

# Evaluation of the Target Hardening Pilot Programme

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# Foreword

Burglary is a crime that can have a profound effect on its victims. It is also one of New Zealand's most common crimes. As a result, the NZ public and government are concerned to see a reduction in burglary.

We have become aware over recent years that some households are more prone to burglary than others. Household surveys show that a small proportion of households experience burglary a number of times over a relatively short period. Moreover, lower socio-economic households are more likely to be repeat victims of burglary. Because of these findings, government was concerned to find a way to assist these victims, both to reduce the trauma for those who experienced multiple burglary, and also to reduce the overall burglary rate.

This report presents an evaluation of a pilot Target Hardening Programme which began operating as a response to these concerns in the Auckland area in April 2001. It is funded by the Ministry of Justice and administered by the New Zealand Council of Victim Support Groups (Victim Support). Since its inception, it has operated across seven Victim Support areas in the greater Auckland region. Under the scheme, improvements to home security, generally by way of installation of deadlocks, window locks and, less often, alarms to the homes of low income earners whose properties have been burgled twice in less than a year.

The evaluation report is the result of a collaboration between the Ministry of Justice, the New Zealand Council of Victim Support Groups, the New Zealand Police, and the researchers from the Institute of Public Policy at Auckland University of Technology and the Ministry of Justice. It suggests a number of areas where improvements can be made to the programme's operation and underlying criteria. The report is an important source of information for future policy development relating to initiatives to reduce repeated victimisation, particularly repeated burglary.

Belinda Clark  
Secretary for Justice



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We appreciated feedback from the advisory group, including representatives from the Crime Prevention Unit, NZ Police, and Victim Support, and convened by the Research and Evaluation Unit of the Ministry of Justice. We would also like to acknowledge Sue Carswell’s contribution to an early draft of the evaluation proposal.

The Authors



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# Executive summary

The Target Hardening Programme (THP) was developed by the Ministry of Justice to provide increased home security and at the same time provide burglary prevention information. The core of the THP centres on the provision of security equipment such as dead bolts on doors, window locks and burglar alarms to lower socio-economic households that have been burgled twice or more within a year.

Victim Support administers the THP and Chubb NZ installs the security equipment. The New Zealand Police have responsibility for referring repeat burglary victims to Victim Support. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for funding the programme.

In April 2001, a pilot of the THP began operating in seven Auckland Victim Support areas: West Auckland, Auckland Central, Manukau, Counties, North Shore, Hibiscus Coast, and North Rodney. Between April 2001 and July 2002, the THP upgraded the security of 167 Auckland households.

Two studies have been conducted to evaluate this pilot. In June 2002, the Institute of Public Policy (IPP) at Auckland University of Technology was contracted to examine the outcomes of the THP for a sample of THP participants and their families and to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the THP.

The IPP evaluation team interviewed 41 adults and eight children from 37 households who had participated in the THP in Auckland. In addition, 26 key stakeholders were interviewed, including Victim Support managers, staff and volunteers; Victim Support National Office; subcontracted assessors; Chubb NZ; Housing New Zealand Corporation; New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice THP Steering Committee.

The Ministry of Justice also conducted a complementary study aiming to measure whether THP households were less likely to experience repeat burglary compared with all households in the area. Because of key limitations in the data for this exercise the objective was not achieved. However the Ministry of Justice study has revealed some important findings relating to the operation of the THP.

## **Key findings: Interviews with THP participants and stakeholders**

### **The perceptions of adult participants in the THP**

- Revictimisation following the THP of three of the 37 interviewed households was because of human error rather than failure of the upgraded security system.
- All the interviewees who had received Target Hardening felt their house was more secure and their fears after the burglaries had reduced.

- As a result of their involvement in the THP, interviewees felt more aware of the need for security around their home and accordingly some had changed their routines.
- Most of the interviewees were appreciative of the support given to them after the burglary by Victim Support as well as the information provided by Victim Support about the THP.
- Recipients of THP were appreciative that the THP security upgrade had been at no cost to the householder, but some interviewees were disappointed not to be able to access the full range of security systems, including an alarm.

### **The perceptions of children within households participating in the THP**

- For most of the eight children in the sample the burglaries increased their fear of victimisation and reduced their feelings of personal security. All of the children were fully aware of the way in which their house had been broken into.
- Children experienced several kinds of loss since the burglaries: loss of material possessions, loss of trust in the people around them, and a loss of a sense of their home as a 'safe haven'.
- The children of the Target Hardened households were aware of the security upgrade since the burglaries and believed that it had made a difference. All the children reported that they were now more careful about locking windows and doors.

### **The efficiency and effectiveness of implementation of the THP: stakeholder views**

- Victim Support respondents in all areas expressed concern at delays in repeat burglary referrals by Police. A delay in referral meant a delay in assessment and ultimately a delay in any security upgrade.
- It was apparent that NZ Police were not well briefed on the THP and the processes for making referrals.
- The information on repeat burglaries provided to Victim Support by the District Police Intelligence and Information Centres in each of the three Police districts was problematic because it did not distinguish residential and non-residential repeat burglaries. The need to check this list was a barrier to the timely implementation of the THP.
- The THP assessment process worked well when one Victim Support staff member or subcontracted assessor did all the assessment, but was less satisfactory where Victim Support relied on Community Constables to do the assessment.
- Most Victim Support groups strictly applied the eligibility criteria but would have preferred greater autonomy to apply discretion in providing Target Hardening assistance to low income repeat burglary victims who did not have a Community Services Card.

- All Victim Support workers believed that the THP should be available to a wider range of burglary victims as well as victims of other types of crime such as domestic violence.
- Victim Support workers agreed that the \$50 allowance from the Ministry of Justice was inadequate recompense for the time and travel expended on each case.
- Relationships between Victim Support, Chubb NZ and the subcontracted assessors were good. Negotiation with Housing New Zealand Corporation over installing Target Hardening in their rented homes had been problematic. Some of those interviewed suggested that HNZC develop a nationwide policy for THP.
- The contract with Chubb NZ set the average price per household for Target Hardening at about \$750 whereas the cost for all installations averaged around \$800.
- The feedback that stakeholders received from clients of the THP has been positive.

## **Key findings: Repeat burglary analysis of Police recorded data**

### **Extent of burglary revictimisation**

In the Manukau, Counties, West Auckland, and North Shore Victim Support areas 21 (16%) of the 129 THP households experienced a total of 27 burglaries (including attempted burglaries) following THP installation, with 16 households experiencing one burglary; four experiencing two burglaries; and one experiencing three burglaries after receiving their Target Hardening security equipment. Only one of the 21 households that experienced a burglary following THP installation received additional THP security equipment. Burglary victimisation following THP installation ranged from within one week following installation to well over a year.

### **THP households compared to total Victim Support areas**

The rate of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for all dwellings in the West Auckland Victim Support area was between 9% and 10%, and was less than the rate of 30% experienced by the THP households.

The rate of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for all dwellings in the Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas at 13% was similar to the rate of 14% experienced by the THP households.

Caution should be exercised in comparing the THP households and total Victim Support areas rates of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation because of:

- the small numbers in the THP samples (20 for West Auckland, 107 for Counties and Manukau);
- an inability to distinguish attempted and completed burglaries in the data; and
- differing time periods of analysis among households.

## **Why was THP households' rate of revictimisation not lower than that for all households in Victim Support areas?**

This finding does not necessarily indicate that THP was not successful to some extent in preventing repeat burglaries because:

- Non-THP households in the Victim Support areas may have also increased their security.
- The rate of repeat burglary victimisation for the THP households may have been higher had they not received THP security equipment.
- The results are based on Police recorded burglary data and may be influenced by differences in reporting practices between THP households and the remaining households in the Victim Support areas.

## **Why did burglaries occur following THP installation?**

Police data showed that at least half of the recorded burglaries following THP could be attributed to THP failure. That is, the point of entry was either an area where security equipment had been installed, but was not in use at the time, or an area that had not been secured by THP. On the other hand, for close to a third of the recorded repeat burglaries (which included attempted burglaries) THP was effective in that entry was prevented by the Target Hardening equipment. For the remaining recorded burglaries, it was unclear from the data why a repeat burglary had occurred.

## **Conclusions**

The two studies which comprise this evaluation have produced useful information about how the THP might be improved. However, the evaluation conducted to date has not been conclusive on the overall effectiveness of the THP in reducing the incidence of repeat burglary among Target Hardened households.

The findings are clear however that the programme contributed to reducing the fears of the small group of adults and children interviewed. There was also a high level of satisfaction with the THP. Because these findings represent a small non-random sample, some caution should be exercised in generalising to all programme participants.

The process evaluation has identified referral difficulties from Police to Victim Support. This referral is key to ensuring eligible victims access the programme. The findings have also revealed some inconsistencies in approach and the application of criteria between Victim Support areas, and a lack of awareness in some areas of the levels of discretion within the programme. A number of key informants questioned the initial criteria set for the programme and believed they should be broadened.

Elements of good practice which can be drawn from the findings are:

- Early referral from Police by means of Offence Reports which clearly identify repeat residential burglaries.

- The employment of one Victim Support worker or sub-contracted assessor to carry out all the THP assessments for an area.
- Making use of the discretion within the programme when eligibility criteria are a barrier to meeting real need.
- Combining THP with support and information from Victim Support and feedback from Police about the burglary investigation.

A number of factors, rather than actual programme failure, may account for the apparent failure to reduce repeat burglaries among THP households identified in the analysis of Police recorded data. It is possible that data deficiencies, some non-THP burgled households perhaps taking similar steps to increase their own security, or THP households perhaps being more likely than other households to report burglaries, together or separately explain the apparent lack of reduction in repeat burglaries.

While the repeat burglary analysis could not conclude whether the THP had been effective in reducing repeat burglary, it has pointed to some issues relating to the objectives and operation of the programme. It raises the question of whether the THP is intended to prevent both completed and attempted burglaries, or whether unsuccessful burglary attempts following the installation of security equipment should be viewed as a success of the scheme. Because few of the programme participants who experienced a repeat burglary were interviewed, we do not know whether further attempted burglaries heightened or reduced participants' sense of safety and security.

The repeat burglary analysis does show that in some cases repeated completed burglaries did occur among Target Hardened households. At least half of the recorded burglaries of Target Hardened households were completed burglaries. The reasons which could be deduced from Police data for completed repeat burglaries pointed to either failure on the part of the householders to use the equipment properly, or to failure of the THP to secure all entry points in the house. The analysis also shows that Victim Support was largely unaware that the programme had not prevented revictimisation of these households, and thus further security equipment or advice was not provided. This would appear to be an important shortcoming in the communication between those responsible for the effective operation of the programme and its clients.

Any further evaluation of the programme should include a similar repeat burglary comparison with equivalent follow-up periods and differentiate between attempted and completed burglaries. Moreover, any further evaluation should be conducted with a larger sample of programme clients, with all households experiencing a burglary following Target Hardening invited to take part.

The findings suggest that while the programme has demonstrated some benefits for participants, a number of processes could be improved to ensure that the service is reaching those for whom it is intended. Further expansion of the programme should be delayed until these issues are addressed.





# Introduction

Burglary (the breaking and entering of a premise with intent to commit a crime) is one of New Zealand's highest recorded crimes. In 2002, the New Zealand Police recorded 60,404 burglaries (New Zealand Police, 2003). Some individual households experience several burglaries. This can be very traumatic for the victims.

The New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims (2001) found that burglary victimisation is likely to be linked to the level of security measures in place when victims were burgled. Twenty-two percent of burglary victims had no security measures in place at the time of the burglaries and 24 percent of burglaries involved entry through an insecure or open entry point, with damage caused in 51 percent of burglaries. Repeat burglaries were more likely to be in residences of people from lower socio-economic groups.

Overseas, it has been found that offering assistance to recent burglary victims not only gives victims support in a time of crisis but has also been successful in reducing repeat victimisation. Farrell and Pease (1993) for example found that the most effective response to repeat burglary victimisation is when it is provided within a short time of the burglary occurring.

In 2001, reducing the incidence and effects of residential burglary became one of the key focus areas for the New Zealand Police (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). Reducing repeat victimisation, situational crime prevention, reducing burglary, and assisting victims have also been on-going priorities for the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). As a result, MOJ and the New Zealand Police formed a Steering Group to develop policy proposals targeting repeat burglary victims and burglary locations.

## The Target Hardening Programme

The Target Hardening Programme (THP) was one response developed by that Steering Group. The objectives of the Programme were to prevent repeat burglary victimisation of lower socio-economic households and increase victims' sense of security by "hardening" or increasing the security of households that are burglary targets, hence the project's name.

The Programme aimed to provide burglary prevention information and offer increased home security (e.g. the installation of security equipment such as dead bolts on doors, window locks and burglar alarms) to lower socio-economic households that had been burgled twice or more within a year.

Victim Support was chosen by the Steering Committee to administer the Programme. The Ministry of Justice had responsibility for the funding. Chubb NZ was awarded the contract by Victim Support to install all the security equipment. The New Zealand Police had responsibility for referring repeat burglary victims.

In April 2001 a pilot of the THP began operating in seven Auckland Victim Support areas: West Auckland, Auckland Central, Manukau, Counties, North Shore, Hibiscus Coast, and North Rodney.

## **The THP process**

The process for implementing the THP requires that once Victim Support has received a referral, the client is contacted within 72 hours to confirm their eligibility for the programme.

To be eligible to receive Target Hardening support, the client has to:

- Have been burgled twice or more at their current residence in the past twelve months;
- Live within an area covered by the THP;
- Belong to a lower socio-economic group (generally determined by having a current Community Services Card, although a discretionary clause does allow for those who do not have a card but are on a low income to be considered);
- Have the approval of the owner if in a rental property;
- Meet the “interests of justice”. (Victim Support has the discretion to provide Target Hardening to clients who do not meet the other criteria when it is in the “interests of justice”, e.g. when a client does not have a Community Services Card, but is still on a low income. Conversely, applications are not accepted when it would be unlikely to be beneficial e.g. where the client has been consistently negligent in keeping their property secure.)

A Victim Support volunteer or security assessor then visits the client so they may complete an application form (TH1). As many THP clients live in rental properties, written consent from the property’s owner has to be obtained for the security equipment to be installed (TH2). The local Victim Support manager then faxes the application and owner’s consent forms to the Victim Support National Office, indicating what response class the client is eligible to receive.

The THP offers a graduated response to repeat burglary victims:

- Victims burgled twice or more in twelve months who do not have security locks receive a Class A response (e.g. new locks).
- Victims who have been burgled three times or more and already have security locks receive a Class B response (e.g. the loan of an audible burglar alarm).
- A Class C response is sometimes given in addition to Class A or B, and can include the installation of security screens and/or new lighting.

- All clients also receive general information on burglary prevention behaviour. Fire safety information and fire alarms may also be given by the Fire Service to ensure that the increased security does not impede residents' escape from a fire.

Once Victim Support National Office has approved the claim, the security assessor arranges for Chubb NZ to conduct a security assessment and install the required security equipment within five days receipt of the original referral to Victim Support. The job sheet from Chubb NZ is then sent back to National Office.

Clients are advised that they must inform Victim Support if they are burgled again following their Target Hardening, and are contacted six months following the installation of the security equipment to establish how well their new security equipment is working.

Between April 2001 and July 2002, the THP Pilot upgraded the security of 167 Auckland households at a total cost of approximately \$150,000.

## **The Target Hardening Pilot Programme Evaluation**

Two studies have been conducted to evaluate this pilot. In June 2002, the Institute of Public Policy at Auckland University of Technology was contracted by the Ministry of Justice to evaluate the THP in Auckland. The key tasks of the THP evaluation were (i) to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the THP for key stakeholders i.e. Victim Support, New Zealand Police, subcontracted assessors, Chubb NZ and Housing New Zealand Corporation and (ii) to examine the outcomes the THP achieved for the repeat burglary victims and their families.

The IPP evaluation team interviewed 41 adults and eight children from 37 households who had participated in the THP in Auckland. The findings from this section of the study represent the experiences and views of a small non-random sample of THP participants. In addition, 26 key stakeholders were interviewed, representing the views of Victim Support managers, staff and volunteers; Victim Support National Office; subcontracted assessors; Chubb NZ; Housing New Zealand Corporation; New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice THP Steering Committee.

