	15	2	5	4	0	0	0	42
Number of Arrests (A1)	12	2	47	16	41	43	20	12	4	4	10	166
Number of Charges	16	18	77	11	0	38	21	5	2	12	4	70
Number of Cautions	1	2	17	6	1	7	3	5	1	1	3	44
Number of NFA	0		14	4	0	8	1	2	1	2	1	33
Number of Referrals	1		1	3	0	0	5	1	0	7	1	18
Number of Primary Detections	6		47	6	0	20	19	8	3	8	7	118
No. of Nuisance Inc's	4	1	0	18	0	19	39	19	10	20	12	137
No. Resolves Nuisance Inc's	3		0	12	0	19	39	11	10	8	3	102
No. Street Crimes	0		102	33	0	32	3	48	58	10	2	288
No. Stop & Search	96	14	28	69	0	79	10	26	58	10	20	300
No. S & S and Arrest Made	0		1	0	0	2	2	1	3	0	0	9
No. DNA (Crim Just Samples)	1		14	11	0	14	15	7	6	12	0	79
No. DNA (Scene Samples)	2		0	0	0	2	0	2	3	0	0	7
No. Sec 17,18 & 32 PACE	1		2	5	0	0	0	4	1	4	3	19

A1 (Operations)-Prisoner(s) arrested as a direct result of an action/operation planned by Operations Divisional Personnel

A1 (Support) - Prisoner(s) arrested as a direct result of an action/operation planned by Divisional (D-M) Personnel

OPERATION 'STREET STRIKE' CUMULATIVE DATA TO 2 DECEMBER 1996

STREET STRIKE	A1	A2	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	L	M	TOTAL
Arrested for												
a) Street Robbery	25	5	61	26	101	39	10	25	22	26	14	324
b) Theft from Person	24	1	144	52	6	54	0	17	35	7	48	343
c) Street Violence	61	10	188	156	189	104	124	74	76	53	98	1060
d) Sexual Offences	14	4	22	13	10	32	7	9	10	7	18	128
e) Public Nuisance	231	51	302	283	467	524	153	168	184	103	235	2439
f) Damage	11	4	97	85	54	124	63	71	62	61	91	708
g) Drugs	106	37	214	88	128	76	77	35	56	57	72	803
h) Auto Crime	334	57	226	224	169	79	154	101	138	47	159	1297
Number of Arrests (a-h)	808	169	1252	827	1144	1032	508	500	543	361	735	7122
Number of Charges	327	55	403	482	514	503	245	168	287	172	332	3104
Number of Cautions	128	42	288	179	352	225	134	167	92	61	139	1657
Number of NFA	26	3	502	174	221	238	197	106	191	113	151	1891
Number of Referrals	51	9	419	94	13	60	11	59	105	645	117	1523
Number of Primary Detections	161	37	899	487	323	310	548	211	457	387	907	4529
No. of Nuisance Inc's	181	54	1238	1069	407	554	805	851	575	278	457	6234
No. Resolves Nuisance Inc's	175	43	1153	908	340	453	613	446	528	232	188	4861
No. Street Crimes	108	44	3365	1771	1280	1681	1627	1692	1718	791	1696	15821
No. Stop & Search	4241	749	3352	2118	768	1535	1527	1681	2245	2038	1797	17061
No. S & S and Arrest Made	156	60	270	173	41	106	131	70	115	49	90	1045
No. DNA (Crim Just Samples)	244	32	647	401	547	509	369	282	533	207	411	3918
No. DNA (Scene Samples)	27	9	7	12	11	17	13	13	14	21	12	120
No. Sec 17,18 & 32 PACE	102	12	386	244	265	253	166	76	157	133	169	1849

A1 (Operations)-Prisoner(s) arrested as a direct result of an action/operation planned by Operations Divisional Personnel
 A2 (Support) - Prisoner(s) arrested as a direct result of an action/operation planned by Divisional (D-M) Personnel

This data is subject to change when outstanding information has been received from Divisions.

◀ **"OPERATION STREET STRIKE"**

APPENDIX "C"

AMPLE LOCAL ANALYSIS

Chart10

FIVE WAYS - OFFENCES BY DAY





Chart13

FIVE WAYS - OFFENCES BY HOUR




"OPERATION STREET STRIKE"

APPENDIX "D"


COMPARATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

AN EXAMPLE

**Street Strike - Public Nuisance Arrests
per 100 Officers by Division**




Street Strike Primary Detections per 100 Officers




This data is subject to change when outstanding information has been recieved from Divisions. 18/07/97

Street Strike - Crime Arrests and those resulting in DNA (CJ samples) being taken



Street Strike Crime Arrests and those resulting in S.17, 18 or 32 Pace Searches by Division



This data is subject to change when outstanding information has been recieved from Divisions. 18/07/97