The Ministry of Justice conducted a complementary study aiming to measure whether THP households were less likely to experience repeat burglary compared with all households in the area. Because of key limitations in the data for this exercise the objective was not achieved. However the study has revealed some important findings relating to the operation of the THP, and these will be discussed with the findings for the study.

This report is presented in two parts. Part A presents the findings of the qualitative study conducted by the Auckland University of Technology, and includes sections on methodology, stakeholders' responses to the programme, the responses of adult clients to the programme, the responses of child clients to the programme, and a discussion of the findings.

Part B of this report presents the findings of the analysis of repeat burglary conducted by the Ministry of Justice, and includes sections on the methodology, results, a discussion of the findings, and suggested improvements.

Part C presents an overview of both parts of the research.

# **Part A: The Views of Key Stakeholders and the Perceptions of Adults and Children in Households Participating in the Target Hardening Programme**

## **A1 Methodology**

### **A1.1 THP evaluation**

The aim of the THP evaluation was to assess the impact of the THP on repeat burglary victimisation and the victims' sense of security. The evaluation also aimed to examine and describe the implementation and operation of the THP. The purpose of this evaluation was to identify which aspects of THP could be improved, and which aspects were operating effectively.

The outcomes of the THP were examined by assessing:

- Whether there was a decrease in the number of repeated burglary victimisations (i.e., repeated burglaries on one property) among programme participants after the programme had been implemented, and if so, the mechanisms by which this was achieved;
- The extent to which programme participants (burglary victims) were satisfied with the service delivered by the programme;
- Whether the programme reduced victims' fear of further crime.

The evaluation was also required to assess the processing efficiency of the programme in the following areas:

- The processes by which burglary victims were referred to Victim Support and how their eligibility for Target Hardening was determined;
- The time taken to deliver each of the components of the THP;
- The resources used to conduct the THP (e.g. number of volunteer assessors, funding);
- The perceptions of key informants regarding the programme's processing efficiency, including the extent to which the programme reaches all eligible victims;
- Identification of practice differences among different Target Hardening sites.

On 19 June 2002, the Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of Auckland University of Technology was contracted by the Ministry of Justice to carry out the evaluation.

### ***A1.1.1 THP pilot study***

In August 2002, IPP carried out a pilot study to test the evaluation instruments for the full-scale Target Hardening evaluation. Four interviews with Victim Support staff in two areas (Auckland Central and Counties Manukau) were conducted. Three interviews with Target Hardening clients in one Victim Support area (Counties) were carried out and two interviews with children from Target Hardened households (Counties) were also conducted.

The pilot study recommended changes to the content and structure of all the evaluation instruments based on client comment. The way in which the interviews were set up with THP children was also amended to allow more time for the interviewer to establish a rapport with the child prior to interview.

The full THP evaluation began in late August 2002.

### ***A1.1.2 Site visits***

Familiarisation visits were made at five of the Auckland Target Hardening areas of West Auckland, Auckland Central, Manukau, Counties, and North Shore. Initial information was gathered on the processes involved in the programme, key informants were identified, relevant programme documentation was identified, and an appropriate method of contacting THP clients for the research was negotiated with Victim Support managers and workers.

### ***A1.1.3 Interviews with members of THP households***

The Ministry of Justice proposed that interviews would be completed with members of 12 THP households from each of the Victim Support areas which participated in the evaluation. Where there were fewer than 12 THP households in any area (e.g. North Shore) members of all THP households were to be invited to take part. Any households identified on the Victim Support THP database as having been target hardened up to February 2002 were eligible to take part in the research. Households were to be selected randomly by IPP until a quota of 12 participating households was achieved for each area.

Up to two adult members of the household and all children over five years of age and under 16 years were invited to participate in the research. All households where at least one member had agreed to take part in the evaluation were included in the sample. Bearing in mind that only a limited number of client interviews would take place in Hibiscus Coast, North Rodney and North Shore, it was still expected that the IPP evaluation team would conduct a minimum of 95 victim interviews.

Victim Support staff agreed to act as intermediaries for IPP by inviting their THP clients to take part in the evaluation. Clients were telephoned and invited to participate. If they agreed, they were asked whether they would prefer to be interviewed by an interviewer from their own ethnic group and gender, according to a list of available interviewers provided by IPP. IPP asked Victim Support in Manukau, Counties, West Auckland and Auckland Central for

sufficient names and addresses of THP households to allow the evaluation team to interview a minimum of 12 households. The aim was to have a sufficient pool of households to interview to allow for THP clients changing their minds about participating and for other eventualities.

Telephoning Target Hardening clients was a time-consuming exercise for Victim Support because a staff member or volunteer had to telephone at a time when the householder was at home. This task had to be fitted into the Victim Support staff's already heavy workload.

One of the team of IPP interviewers then contacted the individual household member by telephone, explaining the purpose of the research and seeking to interview that household member. It was also ascertained whether the client would act as an intermediary in seeking agreement from other household members, including children of the household. If the client declined, no further attempts were made to enrol other household members.

Adult THP household members were individually interviewed face-to-face in their own home, using a structured questionnaire with some open-ended questions (Appendix 1).

At the interview, an information sheet about the THP evaluation was provided by the interviewer (Appendix 3) outlining the purpose of the research and how the information would be reported. Participants were given an assurance that their responses would be treated confidentially and that they had the right to decline to participate, to decline to answer any question, or to withdraw at any stage during the interview. THP clients were also asked to read and sign the IPP consent form (Appendix 4). Interviewees were advised that should they require any support as a result of issues raised for them by the interview a list of support agency contact numbers was available (Appendix 5).

Prior to the interview, each adult respondent was asked to provide some basic demographic information (Appendix 6):

- Age
- Gender
- Ethnicity
- Type of house tenure
- Household structure
- Number of adults in household
- Number of children in household
- Gender and occupation of main income earner
- Employment status of main income earner.

The interview lasted between 40 minutes and one hour.

Once another household member agreed to be contacted by the interviewer, the consent process was repeated with that person. In the case of children, once consent was obtained from a parent or caregiver, the children's interviewer made the initial contact with the child and an age-appropriate information sheet and consent form was used (Appendix 7).

An experienced child interviewer used an age-appropriate open-ended interview schedule for the children in each THP household (Appendix 2). Interviews were conducted one-on-one and focussed on:

- The child's own historical experience of burglary
- The child's feelings about repeat burglaries of their home
- The child's feelings toward the police as a result of police involvement in the repeat burglaries
- The child's view of Victim Support staff's involvement with them
- The value the child placed on the extra security measures provided for the family home
- The child's fear of repeat burglary after TH installation.

The questions asked from the children's interview schedule were dependent upon the age of the child, and thus the time taken for the children's interviews varied from 10 minutes to 25 minutes.

All of the children who participated in the research were given koha - in the form of an age-appropriate small toy, puzzle book or book token.

It was only after a THP client agreed to participate in the evaluation that the research team could ascertain the number and ages of children in the household.

Parents in nine THP households gave consent for their children to be interviewed – a total of 17 children. Only eight interviews with children were completed, however. The reasons for children not participating after parental consent had been given included:

- One five-year-old child was deemed too young to interview
- Two seven-year-old boys declined to participate
- The parents of six children decided, on reflection, that they did not want their children to have to dwell on the details of burglaries.

Another limitation is that all of the eight children interviewed were present in the room during their parents' interviews. Although they were preoccupied with their own activities some may have been influenced by their parents' stated views.

#### ***A1.1.4 Key stakeholder interviews***

Key stakeholders were identified in each local area with the help of the Victim Support managers. In addition, key individuals at national level in Victim Support and the Ministry of Justice with involvement in the THP were also interviewed. Individual interviews were conducted using both closed and open-ended questions.



Stakeholders in the THP included:

- Victim Support
- Ministry of Justice
- New Zealand Police
- Subcontracted assessors
- Chubb NZ
- Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC).

#### ***A1.1.5 Victim Support***

There are 77 Victim Support Groups in New Zealand affiliated to the New Zealand Council of Victim Support Groups. Each Victim Support Group is independent in the sense that it is responsible to its own local governing committee. At the local level, each group fundraises and trains its own volunteers. The National Executive is the elected governing body of Victim Support. The primary role of the executive and the staff of the National Office is to offer practical support, leadership and encouragement to Victim Support Groups.

A decision was made at the National Victim Support AGM in October 2002 to move from a federation structure to a united structure. Strategic planning to implement that change is already underway. At the time of this report the Victim Support structure is still that of a federation of independent groups.

Victim Support National Office contacted all seven of the Victim Support groups in the Auckland region that had been implementing the THP to introduce the IPP's evaluation team and advise them that an interview would be requested. A list of contacts for the seven Victim Support managers was provided to IPP.

Each Victim Support group was initially contacted by email. This was followed by a telephone call from the lead researcher asking for an appointment on site to discuss the THP. Seven such interviews took place. In two cases, return visits were required (West Auckland, North Shore) to ensure all the appropriate staff and volunteers could be assembled.

The interviews were open-ended but followed the Ministry of Justice evaluation measures set out in the Proposal for the Evaluation of the Target Hardening Programme.

At a local level, Victim Support staff took part from the seven areas where the pilot operated:

- Auckland Central
- West Auckland
- North Shore
- Hibiscus Coast
- North Rodney
- Manukau
- Counties.

The Victim Support CEO, based at the National Office in Wellington, was also interviewed.

### ***A1.1.6 New Zealand Police***

Attempts to identify Police personnel with knowledge of the THP were made at the local level through Victim Support and at District level through the three District Commanders. It was evident at the outset from discussions with Victim Support that only a few Police officers have little more than a passing involvement with the THP.

The three District Commanders in Auckland were officially contacted by the lead researcher by email and asked to provide IPP with appropriate contacts for Target Hardening within their organisation. The Police themselves had difficulty identifying officers with any experience of the THP and at least one District Commander asked the Victim Support manager for assistance.

Despite the bottom-up approach at the local level through Victim Support contacts and the top-down approach through the Police hierarchy there were no key officers identified in any of the three Districts who had a real hands-on knowledge of the THP.

The following Police staff took part:

- District Commander (1)
- Inspector (2)
- Detective Sergeant (1)
- Senior Sergeant (1)
- Sergeant (1)
- Constable (1).

### ***A1.1.7 Subcontracted assessors***

Two of the three subcontracted assessors agreed to comment on their involvement with the THP. The Manukau assessor agreed to a full interview at his home, the Auckland Central assessor offered comment over the telephone.

### ***A1.1.8 Chubb NZ***

The National Manager of Chubb NZ and the Operations Controller who oversees the Target Hardening contract agreed to be interviewed.

### ***A1.1.9 Housing New Zealand Corporation***

Despite repeated telephone requests from the lead researcher, Housing New Zealand Corporation in Auckland was unable to provide contact details of anyone who could put Housing New Zealand Corporation's viewpoint regarding Target Hardening. An HNZN Auckland spokesperson said:

*“Housing New Zealand Corporation is decentralised in Auckland and each office responds separately to the needs of HNZN clients in their area. I will give you the number of our policy people in Wellington. They may be able to help.” (S14)*

The HNZC Policy Unit in Wellington also had no knowledge of the THP and stressed the local independence of HNZC office on ‘operational matters’:

*“In the greater Auckland area there are five area managers and 14 neighbourhood units. Housing New Zealand Corporation has a corporate office that provides guidelines for maintaining tenant security to the areas. A level of autonomy operates at the local level and area managers may provide additional direction to tenancy managers. In response to local conditions, tenancy managers are able to apply discretion on a case-by-case basis within prescribed boundaries.” (S15)*

## **A1.2 Adult Interviews**

### ***A1.2.1 Victim Support as liaison for the evaluation***

The researchers proposed to interview members of 12 households in each of the Counties, Auckland Central, Manukau, and West Auckland Victim Support areas, and all of the clients who consented in North Shore and Hibiscus Coast, because of the small number of clients in those areas<sup>1</sup>. It was decided, for privacy reasons, that Victim Support staff would be asked to act as intermediaries by inviting their clients to be contacted by the researchers.

The Victim Support managers in Counties, Auckland Central, Manukau, and West Auckland were each asked to provide contact details for 20 clients in each area who agreed to be contacted by the researchers. This was to allow for non-response. In practice, the Victim Support staff were not able to provide the required number of households, because the households either could not be contacted or declined to allow their contact details to be forwarded to the researchers. Also, all of the Victim Support areas found it difficult to accommodate the additional work involved.

Some of the households whose contact details were supplied did not take part in interviews either because they could not be contacted by the researchers or because they declined to be interviewed. This resulted in a lower than expected number of households and individuals participating in the interviews. Table 1 below gives the number of THP households, the number of household contacts provided by Victim Support and the number of households and individuals who participated in interviews.

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<sup>1</sup> It was decided not to include client interviews from North Rodney for logistical reasons.

**Table 1: Number of individuals and households interviewed**

	Total no. of THP households	Total no. of THP household contacts from VS	Number of households interviewed	Number of individuals interviewed
Auckland City District	46	12	7	7
Counties	42	13*	11*	12*
West Auckland	23	9	8	8
Manukau	54	15	9	12
Hibiscus Coast	1	1	1	1
North Shore	1	1	1	1
North Rodney <sup>1</sup>	1	1	0	0
Total	167	51*	37*	41*

\* includes three households from the pilot study.

### ***A1.2.2 Procedure and instruments***

Once Victim Support received assent, the contact names and addresses were passed on to the interviewer team of three. Potential interview subjects were given a choice of interviewer on the basis of gender and/or ethnicity. However, none chose a specific interviewer. Apart from those with children, interviews were assigned two interviewers. Households were assigned to interviewers by geographical area initially, although when later Victim Support household contacts came through, they were assigned at random.

The interviewer telephoned to arrange to meet with the householders in their homes at a time convenient to them. Only one householder telephoned the lead researcher at IPP to check that the interviewer was bona fide.

Each interviewer then worked through the following process:

1. The Adult Information Sheet was read out and the interviewer answered any questions from clients.
2. The client was made aware that there were a range of support agencies available should there be any requirement after the interview for any further emotional support.
3. The client read and signed the Adult Consent Form.
4. The Statistical Information Sheet was completed.
5. The Adult Interview Schedule was then followed and the interview was taped.

### ***A1.2.3 Interview format***

Interviews with each adult lasted from 30 to 40 minutes. The interview schedule was broken into three general areas:

1. Clients' concerns for their safety before the burglaries.
2. Clients' experience of the burglaries to their homes (including the involvement of Victim Support and the Police).
3. Clients' satisfaction with the THP and any changes to concerns about being re-victimised.

#### ***A1.2.4 Profile of THP households***

The statistical information provided for each household<sup>2</sup> by each interviewee allowed a profile of the Target Hardening households to be compiled.

#### ***A1.2.5 Type of house tenure***

Fifty-seven percent of the Target Hardened properties in the sample were in private ownership, 22 percent were privately rented and three (8 percent) were HNZC rentals.

**Table 2: THP households in sample by type of house tenure**

Type of house tenure	Number	Percentage
Privately owned	21	56.8
Rented - HNZC	3	8.1
Rented - privately	8	21.6
Other	5	13.5
Total	37	100.0

#### ***A1.2.6 Household structure***

The household structure of 43 percent of the Target Hardened households in the sample was that of adults and children. Another 22 percent were households with more than one adult and no children. Thirteen of the 37 (35 percent) were sole occupiers.

**Table 3: THP households in sample by household structure**

Household Structure	Number	Percentage
Sole Occupier	13	35.1
Adults and children	16	43.3
Adults – no children	8	21.6
Total	37	100.0

#### ***A1.2.7 Number of adults in household***

Fifteen of the 37 households who provided information about the number of adults in the household (40 percent) had two adults. Forty percent had a sole adult and 16 percent had three adults.

<sup>2</sup> Three households were interviewed for the pilot study prior to the decision to collect specific statistical information.

**Table 4: THP households in sample by number of adults in household**

No. of adults in household	Number	Percentage
One adult	15	40.5
Two adults	15	40.5
Three adults	6	16.3
More than three adults	1	2.7
Total	37	100.0

***A1.2.8 Number of children in household***

There were 15 households with children in the Target Hardening sample (40 percent). Of those, 67 percent had one or two children and 33 percent had three or more children.

**Table 5: THP households in sample by number of children in household**

No. of children in household	Number	Percentage
One child	4	26.7
Two children	6	40.0
Three children	4	26.7
Four children	0	0.0
Five children	1	6.6
Total	15	100.0

***A1.2.9 Number of burglaries in household***

Twenty households in the sample had had two burglaries in the previous year while 15 had three burglaries or more. Two had had one burglary.

**Table 6: THP households in sample by number of burglaries**

	One	Two	Three	Four+	Total
Auckland City	1	3	2	1	7
West Auckland	0	6	2	0	8
North Shore	0	1	0	0	1
Hibiscus Coast	0	1	0	0	1
Counties	1	4	4	2	11
Manukau	0	5	1	3	9
Total	2	20	9	6	37

### *A1.2.10 Profile of adult interviewees*

#### **Gender**

There were 32 women interviewed (78 percent) and nine men (22 percent).

**Table 7: THP interviewees in sample by gender**

Gender	Number	Percentage
Male	9	22.0
Female	32	78.0
Total	41	100.0

#### **Ethnic background**

Thirty-three of the 41 interviewees described themselves as New Zealand European. Two were Māori and two were Pacific Islanders (one Samoan, one Cook Islander) and four were in the “other” category.

**Table 8: THP interviewees in sample by ethnic background**

Ethnic background	Number	Percentage
NZ European	33	80.5
Māori	2	4.9
Pacific Islander	2	5.4
Other	4	9.7
Total	41	100.0

#### **Employment status of main income earner**

In 14 of the THP households (38 percent) the main income earner was in full-time employment and in two other households the main income earner was in part-time employment. In the other 21 households, the main income earner was unwaged, the majority of those being retirees or pensioners.

**Table 9: Employment status of main income earner in THP households**

Employment status	Number	Percentage
Full-time employment	14	37.8
Part-time employment	2	5.5
Retired/Pensioner	14	37.8
Student	1	2.7
Unemployed/Beneficiary	3	8.1
Homemaker	3	8.1
Total	37	100.0

### **A1.3 Children's Interviews**

As part of the evaluation the views of children aged between six and 16 years in Target Hardening households were also sought. Any Target Hardening households who had children between six and 16 years were asked by Victim Support whether the parent would allow the children to also take part in the evaluation by being interviewed by a specialist child interviewer. Since the households were randomly chosen, there was no control over the number of children who would be available.

#### ***A1.3.1 Procedure and instruments***

The children's interview schedule and procedure were tested in a pilot study involving three children and changes were made accordingly.

The same interviewer interviewed the parents and children of the Target Hardening households. In each case, the parent was interviewed before the children. At the end of the adult interview, even though the parents had consented on their behalf, the child was then asked to give consent to be interviewed. All of the children in the sample were present during the interview with their parent. While this was a threat to the validity of the information, it was not possible for the children to be removed from the interview because of their ages and/or lack of adult supervision. Any future research would probably require parents to bring their children to a location where supervised play could be made available to the children during the adult interview.

Most were therefore already familiar with the interviewer and the general nature of the questions and the answers given by their parents prior to being interviewed themselves. In all but one case, the interviews took place without the presence of the parent. Thus the children's data were uncontaminated and confidential to the interviewer.

Informal time was spent with the children prior to the commencement of the interview with the parent and/or children. In some cases, this consisted of sharing a hot drink with the parent and time spent asking some general friendly questions of the child. For example, a 12-year-old boy took the time to proudly show off his athletic medals, drawings and scouting memorabilia to the interviewer. After spending approximately 30 minutes interacting, he told his mother the interviewer was "really cool" and he consented to a formal audiotaped interview.

Prior to the interviews commencing, children were given an information sheet and consent form to read. The interviewer read through the information sheet with the child. To confirm their understanding of the project and their part in it, the interviewer asked each child to explain why they thought the interviewer wanted to talk to him or her. In all cases, the children appeared to be clear and satisfied with the purpose of the interview. Seven out of eight children consented to the audiotaping of the interview.

Upon completion the child was thanked and received their choice of a small toy or book token as a koha.



The researcher engaged in different forms of interaction with parents and children depending on the age of the children and the needs of both the parent and the children:

- Telephone briefings with parents of potential child participants.
- Face-to-face meetings with potential child participants for familiarisation purposes prior to gaining consent to interview.
- Face-to-face interviews with child participants.
- Field notes made by the researcher of conversations with parent and child participants during home visits.

### ***A1.3.2 Sources of report information***

A number of sources were used to obtain information on the views of children in Target Hardened households including:

- Face-to-face interviews (audiotaped or from notes taken verbatim).
- Field notes made by the researchers during telephone conversations with children.
- Interview with a Victim Support manager experienced in dealing with children victimised by burglary.

### ***A1.3.3 Access and interview process for children***

The criteria for selecting children were on the basis of the parents' consent and simultaneous participation in the adult component of the THP evaluation. Although Victim Support was asked to ascertain whether the household had any children between six and 16 years, some Victim Support groups did not provide this information. This meant that in most cases the interviewer had to find out the information when phoning to schedule a time for the adult interview. Any children aged six to 16 years identified in Target Hardening households whose parents were willing for them to be interviewed were then passed on to the child interviewer.

The child interviewer telephoned the parents to give them information about the content of the child interviews and parents were asked to talk with their child about participating prior to the interviewer's arrival at their home. Parents were assured that the interviewer would proceed with the interview only if the child was comfortable to do so at the scheduled time.

### ***A1.3.4 Sample size***

Nine Target Hardened households were identified as having children between six and 16 years and having parents willing for them to be involved in the evaluation. A total of 17 children were available in those nine households.

The 17 children in the sample were drawn from four of the seven Victim Support areas:

West Auckland	(2)
Auckland Central	(2)
Manukau	(7)
Counties	(6)

Of the 17 children made available, a total number of eight children were interviewed. These children resided in Auckland Central (1), Manukau (3) and Counties (4).

### ***A1.3.5 Profile of child interviewees***

The following table shows the gender, age and ethnicity of the children and the number of burglaries of each child's home. The ethnic mix of the children interviewed was very different from the ethnic mix of adults interviewed.

**Table 10: Profile of child interviewees**

Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Victim Support District	No of burglaries
Girl	7	Māori	Auckland Central	2
Girl	14	Māori	Counties	2
Girl	11	Māori	Counties	2
Girl	11	Māori	Counties	2
Girl	12	Fijian Indian	Counties	3
Boy	12	Māori	Manukau	2
Girl	15	Samoan/European	Manukau	2
Boy	11	Samoan/European	Manukau	2

### ***A1.3.6 Interview format***

Interviews with each child lasted from 10 to 25 minutes. The length of the interview depended both upon the shyness of the child, and their ability to recall information.

The interview schedule was broken into three general areas:

- a) Children's concerns for their safety before the burglaries.
- b) Children's experience of the burglaries to their homes (including the involvement of Victim Support and the Police).
- c) Children's concerns about their safety after the implementation of the Target Hardening Programme.

The responses to the set questions did not necessarily flow in a linear fashion. Proposed questions operated primarily as a guide to structure the interview, or to facilitate gaps in the conversation. The interview schedule was originally designed so that younger children in particular could respond to the interview questions in the form of drawing, for instance, a picture of their house before or after the burglary. This method was not used in subsequent interviews, as the children were old enough to respond verbally and did not want to draw for the interviewer.

## A2 Stakeholders' Responses to the Target Hardening Programme

### A2.1 The Referral Process

The seven Victim Support groups in the Auckland area operate under three different Police Districts.

**Table 11: Distribution of Victim Support groups by Police District**

Police District	Victim Support Group
Auckland City District	Auckland Central Victim Support
North Shore Waitakere District	West Auckland Victim Support
North Shore Waitakere District	North Shore Victim Support
North Shore Waitakere District	Hibiscus Coast Victim Support
North Shore Waitakere District	North Rodney Victim Support
Counties Manukau District	Counties Victim Support
Counties Manukau District	Manukau Victim Support

The number of paid Victim Support staff and volunteers and subcontracted assessors who are available to implement the THP varies from area to area.

**Table 12: Victim Support staff, volunteers and processes for THP**

Victim Support area	Paid staff (f/t) (p/t)	Volunteers	Eligibility Assessment	Security Assessment
Auckland Central	(2) (1)	32	VS volunteer (dedicated)	Subcontracted Assessor
West Auckland	(1) (3)	30	VS Staff/ Volunteer	Subcontracted Assessor
North Shore	(1) (1)	20	VS Volunteer	Community Constable
Hibiscus Coast	(0) (2)	19	Community Constable	Community Constable
North Rodney	(1) (1)	15	Subcontracted Assessor	Subcontracted Assessor
Manukau	(1) (2)	35	Dedicated Volunteer	Subcontracted Assessor
Counties	(1) (2)	21	VS Staff Member	VS Staff Member

### ***A2.1.1 Auckland City District Police***

Between February 2001 and July 2002, 46 households in the Auckland City District were Target Hardened.

### ***A2.1.2 Auckland City District Police referral process***

Twice a week the manager of Auckland Central Victim Support receives a printed list from the Police Intelligence and Information Centre (Intel) in Auckland City District. This lists all the repeat burglaries in the Auckland City District – residential and commercial. There would be an average of 30 repeat burglaries on each Intel list.

The manager then goes through the list and crosses out those that are obviously non-residential properties. If it is not an obvious non-residential property, the name and telephone number is checked against the Police computer statistics to identify the registered owner of the property. The process can be very time-consuming.

Indeed, it is the cumbersome checking process that is probably the biggest block to the timely implementation of the THP:

*“It means me sitting there for five or ten minutes to check each one. I also have to go from my office to someone else’s office to use another computer. That’s why sometimes they pile up. Once we’ve narrowed it down as much as we can to the residential ones, I will type up a list of names, addresses, phone numbers and the dates that they were burgled. I then fax this to one of my volunteers so she can call them to see if they qualify for Target Hardening.” (S01)*

*“When you have to spend up to 45 minutes going through the Intel list and you are going between computers just to check information of people who may not even be eligible for target hardening ... then you find that they’re not eligible ... that’s a lot of time away from the office and the other priorities for Victim Support in this District.” (S01)*

Information on repeat burglaries can also come in to Victim Support through the CARD reports, which gives detail on all calls coming into Auckland City Police District. The victim may have told the operator that they had been burgled before.

Victims can also self-refer. All burglary victims are sent a letter from Victim Support and a burglary pack, which includes details about THP. Prompted by the letter, a repeat burglary victim may phone in seeking assistance from Victim Support.

For the Auckland Central Victim Support manager, the ideal situation would be for Victim Support to get a copy of the completed Burglary Report from the Police:

*“In a perfect world, we would receive the Burglary Report. The new Burglary Report has all the information that we need. It has already been asked by the Police and is there on the form for us to read. The information would be correct because we know the Police have been out there asking the questions face-to-face. Then all we’d have to do is find out if the victim has a Community Services Card. It wouldn’t be nearly so time-consuming.” (S01)*

### **A2.1.3 Auckland Central THP eligibility assessment procedures**

When the THP first started, the heavy workload on the staff and volunteers of Auckland Central meant that getting time to assess eligibility for Target Hardening was difficult:

*“When we first started doing Target Hardening we were trying to get on top of things as soon as they came through. But we were just too busy. It was obvious that the priority for us had to be the victims that have had bad things happen to them and needed help on the spot. They needed our help first. The Target Hardening cases started to build up. I was taking the files home each night to ring people but I just wasn’t getting through it fast enough.” (S01)*

The manager explained that the assessment interview is necessarily lengthy:

*“You just can’t ring up and say, ‘Do you have a Community Services Card?’ and if they say, ‘No’ say, ‘Well I can’t help you then.’ ... and that’s it. You need to talk to them about how they’ve been doing since the burglary. They usually tell you if they have done anything themselves to improve their security. It’s usually a long phone call.” (S01)*

The overworked Auckland Central manager raised the Target Hardening issue with her Victim Support Committee and relief came in the form of a volunteer – from the committee itself:

*“I mentioned it to my committee and one of the committee members (who used to be a volunteer) offered to do the phoning round. She phones during the evening to contact repeat burglary victims and asks them the questions to see if they qualify – if they’ve got a Community Services Card and just to check that they have been burgled twice at that one property.” (S01)*

Those victims who qualify for Target Hardening are then rung by the manager of Victim Support Auckland District and advised that they will receive a call from the assessor contracted by Victim Support to provide the assessment service.

The manager faxes the Target Hardening application to the Victim Support National Office in Wellington for in-principle approval and a copy is also faxed to the assessor:

*“We used to fax the application to Victim Support National Office and wait until we’d heard back before faxing the assessor but there is a delay in them responding and it all got too confusing. Now I fax Victim Support National Office and the assessor at the same time and it seems to work.” (S01)*

#### **A2.1.4 North Shore Waitakere Police District**

Between February 2001 and July 2002, 28 households in the North Shore Waitakere District were target hardened.

The North Shore Waitakere Police District established a Burglary Desk in mid-2000, which processes all burglary complaints in the District. It operates from 7.00am to 10.00pm and is staffed by three non-sworn staff on two shifts. West Auckland Victim Support picks up a list

of all burglaries in the District daily from the clerk of the Burglary Desk. There is an indication on the form as to whether it is a repeat burglary or not and a victimisation history.

In November 2000, Waitakere, North Shore, and Rodney District Victim Support groups in partnership with Safer Community Councils and local Neighbourhood Support groups developed the Buzz Off (Burglary Zero Offending) Project as a response to the needs of repeat residential burglary victims in the District. The project aims to provide a graduated response to burglary depending on whether this is a first burglary (Grade A response), a second (Grade B response) or a third burglary (Grade C response) within the last year.

Grade B and C responses allow for assessment by Police of the victim's residential security and in a C Grade response, funds may be made available for purchase of additional security equipment.

Prior to the Target Hardening Pilot Programme, in Waitakere, North Shore, and Rodney District, volunteers had become accustomed to assessing victims as a part of Project Buzz Off.

#### ***A2.1.5 North Shore Waitakere Police referral process***

##### North Shore Victim Support

North Shore Victim Support has a computer but was not linked to the National Victim Support database at the time of the site visit. The source of repeat burglary information was the information faxed from the Burglary Desk based in Waitakere. According to the Victim Support manager, the name address and telephone number provided was 'scant information':

*"The system could be improved but they say it's too difficult. We don't have a computer but it would be very useful if we could get the front page of the Burglary report faxed to us." (S03)*

There was often a delay in the Victim Support manager receiving the burglary referral:

*"There can be a delay in the reports coming through to us from the Burglary Desk. If a burglary happens after hours the burglary can't be phoned in until the next day." (S03)*

All residential burglary cases are contacted by Victim Support North Shore by telephone or visit:

*"Within an hour of getting the information, we will have contacted the victim." (S03)*

##### Hibiscus Coast Victim Support

Hibiscus Coast receives information on repeat burglaries from Intel, the CARD printouts, Offence Reports and self-referrals. When information arrives, a Victim Support volunteer enters it into the computer and rings the team leader who has a list of rostered volunteers. A volunteer would then make a phone call to the victim. The aim is for the victim to be contacted within 24 hours:

*“That phone call would be made that same day, if there is no one home, we will ring again in the evening - we find that’s the best time to get people at home. It would definitely be within 24 hours. If we don’t get them home that night – and we’d try three or four times – we’d try again at different times the next day.” (S04)*

### North Rodney Victim Support

Burglaries – including repeats - come through to North Rodney Victim Support from the Police through the Offence Reports as they are lodged. These are then passed on to a volunteer to follow-up by telephone. There can often be a delay in the burglary being discovered because in this area there are many holiday homes that may be visited infrequently in the off-season.

#### ***A2.1.6 North Shore Waitakere THP eligibility assessment***

### West Auckland Victim Support

In West Auckland, there is a Victim Support staff member dedicated to the THP. That person’s first job each day is to telephone each of the repeat burglary victims and assess the need of the household for support.

West Auckland Victim Support offers all the repeat burglary victims a home visit:

*“If there have been one or more burglaries, we talk about the Target Hardening scheme and suggest that it’s best if someone comes out and talks to them in person. So a Victim Support person is sent out to do the crisis work and they fill out the first part of the Target Hardening form.” (S02)*

The Victim Support volunteer does not ask about the Community Services Card over the phone, preferring to leave the eligibility questions to a face-to-face meeting.

*“We don’t usually mention the Community Services Card straight up because we find a lot of people who are eligible for one, don’t have one. So we talk about their ability to secure their own home and they may offer some information that gives a clue as to their financial status e.g. they live alone or they are on a low income. The volunteer would note any such information and then go and talk to them personally about that.” (S02)*

### North Shore Victim Support

Burglaries in the North Shore District are faxed through to the Victim Support manager from the Burglary Desk. The manager allocates each burglary to the next Victim Support volunteer on the list:

*“We get name, address and telephone number. The volunteer who goes to visit gathers the rest of the information about the burglary. The volunteer is available to do crisis intervention and will give information on security. They give out the TH booklet and check on income level. We are often first to visit.” (S03)*

Previously, there was an assessor contracted by North Shore Victim Support to implement the THP in North Shore and North Rodney. Since that person moved from the area the assessment is carried out by the local Community Constables. This can be problematic during leave periods and weekends and can mean considerable delays – sometimes over a week – before the repeat burglary is assessed for a Target Hardening security upgrade:

*“It was very hard to find an assessor who was prepared to work only sporadically. We managed to find someone eventually and were really pleased with the work. However, \_\_\_\_\_ recently transferred out of the area. We are now using Community Constables to do that work. The problem there is the delay. They don’t work on weekends and they go on leave. Things just have to wait until they get back.” (S03)*

#### North Rodney Victim Support

North Rodney Victim Support has an assessor who deals with all Target Hardening clients. When a repeat burglary referral comes through from the Police the victim is contacted by a Victim Support volunteer – by telephone in the first instance:

*“Up here we never do cold visits. A victim will get a phone call, a visit and then a burglary pack. If they don’t want a visit we will post a burglary pack to them. We try to find out as much information from them as possible. If they match the criteria for Target Hardening, we call the assessor in. She deals with all the Target Hardening clients.” (S05)*

#### Hibiscus Coast Victim Support

Previously, Hibiscus Coast shared a contracted assessor with North Shore Victim Support to implement the THP. Currently, because the assessor moved, the assessment is carried out by the local Community Constables. As in North Shore, this can be problematic during leave periods and weekends and can mean considerable delays before the repeat burglary is assessed for a Target Hardening security upgrade:

*“The Community Constable was on leave over the school holidays and everything had to wait until he got back. Up here, if someone is away we don’t have someone to step in to cover for him so everything just has to wait.” (S04)*

Project Buzz Off has been operating in this District for over three years. If repeat burglary clients are not eligible for target hardening, they may be eligible for help from the Buzz Off project.

#### **A2.1.7 Counties Manukau Police District**

Between February 2001 and July 2002, 96 households in the Counties Manukau Police District were target hardened.



### ***A2.1.8 Counties Manukau Police referral process***

#### Counties Victim Support

Counties Victim Support receives the consolidated list of all repeat residential and non-residential burglaries from the District's Intel office. They also receive a copy of the Offence Report (ORs) from the Police the day after the Police attend. There can be up to two days' delay in the OR being referred on to Victim Support from the Police. They can arrive by mail, or placed in the Victim Support in-tray or faxed from an outlying station:

*"A lot of referrals we get are usually the day after the burglary. While the Police response is usually within 24 hours, it may be a couple of days before we get the paperwork. On the Offence Report, it's got the box to tick whether there has been a repeat burglary or previous victimisation. Otherwise there's an email from Intel that says that this address has been burgled before." (S07)*

#### Manukau Victim Support

Manukau Victim Support receives information about repeat burglaries in their area directly through ORs faxed from stations or from the District Intel lists, which include all repeat burglaries (residential and commercial) throughout the area:

*"To be relevant for Target Hardening, we have to know that the burglary is residential, that it is in our District and that it is a repeat. Each of the repeat burglary victims is then sent a letter from us telling them that someone will contact them and a copy of the Target Hardening brochure. The information that we receive is then faxed to the person whom we contract to do the Target Hardening work. They then follow up and check on the person's eligibility for Target Hardening and will then do the security assessment." (S06)*

The assessor also checks the lists he receives from Manukau Victim Support for relevancy:

*"The first thing I have to do is eliminate those that belong to other Victim Support areas and those that are obviously businesses." (S09)*

Like Auckland Central Victim Support, the Manukau assessor found this checking very time-consuming.

The assessor at Manukau gets \$50 per household for Target Hardening work. Previously the rate was \$40 and the other \$10 went to the Manukau Victim Support:

*"My price increased to \$50 because the Manukau office doesn't handle Target Hardening and so they don't have administration costs or anything." (S09)*

Criticism was made by the assessor of recent delays between the repeat burglary occurring and him receiving notification of the fact. On the day the lead researcher visited (14 November) the assessor had not received any notifications for several weeks. That same day he received a long list, including a burglary that occurred three weeks earlier, on 22 October:

*“I think there has been a problem at the Manukau Victim Support office with their email. They’ve been off-line for the last two to three weeks; hence I’ve had no referrals through.” (S09)*

### **A2.1.9 Counties Manukau THP eligibility assessment**

#### Counties Victim Support

At Counties Victim Support, there is a Victim Support staff member dedicated to burglary follow-ups. Upon receipt of the referrals from the Police the staff member contacts repeat victims and assesses eligibility of the victim for Target Hardening over the phone in the first instance.

#### Manukau Victim Support

In Manukau, a contracted assessor contacts the repeat burglary victim and assesses eligibility for Target Hardening. Generally, the assessment is done by telephone:

*“Initially I ascertain if they have a Community Services Card and are therefore eligible for Target Hardening assistance, by telephone. I need all the details of their Community Services Card. I then send it off to Wellington for in-principle approval. Wellington gives approval in principle subject to my assessment. I then liaise with the householder and get the man from Chubb to go round and do the assessment.” (S06)*

### **A2.1.10 Financial eligibility for THP**

Across all seven Victim Support areas, workers were unanimous that using the Community Services Card as the measure for determining eligibility for Target Hardening meant that deserving repeat burglary victims were missing out. It was felt that working families who are on low incomes but are above the level to qualify for a Community Services Card are particularly hard hit:

*“I feel the criteria of the Community Services Card is unfair on some middle income people. In our area, people may have scrimped and saved all their lives to buy a little bach at the beach. Then every bloody month their place gets done over and everything is taken. We can’t help them because they earn just that little bit too much money.” (S05)*

*“I think there are people missing out on help from the Target Hardening Programme because they don’t have a Community Services Card. Often it’s people who are working and don’t have any spare cash to upgrade their security. That’s the group who are missing out.” (S04)*

*“There are a lot of people who are struggling that don’t have a Community Services Card. They can be working at two or three jobs to make ends meet. Or they might have lots of children. They can’t afford to buy locks but they don’t qualify for Target Hardening. There are a lot of people that you feel really bad for because they just don’t qualify yet you know how much they would really benefit from the programme.” (S01)*

*“I think there are a lot of people I’ve dealt with that deserve Target Hardening who don’t have a Community Services Card. I’ve got people that have been burgled five times who don’t live in the best part of Papakura. They’re both out working to make ends meet and obviously struggling. They don’t have a Community Services Card and so they don’t fit the criteria.” (S07)*

There was also a feeling among Victim Support workers that there are many low-income earners who are entitled to the Community Services Card who have not actually applied for one:

*“I don’t think the Community Services Card is widely held among low income earners. If I was on a low income and I was healthy and my child was healthy, I wouldn’t bother filling out a form to get one. The only benefits I can see are the reduced medical costs. I think there are a lot of families out there that are on extremely low incomes that just don’t have a Community Services Card. (S01)*

At the same time as Victim Support workers felt that people were missing out by not having a Community Services Card, there was also acknowledgement by several interviewees that some people who hold Community Services Cards also had the means to finance their own security upgrade:

*“There are elderly people who are on National Super and have a Community Services Card but they have also got lots and lots of money.” (S01)*

*“I’ve had dealings with someone who I thought shouldn’t be receiving help from Target Hardening. This man doesn’t live in a nice area and his house is not the best but he has the latest in entertainment systems. He has an enormous brand new DVD, surround sound, a brand new video, a stereo and a computer. His gear is bigger and better than anything I’ve got at home. If he can afford all of that he can afford to get himself his own security system. But this guy had a Community Services Card and he’s been burgled twice in 12 months. He fits the criteria. How do you say to someone like that, ‘Sorry you can’t have Target Hardening?’ How do you do that? It makes me so angry when I know that he’s getting it while others are missing out. Unfortunately there are quite a lot of people who qualify for Target Hardening that are just like this man.” (S07)*

*“I’ve been to repeat burglaries involving obviously wealthy Chinese who’ve set their children up here in Auckland while they’re still in China. Their children are on benefits and so they qualified for help from Target Hardening.” (S08)*

There was, however, general agreement that few people ‘played’ the system and that the financial eligibility rules should be more flexible to allow more repeat burglary victims to access THP support:

*“It would be nice if we could extend Target Hardening to more people.” (S01)*

*“They should widen the criteria to include people on low or middle incomes who need assistance to upgrade their security.” (S03)*

This would mean allowing local Victim Support workers to make recommendations to Victim Support National Office for Target Hardening to be made available to a client on grounds of financial difficulty:

*“There needs to be greater flexibility in applying the financial eligibility criteria. I think the fear is that if we are given flexibility there is going to be a huge influx of applications.” (S05)*

*“I think the criteria for eligibility need to be widened to include people on low incomes who are just as in need of assistance to upgrade their security as people on Community Services Cards.” (S05)*

While some Victim Support areas stuck rigidly to the rules in assessing clients' financial eligibility and turned them down if the criteria were not met, others recommended clients for Target Hardening (and were accepted) despite their not holding a Community Services Card:

*“There have been people that haven't had a Community Services Card that have been able to get Target Hardening assistance. We just signed off that we had evidence that they were a low-income family and provided relevant background information. The Community Services Card is a guide for us, not a rigid rule.” (S02)*

Victim Support workers found it very difficult to turn down people for Target Hardening knowing that on their income level they would not be able to afford to upgrade their security by themselves. They were therefore at risk of further repeat burglaries.

For Victim Support in the North Shore and West Auckland areas, the Buzz Off Project was available to fund security upgrades for repeat burglary victims when they did not meet the Target Hardening criteria:

*“If Target Hardening turns down a client, we are fortunate that we have Buzz Off as a backstop.” (S02)*

*“An elderly couple had too high an income for Target Hardening but we were able to help them through Buzz Off. Target Hardening and Buzz Off track together quite nicely.” (S03)*

One assessor said that if he finds that a repeat burglary victim who is eligible for a Community Services Card does not have one, he will tell them how to apply and encourage them to do so:

*“If people don't have a Community Services Card, I advise them to go and get one and come back to me. These are people who are obviously in need and don't have the finances, but are also unaware of the benefits available to them. Two of the cases I have dealt with were on a low income or had no income at all and I advised them to go and get a Community Services Card.” (S09)*

A suggestion from a Victim Support worker is that if there is no Community Services Card, a level of income should be set and local Victim Support workers should be able to make recommendations based on that:

*“An agreed income level might be easier, although it would be more difficult to ask people about their household income rather than asking for a Community Services Card.” (S01)*

One assessor had strong views against using an agreed income level:

*“The Community Services Card is probably the only workable instrument we have. The only other measure would be a means test and that would be very demeaning for the victim – after all they’ve been through enough trauma.” (S09)*

The researchers were made aware of only one Target Hardening application that had been turned down by the Victim Support National Office. In this case, special circumstances prevailed – the victim was a Victim Support worker:

*“We have been turned down for one. That was a staff member and it was borderline. They felt that since it was borderline, it might be read as giving preferential treatment to Victim Support workers. We secured her house using local money. I just couldn’t be sure that she wasn’t being targeted because of her work for Victim Support. I felt that we had a responsibility to her so we changed the locks and had some trees trimmed.” (S02)*

#### **A2.1.11 Repeat Burglary in 12 months as THP eligibility criterion**

Only one Victim Support group identified a major difficulty with verifying the date(s) of previous burglaries. At Counties Victim Support it was difficult – indeed often impossible – to verify victims’ claims because details of burglaries are purged from CARD after six months:

*“If we phone and they say, ‘I was burgled within the last six months’, that’s good because we know we can search the Offence Reports and verify that. However, if someone says they were burgled more than six months ago it’s a real problem because after six months they are purged off the Police computer system. So we have no way of proving that they were in fact burgled. In those cases, we have to rely on the victim still having either a file number or an acknowledgement from the Police for insurance purposes. In many cases we just have to say, ‘Okay we believe you’. How bad would it look if we said, ‘Look we don’t believe that you were burgled?’. It doesn’t happen for anything else but burglaries. Even finding something that happened two or three months ago has been a nightmare.” (S07)*

A cited example of this was a female victim who told Counties Victim Support that she had suffered several burglaries in the last year. The claim had to be accepted at face value because no recorded proof could be found via Police channels:

*“We just couldn’t track down any record of a previous burglary at her property anywhere. I was a bit dubious. I really felt that something just wasn’t quite right there. But she was right and she did in fact find her Police acknowledgement which substantiated her claim.” (S07)*

When asked why Victim Support could not receive a list from Intel that was already sorted into repeat residential burglaries, the manager stated that the current system is unable to deliver it:

*“I don’t know if they can because they have known from the beginning what we needed the information for.” (S01)*

Just as the Victim Support workers were unanimous in their desire for there to be more flexibility with the financial eligibility criteria, so all expressed strong feelings that the THP should be available to a wider range of burglary victims as well as victims of other types of crime.

Many felt that first-time burglary victims who are particularly traumatised by the crime should be able to receive help from Target Hardening – especially elderly people living on their own or women living under Protection Orders:

*“I think it depends a lot on the nature of the burglary. Last year we had several burglaries where this guy entered homes when people were sleeping. No one heard him enter their property. His victims were all elderly people and they were traumatised by the fact that he’d got in and they hadn’t heard him. One woman couldn’t understand how he’d managed to open and shut a squeaky door in her house without being heard. They wanted alarms and bars on their windows but unfortunately they weren’t eligible and they themselves couldn’t afford to do it.” (S04)*

*“One example of where we should have been able to offer Target Hardening help was to the family involved in the home invasion and sexual violation of a seven-year-old girl. It wasn’t offered because we knew they didn’t meet the eligibility criteria. The volunteer that was working with the family did get the insurance companies to install new security systems but it would have been nice for us to say, ‘We can do these things for you – why don’t you sign here?’” (S05)*

*“The criteria should be extended to allow Target Hardening for first-time burglary victims.” (S03)*

*“Target Hardening should be available where there have been multiple breaches of a Protection Order by breaking into and prowling around the home. Quite clearly these women are facing greater personal risk than other burglary victims. Sometimes burglary victims with Protection Orders don’t report it because they either don’t think it’s a breach of the Protection Order or they are despondent about the perceived lack of response from the Police. Either way, we don’t often hear about those types of repeat burglary.” (S02)*

*“I think it should be a judgement call. There are a lot of elderly people out there who have only been burgled once but to them that’s a terrifying experience. They are so much more affected by that one burglary. This elderly woman may have had her privacy invaded for the first time in her life. Her life is in that little house and someone’s been in it. If she hasn’t been burgled in the last 12 months, there’s nothing we can do for her.” (S07)*

*“Some people genuinely deserve help. I’ve had a couple of ladies that haven’t been elderly but they have been terrified by the burglary and just can’t sleep at night. I think they are just a bit more deserving than the 30-year-old man with a family who’s been ripped off but who’s well covered by insurance.” (S07)*

*“I think it should be put in the hands of local managers and a local Target Hardening group. You get an old lady who has been raped and had her home invaded and we say, ‘Sorry, we can’t help you. If you have been raped and had your home invaded three times we can do something for you’. We need to widen the criteria I think. Where it is a first time horrific crime, Target Hardening help should be available. We should be able to go to her and say ‘We can do this for you’.” (S05)*

One Victim Support manager felt strongly that if more people were eligible for Target Hardening, then higher priority would be assigned to the timely processing of applications:

*“We do have problems with the timeliness of implementing the Target Hardening Programme and I just can’t see it getting any better in a hurry. It has nothing to do with the scheme at all; it’s our workload here and our priorities. Maybe if we had more chance of people qualifying then we’d have to ensure they are processed quicker.”*

## **A2.2 Time Taken to Deliver Target Hardening Upgrade**

The time required to install the appropriate Target Hardening security upgrade in any household in the seven Victim Support areas in Auckland is dependent on the following linkages:

- a) Time taken for Police to make repeat burglary referral.
- b) Time taken for Victim Support to contact repeat burglary victim and assess eligibility.
- c) Time taken for security assessment to be made.
- d) Time taken for work to be completed on security upgrade.

### ***A2.2.1 Time taken for Police to make repeat burglary referral***

Section 1 of this report discussed the Police referral processes for repeat burglary victims. There is no doubt that if Victim Support workers received quality and timely information from the Police, the time from burglary to upgrade could be greatly reduced.

In two of the three Police Districts (Auckland Central and Counties Manukau), Victim Support would ideally receive the copied front page of the completed Police Burglary Offence Report (POL 23) as soon as the attending officer has returned to the station.

This is dependent on several factors:

- a) That the officer is aware of the THP and the benefits it can offer to repeat burglary victims.
- b) That an officer attends the burglary soon after its occurrence (ideally within 24 hours).
- c) That the officer fully completes the Burglary OR (particularly the section relating to previous victimisation).
- d) That the officer copies the front page of the completed Burglary Offence Report and forwards it to the appropriate Victim Support manager.

In the North Shore Waitakere District the Police referral information on repeat burglaries from the Burglary Desk should be as comprehensive as the copied front page of the Burglary

Offence Report in the other two areas - especially in relation to previous victimisation. That is dependent also on several factors:

- (i) That the Burglary Desk is aware of the THP and the benefits it can offer repeat burglary victims.
- (ii) That the Burglary Desk Clerk advises the appropriate Victim Support office of the repeat burglary as soon as possible after it is reported.
- (iii) That the Burglary Desk provides the appropriate Victim Support group with information on the circumstances of the burglary and any Police data relating to previous victimisation.

While the Police Intel list of repeat burglaries in each District is important to all but one of the Auckland Victim Support groups, the fact that there is much processing and checking work to be done dilutes its importance and hinders the timely processing of the THP.

If, in Auckland City and Counties Manukau Police Districts, the appropriate Victim Support group always received the copied front page of the Burglary Offence Report this would enable a much more timely and relevant response from Victim Support.

Similarly, if the Waitakere North Shore Burglary Desk provided the West Auckland, North Shore, Hibiscus Coast, and North Rodney Victim Support groups with similar information, this would allow Victim Support staff and volunteers to spend less time on checking repeat burglary details and concentrate more on timely assessment of victims for eligibility for the THP.

#### ***A2.2.2 Time taken for Victim Support to contact client to assess eligibility***

Three of the seven Victim Support groups had only processed one Target Hardening client each (North Shore, Hibiscus Coast, North Rodney). Two of the other four Victim Support groups (Auckland Central and Counties) were concerned that when their crisis workload was heavy, Target Hardening work could build up leading to delays in contacting repeat burglary victims:

*“Stress builds up when the office is busy. Then we’re a little bit pushed to get through the Target Hardening work. It just gets sidelined. When we do Target Hardening, we do them in a batch and we all do that and nothing else for a while. Everything else gets shoved aside for a while. All day Tuesday this week it was Target Hardening. We’ll do about ten at once. Not all of them will be eligible. Once it’s up to date I feel a bit better.” (S07)*

*“We don’t really have the time to do it. We have other things to do as well. It’s not unusual for \_\_\_\_\_ (paid worker) to put a whole afternoon aside just to make Target Hardening telephone calls and not get through them all. A lot of people aren’t in during the day so we have to do more phoning in the evening. And that’s just the start of the process.” (S07)*



*“They told us at the training that the whole process of Target Hardening a repeat burglary victim’s home is supposed to be done within a week. If Target Hardening was our top priority it might be possible for us to contact the repeat burglary victim within two or three days. But we can’t do that; we are just too busy with other crime victims. If people need our immediate attention, they must take priority. I understand from the training why they are aiming for a seven-day turnaround. It’s based on stats that they had from the UK that shows that repeat offenders come back within the first week or two. In the very beginning we did aim for that but things just got really messy because Target Hardening was becoming a big thing and our other work just wasn’t getting done.” (ACVS)*

### **A2.2.3 Time taken for security assessment to be made**

In three Victim Support areas, the assessment function is contracted out to an assessor outside of Victim Support (Auckland Central, West Auckland, and Manukau).

The assessors in Auckland Central and West Auckland receive referrals which have already been assessed by Victim Support as eligible for Target Hardening. In Manukau, the assessor also adjudicates on eligibility.

The assessors both complained that they often received no referrals for weeks from Victim Support and then received a large batch of referrals at once:

*“I’d much prefer it if they came though regularly one or two at a time but I suppose they’re busy and don’t have the time to stay on top of them.” (S08)*

To have a contracted assessor do all the Target Hardening work – including assessing for financial eligibility – leaves the Manukau Victim Support free to concentrate on other crime victims:

*“We send the information on repeat burglaries through to \_\_\_\_\_ (the assessor) and he deals with them from then on. He informs them that they may be eligible for help and assistance from target hardening to make their homes more secure. If they’re not, he generally gives them some advice anyway.” (S06)*

Generally, delegating responsibility for completing the Target Hardening work lessened stress on the Victim Support group. It is the assessor who liaises with the victim and Chubb NZ to ensure the assessment and security upgrade is carried out in a timely manner:

*“We pay the \$50 that we get per Target Hardening case from the Ministry of Justice to our contracted assessor. Once he gets the list from me of eligible repeat burglary victims in the District, he does all the running around thereafter. He arranges a time with the victim to do the security assessment along with the security company’s installation.” (S01)*

*“We get \$50 for every successful Target Hardening we put in place and we give that to our assessor. He may go to a property once and it’s successful or he may need to visit ten times. We also ask that he attends when Chubb go to do the installation for the sake of continuity of contact.” (S02)*

*“I assess the client over the phone for eligibility and apply for approval. When it comes back, I liaise with Chubb and we make a time with the person to do the assessment. I then go back when the work is being done. I’ll wait a few days and then I always phone the client to see if they are happy and ask if the work was done well. I have never had a complaint.” (S09)*

The assessors and Victim Support staff responsible for doing the assessment reported on the difficulty in arranging access for the assessment to be done. Getting people at home is difficult when the householders were working and in rural areas like North Rodney and the Hibiscus Coast the householder might actually reside elsewhere:

*“I try and do the assessment within a week but I can’t always manage that. Often you can’t get hold of people. A lot of people have cell phones for incoming calls only. That can be really frustrating. In cases like that I send them a letter asking them to call Victim Support (because I don’t give out my home number). That can be a bit of a problem when Mrs Jones calls Victim Support and says, ‘I want to speak to \_\_\_\_\_ about Target Hardening (I only give out my Christian name). Then a volunteer says, ‘Oh yes, he’s been trying to get a hold of you.’ Then Mrs Jones says, ‘Will you get him to ring me?’ Then I have to repeat the same performance! I end up trying people’s cell phones at all sorts of times morning and evening. I’ll even try at 10pm.” (S09)*

*“There is a lot of work in contacting victims – especially when they don’t have a phone. I’ve driven way out to a rural area to find they’re not home so I leave a note asking them to ring me. I’ve gone out there a second time and left another note. Then there are the clients that you’ve phoned and made an appointment for them and they aren’t there when you arrive. So you leave a note. It’s very time-consuming.” (S07)*

All the Victim Support areas that do not currently have an assessor mentioned the difficulty of recruiting a person willing to work sporadically and retaining that person to enable a build up of Target Hardening skills:

*“One problem we have here is our turnover of volunteers, especially in the assessor role. If you are lucky enough to have an assessor stay for a lengthy period, you can build up knowledge and experience, but finding a volunteer who can commit to staying for a long period is difficult.” (S02)*

*“We got a bright spark who said he’d do it and then he pulled out. We finally managed to get someone else and we’ve been really pleased with her work but she’s just recently transferred out of the area. We’re now using Community Constables to do the security assessments but the problem there is there can be a delay in getting the assessment done.” (S03)*

#### **A2.2.4 Time taken for completion of work on security upgrade**

There were a few complaints about the availability of Chubb NZ, the firm contracted to do the target hardening upgrades – especially in more rural areas:

*“The last few visits I’ve made to do the assessment in victims’ homes Chubb have been late. I’m not knocking them – I know they’re busy. He had come from another job. We had a 1.00pm appointment at the woman’s home but he didn’t get there until 1.40pm. That wasn’t the first time it’s happened. So here am I sitting on the side of the road and I go into the victim and say ‘I’m really sorry, he must be on his way.’ I suppose it’s to be expected because they have to drive way*

*out here from Dominion Road in Central Auckland. In the past he's been late by about 15 or 20 minutes. I just have to spend so much time waiting that I always make sure I've got plenty of paperwork in the car. A lot of the work I have to do – and therefore, the waiting – is in my own time (outside of paid Victim Support hours). It can mean that I'm then late to pick up my kids as promised or whatever.” (S07)*

*“There was a difficulty with getting Chubb to come way out here within the time frame. He just said they didn't have the manpower to do it. Wellington can tell you what they like but bad luck, we can't do it.” (S04)*

### **A2.2.5 Resources to implement the Target Hardening Programme**

The number of paid Victim Support staff and volunteers who are available to implement the THP varies from area to area.

As we have discussed earlier, stress for Victim Support builds up in the initial stages of the Target Hardening process (checking of referrals and assessment of eligibility) because of the time-consuming nature of the tasks:

*“We would spend a minimum of four to six hours on a Target Hardening case. Detailed ones can take three or four days to organise. In one case, the landlord was overseas and the property was owned by a Trust. We had to track down the Trust's solicitor and he was overseas at the time. It took a long time to sort out.” (S02)*

*“Target Hardening takes a lot of time. I keep statistics on how long I spend on Target Hardening work. I average a telephone call at 15 minutes. I time a fax at 15 minutes. Any visit I make I time it from when I leave home or the office to meeting with the client and then returning to home or office. Even if I only spend five minutes with the client, it can be an hour's round trip out here.” (S07)*

There was agreement among the Victim Support workers regularly implementing the THP that the \$50 allowance from the Ministry of Justice was inadequate recompense for the time expended on each case:

*“Target Hardening is woefully underfunded for the hours that are put into each case. \$50 just doesn't cover it. There's the volunteer's time (including follow-up visits) and the assessor's time. It can be up to eight hours per case. Where there are children involved, it can be a lot longer.” (S03)*

*“We are paid \$50 per approved application. Last week I contacted our CEO asking him to consider increasing the amount we receive for Target Hardening outlining the number of hours we put into each case and the number of kilometres we travel. Up until the end of September we have made 288 Target Hardening contacts. That took up 99.85 hours of our time and meant 976 kilometres of travel. From that 50 Target Hardening upgrades were approved and carried out. These stats didn't include the time spent determining eligibility for Target Hardening, nor did it include data entry time, paperwork, phone and fax time. I asked him to consider a further \$25 per approved Target Hardening application, which would increase to \$75 the amount paid.” (S07)*

*“I would like to see the true costs of providing the Target Hardening services given to us based on the actual time involved. \$50 per successful target hardening household isn’t a lot and doesn’t go that far. It really costs our organisation because we have been left to determine how that \$50 is spent. In our case we give it to the assessor because we think that’s fair. But that is only a token amount really. We have to pay mileage over and above that.” (S02)*

One Victim Support worker cited the circumstances surrounding the burglary of a local family who were in Australia at the time of the burglary. The time invested by Victim Support in following-up that particular case exceeded 30 hours. While some of that time was in supportive phone calls, a great deal of the time was spent on Target Hardening the property and assisting the family to replace goods that were stolen.

One issue that was referred to by most Victim Support workers was that the travel costs associated with Target Hardening were not funded and had to be underwritten by Victim Support. As discussed earlier, in rural areas - or where the victim does not have a telephone - this can mean several lengthy round trips. One manager says that some volunteers never put in travel claims:

*“Victim Support volunteer travel costs get reimbursed but a lot of them don’t charge for it. Those that need to do, but some just don’t claim. Others donate half of their claim back to Victim Support.” (S06)*

## **A2.3 Target Hardening Programme’s Processing Efficiency**

### **A2.3.1 Interagency relationships - Police**

Apart from the complaints made elsewhere in this report regarding the Police referral process for repeat burglary victims, there was no substantive criticism of Police by Victim Support in relation to their involvement in the Target Hardening process. This is largely because there is little or no involvement of Police outside of Community Constables in the North Shore and Hibiscus Coast areas.

Respondents who were identified as being key stakeholders within Police in each of the three Districts were supportive but largely ignorant of the THP implementation process. Although Police interviewees made supportive comments about the THP, they were not rooted in hands-on experience of its implementation:

*“Target Hardening means we have been able to deliver upgraded security into the home of repeat burglary victims, that’s got to be good. I would fully endorse any initiative which attempts to limit or restrict unlawful entry into any premises.” (S11)*

*“Personally I think it’s a good idea but there’s not much call for it in my area.” (S12)*

What was noticeable through the interviews was that, in general, the Police know very little about the THP. Even a sergeant working in the Burglary Squad didn’t really know the details of how it worked:

*“Generally there is no real liaison on this between Police and Victim Support. We have no idea which houses have been ‘target hardened’ nor do we know how people are eligible to have this target hardening done.” (S10)*

### **A2.3.2 Interagency relationships – Chubb NZ**

The working relationship between Victim Support volunteers and assessors and Chubb NZ was good on the whole, outside of criticisms of Chubb’s time keeping in rural areas:

*“Chubb have been such nice people. Very thorough and clean. Their standard of workmanship is good.” (S09)*

Similarly Chubb NZ expressed satisfaction in their dealings with assessors and Victim Support staff:

*“We have built up a fair amount of trust with the people we are working with out there. We mainly deal with the assessors in Auckland Central, Counties, and Manukau.” (S13)*

The manager of Chubb NZ was unaware of any local problems with time keeping relating to assessments or installations by Chubb NZ personnel:

*“We try to respond within 24 hours of the call coming in. That’s dependent on what time the assessor rings in and where the household is located. I am not aware of any problems regarding any delays by Chubb personnel in an assessment being done or security being installed.” (S13)*

### **A2.3.3 Interagency relationships – Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC)**

The working relationship between Victim Support and their assessors and HNZC in relation to Target Hardening is largely dependent upon the co-operation of local HNZC staff:

*“It is entirely dependent on who you have to deal with. After a burglary to a HNZC house, some HNZC staff will bend over backwards to help but there are just as many others who say, ‘It’s not our problem, you’ve got to take on some of the responsibility yourself’. Tenants have said to me, ‘If we miss a week’s rent they are on our doorstep. Yet when we get broken into we sit for ten days with broken windows’.” (S09)*

Some Housing New Zealand Corporation managers quoted HNZC policy which, they claimed, forbids deadlocks on doors and locks on windows because of the risk of fire:

*“There have been difficulties with Housing New Zealand Corporation because they have a policy of not putting deadlocks on doors because they are worried about the risk of fire. In July 2001 I went and addressed the managers at the Otaru Office and spoke to them about Target Hardening.” (S09)*

*“HNZC has been really good – apart from one office (either Panmure or Glen Innes) who said we couldn’t do any Target Hardening in their area. They sent us a letter explaining that the reason behind this was because of fire risk. If they had dead bolts and locks on all doors and there was a fire, there may be children unable to get out of the house. It’s a little bit frustrating for us if a repeat*

*victim phones up and they live in Panmure and we have to say, 'Panmure won't do it, but Glen Innes, right next door, will'." (S01)*

Some Victim Support staff and assessors were prepared to negotiate with Housing New Zealand Corporation:

*"HNZC have a policy of, 'We don't want deadlocks and we don't want windows locked upstairs because we are concerned about egress'. But I negotiate and try to find ways around things. If they object to double key deadlocks, why can't we fit a dead bolt with a flick on it?" (S09)*

*"HNZC has a couple of restrictions. They don't like deadlocks in case of fire. How we get round that is to put a key on the outside but a latch on the inside. They also prefer at least one window unbolted so that you can get out if there's a fire. So you can have deadlocks on your front and back doors as long as you can still get out a window on the side. HNZC says it's for fire safety." (S07)*

*"There have been a few problems dealing with HNZC properties. I try to deal with them personally. Some offices and some managers can be difficult. They say, 'Our policy is not to put deadlocks on doors'. As far as I am concerned HNZC are receiving rent and I think they should protect their property. I always manage to get them done with a bit of circumnavigation." (S09)*

Assessors and Victim Support staff complained that having to negotiate with individual HNZC offices or HNZC sub-contractors is very time-consuming:

*"As far as Housing New Zealand Corporation is concerned, it's the bureaucracy that gets you. You've got to get the local manager to personally approve the work. There's also quite a bit of work involved in cases in which other agencies are contracted to handle HNZC property on their behalf – for example Crockers manage on behalf of HNZC on some occasions and that can cause delays." (S09)*

One Victim Support manager mentioned that the rules governing Target Hardening HNZC properties just changed without any warning:

*"At the beginning, we were told in our Target Hardening training that we definitely weren't to Target Harden HNZC properties. They told us that HNZC had their own funding, being a Government Department. Somewhere along the line it changed without anyone ever telling us officially." (S01)*

The solution identified in interviews was that HNZC should develop a nationwide policy for Target Hardening – especially if the programme extends beyond Auckland:

*"It would be useful if HNZC had a policy for the country or the region so that you didn't have to negotiate each time the issue of Target Hardening comes up." (S09)*

*"If the Target Hardening Programme extends nationwide, Housing New Zealand Corporation will need to develop a nationwide policy on this." (S01)*

Chubb NZ was also aware of the HNZC rules regarding deadlocks on doors:

*“In some cases when HNZC said they didn’t want deadlocks put onto the doors we offered a deadlock which has a thumb turn to the inside.” (S13)*

A HNZC Policy Unit spokesperson stated that if the THP were to be extended outside of Auckland they would expect to be consulted so that operational guidelines for local offices could be developed.

#### **A2.3.4 Interagency relationships – private landlords**

Interaction with private landlords was dependent on the landlord concerned. Generally, there was support for Target Hardening upgrades even if some Victim Support workers felt that the landlord could have either been more gracious or contributed to securing his own rental property:

*“Generally landlords are pretty happy about Target Hardening.” (S07)*

*“Some of the private landlords are not very cooperative and I think some could quite often afford to protect their own property. Some will not allow us to put holes in doors and things like that but to me that’s ridiculous because it’s their property that’s being safeguarded. I feel that landlords could do a lot more to help their tenants. They often do nothing until I phone up.” (S09)*

#### **A2.3.5 Installation costs**

Chubb NZ is contracted to Victim Support to provide the security upgrades for Target Hardening. The initial contract nationally is for \$1.2 million over three years. The average price per household was set at about \$750. The national manager of Chubb NZ admits that it was difficult to settle on an average figure per household:

*“We tried to put a figure on an average household. We looked at an average three-bedroom house with an average number of windows, a front and back door and patio doors. But what we came across is that we have to upgrade some very big two-storey dwellings with a large number of windows.” (S13)*

Since the inception of the programme eighteen months ago in April 2001, Chubb NZ has carried out 177 security upgrades for Target Hardening properties in Auckland averaging about nine jobs per month (range 0 jobs to 15 jobs).

Chubb NZ’s most recent Target Hardening jobs sheet for October 2002 averaged at \$797.80.

**Table 13: Chubb NZ – THP costs for October 2002**

	Survey	Hardware	Labour	TOTAL (inc GST)
AK219	\$45.00	\$334.11	\$405.00	\$882.13
AK220	\$45.00	\$264.81	\$325.00	\$714.17
AK221	\$45.00	\$306.12	\$340.00	\$777.52
AK222	\$45.00	\$244.44	\$300.00	\$663.13
AK223	\$45.00	\$305.55	\$375.00	\$816.25
AK224	\$45.00	\$326.75	\$400.00	\$868.22
AK225	\$45.00	\$286.11	\$423.00	\$848.38
AK226	\$45.00	\$305.55	\$375.00	\$816.25
AK227	\$45.00	\$336.08	\$412.00	\$892.22
AK228	\$45.00	\$298.90	\$278.00	\$699.64
				\$7,977.85

If the trend continues, after three years it could be estimated that Chubb NZ will Target Harden around 350 properties in Auckland at a cost of \$282,421. This is still well under the \$1.2 million allocated by the Ministry of Justice and Chubb’s estimate of 350 properties per year at \$750 per property (\$787,500)

Chubb NZ reports that 25 percent of all Target Hardening jobs were above that estimate, averaging out at around \$800 overall. So far this has not led to any budgeting problem because it has largely evened out over the period.

**Table 14: Chubb NZ - average cost per THP household (April 01-Oct 02)**

	Apr 2001- Aug 2001	Sep 2001- Feb 2002	Mar 2002 - Oct 2002	Total
No. of Auckland TH jobs	42	52	83	177
No. of TH jobs over \$750	13	10	20	43
% TH jobs over \$750	31	19	24	24

Chubb NZ also reports that only 18 of the 177 Target Hardening upgrades (10 percent) involved the installation of an alarm system. Most of the alarms were installed in conjunction with locks. The VIBIS (Victim Incident Based Information System) database shows that of the 100 Target Hardening clients where the Target Hardening work and costs were entered (out of a total of 170) 80 received a Class A response (80 percent), 18 received a Class B response and two received a Class C response.

There were no reported problems from Victim Support workers or assessors seeking approval from Victim Support National Office for work beyond the \$750:

*“We do try to cover houses as adequately as possible within the \$750 target set. We have to compromise on occasions because the \$750 doesn’t cover houses with a large number of windows. When I have had to exceed that amount, Victim Support National Office has always supported*



*me and they've come back with approval at a higher rate. There have only been one or two occasions when the \$750 has been too low.” (S09)*

## **A2.4 Strengths of the Target Hardening Programme**

Some of the Victim Support workers reported that it was quite difficult for repeat burglary victims to understand that their security upgrade would be at no cost to themselves:

*“There’s a lot of disbelief around about it being free. People tend to think there must be a catch and that it’ll come back on them somehow.” (S02)*

*“It’s so important to tell them that it’s free. When you tell them the funding is from the Ministry of Justice, a lot of people still don’t believe it’s free. Initially people shut down, it’s only when they hear the word ‘free’ they get interested.” (S07)*

*“One elderly woman didn’t want it because of her anti-government feelings. The assessor went ahead with it. Anyway, when they went to install it, she asked them again who was paying for it. Again she told them, ‘If it’s the Government that’s paying for it, I don’t want it.’ But the assessor who had built up a good relationship with her just put his foot down and told her that if it made her happier, it is Victim Support that’s making her take it.” (S02)*

Notwithstanding criticisms made by key stakeholders throughout this report, there is unanimous support for extending the Target Hardening Programme. For many, Target Hardening means the victim can be offered something tangible beyond emotional support:

*“A lot of our job is really terrible. Aside from spending time with the victim and being there, there is not really that much more we can do. Target Hardening has been so great – we are able to offer them something practical - beyond Spot the dog - that isn’t going to cost them any money.” (S05)*

*“We have only done one up here but it went like clockwork. The Victim Support National Office received the paperwork and it was approved immediately so the security upgrade was all organised and done the next day. It was as immediate as it could have been done. So the poor woman had only one night that she didn’t cope too well. (S05)*

The feedback to all stakeholders from repeat burglary victims who have been clients of the THP has been positive:

*“A lot of the victims are obviously happy that they have more security and feel more secure about going out during the day and sleeping at night time. A lot of people – particularly women living alone – are more comfortable knowing that the locks on their windows means there is less chance of someone coming in.” (S07)*

*“An elderly couple from Pukekobe phoned me a couple of days after they got their security put in. You’d think they’d been given a million dollars. They just phoned to say, ‘Thank You’. When I went there the day after the burglary, they had every window in their house closed because the burglar had got in through the toilet window while she had been sewing in the sewing room.” (S07)*

*“I think it’s a very worthwhile exercise. In fact I think it’s the best thing since sliced bread. These people have been traumatised, they need support, which they get from Victim Support, but if Target Hardening weren’t there they wouldn’t get any physical help. I think it’s a very generous scheme.”*  
(S09)

### **A3 Adults’ Responses to the Target Hardening Programme**

The evaluation team interviewed 41 adult individuals from 37 households.

#### **A3.1 Revictimisation**

Three of the 37 THP households were burgled again after Target Hardening. In each case, there was no fault with the upgraded security equipment installed rather it was the householder failing to adequately secure the property. In one case a set of stolen keys was used to gain access. In all cases the Police were informed. A summary of the circumstances of each of the repeat victimisations as reported by the victims follows.

##### **(001)**

The house was burgled in January. Window locks and a deadlock for the door were provided through Target Hardening. It was burgled again in July. Access was gained through an open window. The householder didn’t realise that the window locks are only any good if the window is shut. After the July burglary the householder put in her own locks so that the windows can be open and secure.

##### **(012)**

The householder was burgled once after Target Hardening. Access was gained through the ranch slider window.

##### **(032)**

After the first burglary, the victim had locks to both windows and doors installed through Target Hardening. She was burgled twice more. Both times the house was locked and the victim was gardening. When she returned to the house, she realised someone had been through the house because of the footprints on the carpet. The Police were informed on both occasions and they said the only way the person could have gained access was with a key. The victim later discovered that a set of keys hidden outside for emergencies had gone missing

In West Auckland, Hibiscus Coast, and North Shore none of the three households that had been Target Hardened were burgled again.

#### **A3.2 Fear after first burglary**

After the first burglary, 25 of the interviewees admitted that they were ‘worried’ (15) or ‘a bit worried’ (10) that they would be burgled again.

Seven said they were ‘not worried’, but two of those admitted that they were aware it could happen again:

*“I wouldn’t use the word ‘worried’. Aware is a better word to use.” (044)*

Most people reported that after the first burglary they had a sense of fear or danger that had not been present before:

*“There is always a sense of fear. When I wake in the night I’m always listening. When I go to the toilet I always look out the window. I don’t know. I just feel sometimes that somebody is here, breaking into the car maybe.” (014)*

*“Well it certainly doesn’t help your peace of mind you are always thinking in the back of your mind that these crooks will think up some other way to get into your premises. You are never easy in your mind. You keep thinking about what might be next, like a home invasion or breaking a window. You feel helpless. It needs more policing.” (042)*

### **A3.3 How householders learned of the Target Hardening Programme**

Of the 29 interviewees who were able to recall how they found out about the THP, 14 said they learned about THP through Victim Support, six heard from the Police and a further two heard about it on the news. Eight others couldn’t remember, didn’t know, or were vague about how they had initially heard about THP:

*“Someone rung me because I’d been burgled three times but I’m not sure who that was.”(015)*

Interviewees were confused about the roles of the Police and Victim Support in relation to the THP. For example, some thought it was the Police who had provided the security upgrade for them, others thought that Victim Support worked for the Police:

*“When these people (Victim Support) arrived I just thought the Police had sent them to me.” (014)*

### **A3.4 Feelings when advised of eligibility for Target Hardening**

The interviewees recall being very pleased and relieved that they were getting their home security upgraded.

*“It’s good that the government is helping.” (014))*

*“Much relieved.” (026)*

*“Great. It really put my mind at ease” (029))*

*“Oh good. I felt that they had done an excellent job”. (044)*

*“I thought it was a marvellous scheme, at the back of my mind I though it was a bit like bolting the door after the horse has gone. To my mind in some ways the money should be spent on the Police force, but I know that’s not possible I guess. But I thought it was great.” (045)*

*“I was all for it to put locks on. That was great because I realised that none of the windows had locks. It was a very vulnerable house; it would have been very easy to break into.” (049)*

### **A3.5 Timeliness of the stages of the Target Hardening Programme**

All the interviewees had difficulty remembering when the various stages of the THP took place because of the time lapse between the burglary and the interview. The only clear memory most of the householders had was the speed with which the work on installation was carried out.

(i) Time from burglary to assessment

Some interviewees said they were contacted for assessment almost straight away. For others it was anywhere between two and six weeks before they were contacted.

(ii) Time from assessment to installation

Some interviewees said the equipment was installed almost immediately after assessment, other waited for three to four weeks.

(iii) Time from burglary to installation

The time factor varied for many households from two to three weeks for some and for as much as one year for others.

(iv) Time to install the equipment

All the interviewees stated that the work to install the Target Hardening security upgrade was completed within a few hours, the maximum being a whole day.

Only one respondent was critical of the length of time she had to wait for the Target Hardening process to be implemented:

*“I was quite unhappy with the service provided. It wasn’t until I saw a story on television that I knew about the [Target Hardening] programme. I contacted them but it was six months before they got back to me. I was ringing them like every week. They said they wanted to check the Police report. I gave them all the Police numbers and it took them two months to get back to tell me that I was eligible. I gave them my details about four times. I was just waiting, waiting, waiting and I just gave up. Maybe I was the only one they didn’t ring back. I felt like I was waiting in a very very long queue. I ended up getting an alarm myself as the insurance company were going to cancel my house and content insurance. The Victim Support came a week after I got the alarm. Since I had just got the alarm a few days ago I wanted to cancel it and get one from them but the request was turned down. I am very unhappy with the service and the way I was treated.” (020)*

### **A3.6 Understanding of the key security components provided**

Most of the households were provided with deadlocks for the front and back door and for the ranch sliders. Locks were provided for the windows in the house as well as the garage.

For the locks and deadlocks, there were no written instructions. Verbal instructions were given and householders were shown how to operate them and how to use their new keys. At

interview, householders were conversant in the use of locks and in all cases demonstrated their use to the interviewer.

The three households who were provided security alarms were given verbal instructions and shown how to use it and they were left with written information on how to operate alarms. All of the householders were using the alarms.

### **A3.7 Feelings after Target Hardening Programme upgrade**

The security work completed through the THP reduced interviewees' fears of being burgled again. Three were 'worried' that their house would be broken into again, compared with 17 who said they were 'a bit worried' and 12 who said that they were 'not worried'.

All the interviewees without exception were appreciative of the extra security provided through the THP. All mentioned that they felt their house was more secure:

*"I'm happy with the locks. I think it helps. It's been two years now." (013)*

*"Anyone's house might be broken into anytime but at least it is more difficult now". (039)*

*"I just feel safer having the extra security." (015)*

*"I can go out now for a couple of hours, I can go away for weekends and feel quite secure". (026).*

*"I feel that the house is more secure and therefore the possessions that I have within the house are more secure." (033)*

*"It has made me happier about going out during the day. At night I'm still a bit nervous." (030)*

*"I am not stressed anymore. I don't get scared at night and I don't worry about coming home and finding the house broken into." (028)*

*"It's given me extra security and peace of mind." (043)*

*"I used to be one of those people who were afraid to go to sleep at night with the window open - even when it was hot - in case the children might get taken away. But now I feel quite happy to leave windows open a little now and even when I'm not at home I'm not so worried." (028)*

*"It's made me feel a lot easier about living here and coming home and making us feel more safe to be here, especially if it's me and the three kids all the time." (026)*

While all of the interviewees believed that the security measures would act as a deterrent to burglars in future, some said they believed that a determined burglar could probably still overcome the added security to find a means of entry:

*"Well it might slow them down. It will probably not prevent them - if they want to get in they have probably got the gear to do it anyway but it will probably slow them down. There'll be more chance of them being noticed or heard" (005)*

*“It will limit the opportunities.” (039)*

*“It would certainly make it more difficult, but I don’t know if it would prevent anything. I think that the fact that we have security and an alarm, which has a blinking red light...and stickers on the windows, would deter most thieves. It may make him think it was too hard, but if he thought it was worth it, it wouldn’t stop him.” (042)*

A major benefit cited in interviews was that the Target Hardening security upgrade had been at no cost to the householder. It made many feel that they were important to the government and not just another burglary statistic:

*“It was good to know that the government was aware and trying to help.” (014)*

*“It has also given me a nice feeling that there are people out there that care, they can’t be everywhere protecting everyone. I am very grateful that they helped and I know the Police and the security are doing their best.” (023)*

### **A3.8 Changes to daily routine after Target Hardening**

As a result of their involvement in the THP, interviewees felt more aware of the need for security around their home and accordingly some had changed their routines:

*“I tend to come home sooner where once I would take my time over visits. I tend to cut it short now”. (052)*

*“I am now edgy now when he is out.” (053)*

*“We hide things when we go out, we always think about it now. Sometimes we leave the light on when we are out. Even when we are home, my wife and children by themselves, they put the light on outside. Now we lock everything. We lock our cars. We don’t leave anything outside.” (014)*

*“We just make sure everything is locked and we put the alarm on.” (020)*

*“When I go in the back garden now I always lock the back door, the front door is always locked.” (045)*

Some respondents said they were keen to ensure that their family, friends and neighbours also benefited from their own raised awareness:

*“The whole experience enlightened me. I feel I can now support other people more if they do get burgled. I’m telling friends what they need to do for burglaries now, with locks and systems. I’m much more aware of what needs to be done to make a house secure.” (026)*

Some elderly victims had learned that their daily routines may have been observed by the offender in planning the burglary and so were now altering the timings of their daily activities and had become more watchful of strangers loitering in the neighbourhood.

### A3.9 Further desired security improvements

Target Hardening raised awareness of home security systems leading to expectations of some interviewees that a further security upgrade would be necessary to ensure that their home was fully ‘target hardened’.

Four of the interviewees said that an alarm would make their home more secure:

*“Well probably the next step is a burglar alarm.” (005)*

*“I could have had a security system, you know an electronic system.” (049)*

*“The only other thing would be a burglar alarm.” (050)*

*“I think it’s a shame that they couldn’t help us out with making the payments for the alarm. That would help a lot more than a few extra window locks as far as I am concerned.” (017)*

Other security improvements suggested included: a dog, closed circuit television, infrared beam and electronic surveillance:

*“Security lights at the back could put off some who are wandering around the back - that would be a deterrent possibly.” (027)*

*“Really there’s not much else we can do apart from getting a dog. We all watch each other’s properties all the time.” (039)*

*“I don’t know what to think because I don’t know what’s going to stop them getting in again. A closed-circuit camera? Maybe getting a radio-controlled beam so you can tell when someone is coming up the driveway?” (034)*

*“I couldn’t think of anything else that would make a difference. To go down the route of electronic surveillance would be a major project.” (042)*

When interviewees were probed as to why they did not seek the additional security they desired, all pointed out that cost was the main prohibiting factor:

*“I just couldn’t afford it really” (049)*

### A3.10 Feelings about agencies involved in the Target Hardening Programme

#### A.3.10.1 New Zealand Police

Respondents clearly recalled how long it took the Police to attend after the burglary and commented on it:

*“The Police were excellent, I know how busy they are and not one, but three cars turned up.” (021)*

*“The first time the Police came the next day. The second time they didn’t come for two days.” (020)*

*“The Police came about three or four days later.” (028)*

Seventeen respondents recalled that the Police officer who responded to the burglary offered them security advice:

*“The Police advised on locking doors and he sat and talked to us for a while about not talking to people at the gate.” (018)*

*“He (the Police officer) sat down and spoke to us for quite a while. He even suggested that we lock the back gate.” (018)*

*“He told us, ‘Don’t let anybody in the house and don’t talk to any strangers.’” (019)*

Nine respondents recalled that the Police officer who attended did not offer any security advice:

*“I got no advice from the Police – Not a thing.” (001)*

It would seem that there may be an expectation that giving security advice is a Police function regardless of whether the officer visiting is a Community Constable, a Burglary Squad detective, a CIB detective or an officer on general patrol.

The only other criticism of the Police from the interviewees was their failure to give feedback to the victims about the progress of their investigation into the burglary:

*“The Police put a little notice in the paper that mentioned an elderly couple that had been robbed three times and a possible lead they had. And then after that it was said in the paper that a 17-year-old was arrested who had burgled us but we were not informed about it.” (052)*

*“They weren’t particularly interested. The most frustrating thing is we never heard anything about whether they had any success catching them or anything at all.” (042)*

One victim claimed that he had provided Police with an identification of the offender, but the Police never informed him as to whether that offender had been apprehended:

*“The Police did come round to my house and show me some pictures of offenders and I was able to pick her out. But no-one got back to me and nothing’s happened as far as I know. I was a bit annoyed about that. I know they are not obliged to let me know, but it would have been good to have some feedback.” (012)*

In another household a cell phone had been stolen and the offender had been traced through that:

*“Because of the phone calls they did have a name of a girl from the second burglary and they had a warrant out for her arrest but we don’t know what’s happened.” (013)*



### **A3.10.2 Victim Support**

Most of the interviewees (29) commented that they were ‘very satisfied’ (15) or ‘satisfied’ (14) with the support given to them after the burglary by Victim Support:

*“We were very pleased and impressed by them, they were very generous in what they did and they did it very efficiently”*

*“Wonderful, they are just perfect people.” (024)*

*“They went through the process of talking through the Target Hardening Programme which I thought it was a good idea because I had never heard of it before”. (025)*

*“They were the ones who made the initial contact and then they made sure that someone came to see me, to make sure the locksmith had come around. And they came around about a week or two later to see how everything was. Yes they were very good. I can’t say the same about the Police. (028)*

*“It is a real shock, so to have Victim Support is a reassuring thing in a shocking time. We are impressed with what Victim Support offer in the emotional side of things as much as the physical”. (033)*

Victim Support in the West Auckland area was singled out by name for praise more than any other Victim Support group.

### **A3.10.3 Chubb NZ**

All but two of the 41 interviewees were satisfied with the security firm for completing the work efficiently. No one named the firm. The first complaint originated when the tradesman refused to go beyond the contracted work to assist the householder:

*“I was satisfied but he got a bit grumpy at one stage when I asked him if he could drill a hole for this other lock I had that wasn’t working over in the other house. I thought that since he had the equipment. He said no, he didn’t have time.” (015)*

The other was a complaint about the mess after the job was completed:

*“I felt he could have bought a vacuum cleaner because there were steel bits that went down on to the floor and my son could have stood on those and hurt his feet. So cleaning up after the job would have been good.” (030)*

### **A3.10.4 Housing New Zealand Corporation**

The only comment about HNZC from an interviewee was from a HNZC tenant who had ‘target hardening’ carried out by HNZC after an attempted burglary on her property. The tenant was provided with a security door, security lighting and an alarm system.

### **A3.11 Suggested changes to the Target Hardening Programme**

Several respondents mentioned that Target Hardening should look at the location of the property when assessing a security upgrade:

*“Perhaps they [Target Hardening] could look at people’s gardens or the access to the property, which is just as important as the house.” (012)*

*“The reserve behind the property makes it very accessible for people to come up behind.” (033)*

One respondent felt that location should play an important part in assessing whether Target Hardening is appropriate after a first burglary:

*“I live way out in the bush without neighbours close by. I would have liked to have the extra security after the first burglary. The sooner you have the security installed the better.” (030)*

One respondent felt that financing the Target Hardening individual properties was like the ‘ambulance at the bottom of the cliff’ and that money would be better spent on policing:

*“We gained some locks on our doors but that’s about it. If the cost of this is being spread over the whole country it must be hugely expensive and it is a like having the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. If that money were spent on extra policing, that is, extra patrols, they would be heading in the right direction.” (035)*

## **A4 Children’s Responses to the Target Hardening Programme**

### **A4.1 Profile of the children interviewed**

Eight children were interviewed as part of the THP evaluation, six girls and two boys. Five of the children were Māori; two were Samoan and one Fijian. One child was aged seven, three aged 11, one aged 12, one aged 14 and one aged 15. Seven of the eight children were in the Counties Manukau Police District, one was from Auckland Central.

### **A4.2 Children’s fear of being burgled**

All of the children said that prior to the first burglary, while they were aware that there was a possibility that a burglary might occur, none of them was worried that their house might get broken into. Each of the children stated that they were aware of the need to secure the house before leaving by locking doors and windows. Prior to the burglaries, one household already had a burglar alarm installed and this made their children feel very safe.

### A4.3 Children's reactions to the burglaries

In six out of eight cases, the children arrived home with parents to discover the first burglary:

*"The first time we were gone for two weeks and we came home and like walked through the back door and realised it was unlocked. The microwave and TV was gone and the rest of our stuff was gone – everything." (Subject B)*

One child discovered the burglary when he arrived home by himself. This was a particularly traumatic discovery for this 12-year-old boy (Subject F). He described it as "creepy" and found it quite difficult to talk about what had happened. The interview took place several months after the last burglary.

Another child found out about what happened from her parents. The parents of this twelve-year-old girl (Subject E) initially tried to conceal the burglary from her and her brother. They were told later in the same day that it occurred.

The child was not immediately aware there had been a burglary when she came into the house. She recalls:

*"I was thinking, where is the television? And then they told me and I looked and noticed that other stuff was missing too" (Subject E).*

Discovering the burglary had a major impact on the children. They described their feelings as follows:

*"Mummy was scared." (Subject A)*

*"I didn't want to come back in the house by myself after that." (Subject B)*

*"It was creepy." (Subject C)*

*"It was freaky." (Subject D)*

*"It was scary the first time 'cause I was one of the first ones inside the house." (Subject E)*

*"I cried when I went to bed." (Subject B)*

*"I was real angry." (Subject H)*

All of the children had a detailed awareness of the way in which their house was broken into. They were able to show the interviewer the exact window or door that was accessed, and to describe in detail how the offender managed to break in.

### A4.4 Losses experienced by children after burglaries

Children experienced several kinds of loss - loss of material possessions, loss of trust in the people around them, and a loss of a sense of their home as a 'safe haven'.

All of the eight children noted that the family television had been stolen in the burglaries. In five of the eight households the children lost items that were their own:

- Three households lost expensive video games (e.g. Nintendo/Playstation) owned by the children.
- One boy had both his bicycle, and one belonging to his friend, stolen from the property.
- One girl described how her expensive ‘trendy’ clothing had been taken from her room.

Two of the five families had home and contents insurance and they were able to replace their children’s things, although not immediately. The three remaining families were not able to immediately replace their lost possessions for financial reasons. However, one child said a friend loaned him a replacement bicycle and a television.

All of the children mentioned that the burglary made them feel less secure at home and less trusting of others:

- One child stated that he “never, ever” leaves belongings, such as his bicycle, outside the house. He brings his toys inside even if he is just running inside the house to get a drink, rather than leave them on the footpath. (Subject F)
- Another child is suspicious of his playmates, as one was the suspected offender. He no longer invites his friends around after school for fear they will learn how to gain access to his home. (Subject H)
- One girl has developed a habit of hiding her precious things in her room when she leaves the house. She has invented hiding places for her pocket money, portable CD player and CDs and favoured items of clothes. (Subject E)
- One girl is described by her sister as “obsessive” about security. She will not leave the house until she has made a check of each and every window and door in the house to ensure it is locked. (Subject C)
- One child has since experienced bullying at school as a result of his parents ‘dobbing in’ his friend to the Police. (Subject H)
- One girl found her sleep disrupted for a number of months. She awoke frightened whenever the security light outside her bedroom window went on. (Subject B)

#### **A4.5 Arrest of the offender**

In only two cases was the offender caught - in one case, the suspected offender of both burglaries was a relative of the child and in the other case, the suspected offender in the first burglary was the ex-partner of the child's mother.

The offenders in all other instances were never caught.

#### **A4.6 Increasing home security**

All of the children mentioned that since the burglaries, new locks had been put on their doors and windows.

Other improvements to their households mentioned by the children included:

- Purchasing burglar alarms.
- Buying a dog.
- Removing anything from around the property that could be used to break in.
- Arranging for a house sitter if they are going on holiday.

#### **A4.7 Fear of another burglary**

None of the children thought they would be subject to a repeat burglary after the first burglary. After the first burglary, all of the children and their families took precautions against further burglaries.

One family purchased a burglar alarm after the second burglary and the children felt confident this would prevent future burglaries. They have not had any repeat burglaries since.

However, another family had an alarm at the time of the first burglary that had been deactivated. The children were concerned that the burglar is a professional who will not be deterred.

#### **A4.8 Change to routines**

All the children reported that they were more careful about locking windows and doors. Two reported that they had become quite obsessive about that since the burglaries and they also checked around the outside of their homes to ensure that they did not leave things lying around that could be used to break into their home:

*“Yeah every time before we go to sleep we go checking all the doors and windows. We always used to leave it to up to Dad, now we do it too.” (Subject D)*

Several children also expressed that they are more fearful, particularly in terms of being at home on their own:

*“I’m scared] only when I’m home alone.” (Subject C)*

*“I’m scared to come home by myself.” (Subject F)*

## **A4.9 Security after Target Hardening**

For all the children interviewed, it had been several months since their last burglary. Responses to this question were mixed. Most children thought that the improved security had made a difference.

Others were more ambivalent:

*“If they are going to do it you can’t stop them.” (Subject C)*

*“I don’t care as long as I’m not home when they come in.” (Subject B)*

## **A4.10 Further desired security improvements**

All of the children who did not have an alarm said that they would feel much safer if an alarm was installed.

One child claimed that he would really only feel safe if he can get a “big mean dog” and leave it inside the house while he is at school. His other option was to “move somewhere nice”. (Subject A):

*“I don’t know, we got locks and alarms, there’s not really much else you can do” (Subject D)*

*“Always have someone baby-sit the house. That was the first time we didn’t have someone stay at our house when we were gone” (Subject A)*

## **A5 Discussion**

### **A5.1 Methodology**

#### **A5.1.1 Stakeholder interviews**

Victim Support workers and staff kindly accommodated the lead researcher for interviews, but at all times the researcher was acutely aware of their pressure of work and their need to monitor phones. Almost all interviews with Victim Support workers and volunteers were punctuated by phone calls and requests for help from other Victim Support personnel or Police.

Within the New Zealand Police and Housing New Zealand Corporation, it was difficult to find any one person to interview with any hands-on knowledge of the Target Hardening Programme. This indicates a lack of communication between the Ministry of Justice and two organisations that are pivotal to the successful implementation of the THP.

It is suggested that key informants within organisations involved in the THP are fully briefed by the Ministry of Justice and that within their organisation they take responsibility for ensuring all personnel are conversant with the aims of the programme and its implementation process.

#### ***A5.1.2 Adult interviews***

The Victim Support staff and volunteers in the city areas are clearly under pressure to keep up with the demands on their already stretched services. The managers indicated that they were under strength in terms of their volunteer force and that recruitment was difficult. Being required to ask repeat burglary victims to participate in the Target Hardening evaluation added to the pressure of work. This was also apparent in the failure of the Victim Support groups to provide enough contacts for households willing to participate to allow IPP to interview a minimum of 12 in each area and their failure to record both declines and information about number of adults and children in the household who might be available for interview.

Victim Support was asked to contact Target Hardening households at random and invite them to be part of the Target Hardening evaluation. This meant that there was no control over the number of adults and children who might be available for interview. Despite a request from the lead researcher that this information be ascertained during the initial telephone call to the clients, only one Victim Support area was able to provide that detail to assist the evaluation team.

The shortfall in numbers of household contacts, combined with the delay in them being communicated to the research team meant that the research team was unable to meet the Ministry of Justice target of 95 adults and 25 children.

When seven clients who had agreed to take part declined when approached by the interviewer, there was disappointment that there were no substitute clients available. The team's interviews with 41 adults and 8 children were less than expected but the deficiencies evident in the course of the evaluation reinforced inefficiencies apparent within the THP. In that respect, these inefficiencies give rise to changes that are necessary if the programme is to be improved.

In areas where a contracted assessor is the key THP contact, it may have been more productive for that person to have made contact with repeat burglary victims to engage in the evaluation.

It is suggested that Victim Support is financially compensated for any future additional evaluation work tasks to ensure the task is prioritised and assigned to one person.

The statistical information on the 167 Target Hardening clients provided by National Office of Victim Support from the VIBIS database was unhelpful because it was incomplete.

It is suggested that it is made mandatory for Victim Support staff and subcontracted assessors to submit to National Office of Victim Support monthly returns detailing full statistical information for each Target Hardening client, including: age; gender; ethnic background; house tenure; number of adults in the household and the number and ages of children in the household.

In most cases, all that the interviewer knew about the client who was being telephoned was their name, address and telephone number. Information about the possible number of adults and children was communicated back to the lead researcher after the interviewer had made contact with the client.

### ***A5.1.3 Children's interviews***

In all cases, the children of the household were interviewed by the same interviewer as had interviewed their parent(s). This was done to familiarise the children with the researcher and build the children's trust and confidence. It also meant, however, that the children heard the parent(s)' interview responses and this is very likely to have influenced their own dialogue later.

In future evaluations it is suggested that children are interviewed prior to any interview with adults in the household and where possible, interviewed separately from the adults and given the opportunity to be given counselling.

## **A5.2 Stakeholders' Responses**

### ***A5.2.1 Referral process***

Victim Support groups in Auckland operate in three different Police Districts with each group operating independently. As a consequence, the repeat burglary referral process is different in each Victim Support area.

There was concern from some Victim Support staff and subcontracted assessors at delays in repeat burglary referrals by Police reaching Victim Support. A delay in referral means a delay in assessment and ultimately a delay in any security upgrade.

The Intel information on repeat burglaries provided to Victim Support by the local District Police Intelligence and Information Centre is problematic in that it lists all repeat residential and commercial burglaries for the District. The process of checking this list by Victim Support or the subcontracted assessor is time-consuming and acts as a barrier to the timely implementation of the THP. Victim Support workers are aware that an unprotected property is more 'at risk' in the weeks following the burglary and they feel pressure to follow through with Target Hardening as soon as is practicable.

A standardising of the referral process from Police to Victim Support is suggested to ensure that Victim Support receives timely and quality information about repeat residential burglaries



in their area. It is also suggested that they are supplied with a copy of the front page of the completed Police Burglary Report (POL 23) within 48 hours of the burglary occurring.

### ***A5.2.2 The assessment process***

Just as the referral process is different from area to area, so too is the assessment process. It works well when one Victim Support staffer or subcontracted assessor does all the assessments and is able to build up experience. It works poorly where Victim Support has to rely on Community Constables to do the assessment due to the lack of control over the prioritisation of the visit, which can lead to delays in any security upgrade of the property.

It is suggested that the assessment process is standardised to ensure that a dedicated Victim Support worker or a subcontracted assessor contacts the repeat burglary victim as soon as possible after the Police referral is made or within 72 hours.

### ***A5.2.3 Financial eligibility***

Across all seven Victim Support areas, workers were unanimous that using the Community Services Card as the sole measure for determining eligibility for Target Hardening was inadequate. Although there is a discretionary clause which does allow Victim Support to consider repeat burglary victims who do not have a Community Services Card but are on a low income, very few Victim Support workers were aware of it. The demand was strong for greater flexibility in policy so as to allow local Victim Support the capacity to recommend Target Hardening assistance for repeat burglary victims without a Community Services Card.

It is suggested that Victim Support Groups are consulted to develop a process to establish more flexible rules for financial eligibility, so as to allow repeat burglary victims without a Community Services card access to THP support.

### ***A5.2.4 Eligibility (repeat burglary within 12 months)***

In one area, it was impossible to officially verify a burglary occurring outside of the last six months and it fell to the victim to provide verification.

It is suggested that the New Zealand Police confirm the date of all burglaries in the past twelve months before the referral is made to Victim Support.

All Victim Support workers expressed strong feelings that the THP should be available to a wider range of burglary victims as well as victims of some other types of crime.

Many felt that first time burglary victims who are particularly traumatised by the crime should be able to receive help from Target Hardening – especially elderly people living on their own or women living under Protection Orders.

It is suggested that the criteria for eligibility are reviewed to allow local Victim Support to exercise discretion with regard to Target Hardening assistance for deserving cases outside of those victims who have been burgled twice in the last year. For example, assistance for

Target Hardening might apply to some first-time burglary victims or other particularly vulnerable victims.

#### ***A5.2.5 Time taken to deliver THP security upgrade***

As discussed in section A2.2, the time required to install the appropriate Target Hardening security upgrade in any household in the seven Victim Support areas in Auckland is dependent on all the linkages in the implementation process being given priority. There is no doubt that if Victim Support receives timely and quality information from the Police, the time from burglary to upgrade will be greatly reduced.

#### ***A5.2.6 Time taken for Police to make repeat burglary referral***

As discussed earlier in this report, the time taken for the police to refer a repeat burglary to Victim Support is dependent on a number of factors including the decisions made by the attending officer and the availability of Intel staff.

It is suggested that all Police personnel involved with burglaries are fully briefed and made conversant with the aims of the programme and its implementation process (including recommended deadlines).

#### ***A5.2.7 Time taken for security assessment to be made and security upgrade to be completed***

Chubb NZ was unaware of delays of employees attending assessment visits in rural area and needs to ensure quicker attendance.

It is suggested that Chubb NZ ensures that appointments made for Target Hardening assessments in rural areas are kept and that the firm's performance in this regard is factored in to contractual negotiations.

Generally, delegating responsibility for completing the Target Hardening work to a subcontracted assessor lessened the stress on Victim Support to meet deadlines. All the Victim Support areas that do not currently have an assessor mentioned the difficulty of recruiting a person willing to work sporadically and retaining that person to enable a build up of Target Hardening skills for the remuneration allowed.

#### ***A5.2.8 Resources to implement the Target Hardening Programme***

One of the most time-consuming aspects of implementing the Target Hardening process for Victim Support workers (who do not use a subcontracted assessor) was the lengthy assessment interview. There was agreement among Victim Support workers regularly implementing the THP that the \$50 allowance from the Ministry of Justice was inadequate recompense for the time expended on each case.

One issue referred to by most Victim Support workers was that the travel costs associated with Target Hardening were not funded and had to be underwritten by Victim Support. As

discussed earlier, in rural areas – or where the victim does not have a telephone – this can mean several lengthy and costly round trips.

It is suggested that the Ministry of Justice reviews the current \$50 per client remuneration for implementing the THP to take account of the actual time invested in each case by Victim Support and/or the subcontracted assessor and their associated travel costs.

#### ***A5.2.9 Interagency relationships***

Relationships between Victim Support, Chubb NZ and the subcontracted assessors were good. The issue of the Police referral process has been addressed earlier in this report, as has the issue of the lack of knowledge on the part of the Police about the THP.

The relationship between Victim Support and the subcontracted assessors with Housing New Zealand Corporation was problematic. Victim Support staff and assessors complained that having to negotiate with individual HNZC offices or HNZC sub-contractors is very time-consuming.

The solution identified in interviews was that HNZC should develop a nationwide policy for Target Hardening – especially if the programme extends beyond Auckland.

It is suggested that the Ministry of Justice and Victim Support consult HNZC so that national operational guidelines for the implementation of the Target Hardening Programme can be developed.

#### ***A5.2.10 Installation costs***

The average price per household for Target Hardening was set by Chubb NZ at about \$750. Twenty-five percent of all Target Hardening installations were above that figure, averaging out at around \$800 overall.

It is suggested that the contract with Chubb NZ is reviewed in light of any new criteria for eligibility for the THP.

#### ***A5.2.11 Strengths of the Target Hardening Programme***

Notwithstanding any criticisms made by key stakeholders throughout this report, there is unanimous support for extending the Target Hardening Programme. The feedback to all stakeholders from repeat burglary victims who have been clients of the THP has been positive.

It is suggested that the Target Hardening Programme be continued and positively developed from the Target Hardening evaluation recommendations.

## **A5.3 Adults' Responses**

### ***A5.3.1 Revictimisation***

Revictimisation of three of the 37 Target Hardened properties following the THP was due to human error in relation to security and not due to failure of the upgraded security system.

### ***A5.3.2 How householders learned of the Target Hardening Programme***

There was a great deal of confusion among householders who had received assistance from the THP about who had actually organised and funded their security upgrade.

If the THP is to be expanded, it is suggested that the Ministry of Justice in conjunction with Victim Support engages in a widespread education campaign utilising and expanding the current burglary kit to inform the public about the benefits of the THP and the roles of all the key stakeholders.

### ***A5.3.3 Timeliness of the stages of the Target Hardening Programme***

It was very difficult to review the time sequence for each phase of the THP.

It is suggested that for each Target Hardening client, Victim Support (or the subcontracted assessor) keeps clear records of the following: date of burglary; date of assessment; date of installation; time to install the equipment.

### ***A5.3.4 Feelings after Target Hardening security upgrade***

All the interviewees without exception were appreciative of the extra security provided through the THP. All mentioned that they felt their house was more secure and their fears after the burglaries had lessened.

A major benefit cited in interviews was that the Target Hardening security upgrade had been at no cost to the householder. It made many feel that they were important to Government and not just another burglary statistic.

It is suggested that the fact that Target Hardening is given at no cost to repeat burglary victims through the programme should be publicised more widely.

### ***A5.3.5 Changes to daily routine after the Target Hardening Programme***

As a result of their involvement in the THP, interviewees felt more aware of the need for security around their home and accordingly some had changed their routines. They also became more aware of additional security that might further 'target harden' their property beyond that which was provided.

### ***A5.3.6 Satisfaction with Police***

Satisfaction with the Police was largely based on how long it took them to attend after the burglary. There is still an expectation that giving security advice is a Police function regardless of whether the officer visiting is a Community Constable, a Burglary Squad detective, a CIB detective or an officer on general patrol.

A criticism of Police from the interviewees was their failure to give feedback to the victims about the progress of their investigation into the burglary. This was especially true when the victim had provided Police with an identification, which made an arrest more likely.

### ***A5.3.7 Satisfaction with Victim Support***

Most of the interviewees were appreciative of the support given to them after the burglary by Victim Support as well as the information provided by Victim Support about the THP.

### ***A5.3.8 Improvements to the Target Hardening Programme***

The only comments from clients regarding improvements to the Target Hardening Programme were their disappointment at not being able to access the full range of security systems – including an alarm.

## **A5.4 Children's Responses**

### ***A5.4.1 Children's fear of being burgled before the first burglary***

Prior to the first burglary, all of the children said that while they were aware that there was a possibility that a burglary might occur, none of them were worried that their house might get broken into. Each of the children stated that they were aware of the need to secure the house before leaving by locking doors and windows.

### ***A5.4.2 Children's reactions to the burglaries***

Most of the children in the sample were with parents when the burglary was discovered which increased their fear of revictimisation and decreased their feelings of personal security. All of the children had a detailed awareness of the way in which their house was broken into. They were able to show the interviewer the exact window or door that was accessed, and to describe in detail how the offender managed to break in.

It is suggested that the Police ascertain the presence of children in a household as part of their Offence Report and inform Victim Support as part of the referral process so that the impact of burglary on children in a household can be assessed and that this be recorded in VIBIS.

### ***A5.4.3 Losses experienced by children after burglaries***

Children experienced several kinds of loss - loss of material possessions, loss of trust in the people around them and a loss of a sense of their home as a 'safe haven'. All of the children mentioned that the burglary made them feel less secure at home and less trusting of others.

It appears that children who have been exposed to repeat burglary suffer a range of effects, and some of these have a negative ongoing effect, such as 'giving up' on the hope of ever being safe at home, loss of trust in their peers and local neighbours, and the distress caused by losing material possessions that cannot be replaced because of the low income status of the household.

#### ***A5.4.4 Security after Target Hardening***

The children of the Target Hardened households were aware of the security upgrade since the burglaries, i.e. that new locks had been put on their doors and windows, and that it had made a difference.

All the children reported that they were now more careful about locking windows and doors and several were more fearful at home, particularly if they were at home on their own. All of the children who did not have an alarm said that they would feel much safer if an alarm was installed.

# **Part B: Target Hardening Repeat Burglary Analysis**

## **B1 Introduction**

The Victim Support Target Hardening Programme (THP) aims to prevent further repeat burglary victimisation of lower socio-economic households and increase victims' sense of security by installing locks or alarms in households that are burglary targets.

One of the objectives of the THP evaluation was to examine whether a decrease in the number of repeat burglary victimisations (i.e., repeated burglaries on one property) among THP participants occurred after THP was implemented. This objective was to be measured by comparing the proportion of THP households burgled after THP installation with the proportion of repeat dwelling burglaries recorded by Police in each THP area over the same time period.

The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of the Auckland University of Technology (AUT) conducted the bulk of the evaluation. However, to compare the proportion of THP households burgled after THP installation to the proportion of repeat dwelling burglaries in the THP areas required access to households' personal information held by the Police. The Privacy Act (1993) allows the disclosure of Police-held personal information to the Ministry of Justice for research purposes, on the understanding that it is not published in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual households concerned. Therefore the Ministry of Justice Research and Evaluation Unit (MOJ) conducted this component of the evaluation.

## **B2 Methodology**

### **B2.2 Data sources**

Victim Support Head Office maintains a database which records various statistical information related to the THP recipients. From this database and Chubb Security installation data, Victim Support provided MOJ with the THP households' address, the Victim Support area, and the date of Target Hardening security equipment installation. This information was provided for all 171 households within the five Victim Support areas selected for the evaluation that received Target Hardening between 10 January 2001 (date of the first target hardening installation) and 26 September 2002 (most recent date of installation at the time of the Victim Support data extract).

MOJ then obtained from the Police National Intelligence Application (NIA)<sup>3</sup> database the police recorded burglary histories and the name of the corresponding Police area for each of the 171 households.

In order to calculate the total number of police recorded repeat dwelling<sup>4</sup> burglaries for each THP area, MOJ also obtained from NIA<sup>5</sup> the address and location type for all dwelling burglaries between the area's first Target Hardening installation (05 April 2001) and the date of the NIA database data extract (20 January 2003<sup>6</sup>).

### **B2.3 Final sample**

After querying each address of the 171 Target Hardened households in NIA, it was evident that not all of the corresponding Police areas held recorded burglary data in NIA. The corresponding Police areas for the Manukau, Counties, West Auckland, and North Shore Victim Support areas have entered every recorded burglary into NIA since 01 April 2001<sup>7</sup>, and all of the THP households in these areas received their Target Hardening installations after 01 April 2001. Any further burglary victimisation experienced by these households<sup>8</sup> that were reported to Police would therefore be recorded in NIA. The corresponding Police areas for the Auckland Central Victim Support area, however, hold the majority of recorded burglary reports in hardcopy files at their various Auckland Police stations.

The households from the Auckland Central Victim Support area were excluded from the analysis due to the resources required to conduct file searches at the various Auckland Police stations, and given that the remaining selected Victim Support areas still incorporated 75.4% (n = 129) of the original sample. See Table 15 for the Victim Support areas included in the final sample and their corresponding Police areas.

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<sup>3</sup> NIA supports operational policing by enabling Police staff to record and query intelligence information about People, Vehicles, Items, Locations, Organisations, Records and Accounts.

<sup>4</sup> Dwelling burglaries in the NIA database are indicated by location types Residential and Miscellaneous – Dwelling. NIA also includes some of the burglaries for which a location type has not been entered.

<sup>5</sup> This information was obtained from data extract queries in the NIA Occurrences Universe, within the Police Business Objects system.

<sup>6</sup> As the data extract began on the 21 January 2003, all data extract queries requested 20 January 2003 as the end date.

<sup>7</sup> The relevant Intel sections of Police report that from 01 April 2001 all burglaries for the Counties Manukau police district and the Rodney and Waitakere police areas were entered into NIA.

<sup>8</sup> Burglaries that were entered into NIA prior to 21 January 2003.



**Table 15: Number of Target Hardened households in each selected Victim Support area and their corresponding Police areas.**

Victim Support area	Police district	Police area	No. of TH households
Manukau	Counties/Manukau	Howick	1
		Mangere	15
		(Part of) Manurewa	1
		Otahuhu/ Papatoetoe	25
		Otara	13
		Auckland Airport	0
<b><i>Manukau Victim Support area total</i></b>			<b><i>55</i></b>
Counties	Counties/Manukau	(Part of) Manurewa	34
		Papakura	9
		Pukekohe	9
<b><i>Counties Victim Support area total</i></b>			<b><i>52</i></b>
West Auckland	North Shore /Waitakere	Rodney	1
		Waitakere	19
<b><i>West Auckland Victim Support area total</i></b>			<b><i>20</i></b>
North Shore	North Shore /Waitakere	North Shore	2
<b><i>North Shore Victim Support area total</i></b>			<b><i>2</i></b>
<b>Total</b>			<b>129</b>

## B2.4 Data limitations

### ***B2.4.1 Police recorded burglary data<sup>9</sup>***

Although the proportion of burglaries reported to Police is relatively high<sup>10</sup> in comparison to other crimes, it is important to note that Police burglary statistics are limited in the sense that they are restricted to burglaries that have come to Police attention. The 2001 New Zealand National Crime Victims Survey (NZNCVS) found that whether a household offence was reported to the Police can depend on social status, with lower socio-economic households less likely to report. All households in the THP sample are lower socio-economic households. Therefore the extent to which THP households reported further burglary victimisation may be lower than the rest of the Victim Support area. All THP clients, however, agreed as part of the conditions of receiving THP security equipment that they would report any further burglaries to Victim Support.

<sup>9</sup> Police official dwelling burglary figures were not used for the analysis as they do not allow analysis by address, a necessary requirement for establishing repeat burglary victimisation. NIA dwelling burglary data from the Police areas involved in the final sample, however, are considered to closely reflect official figures, with relevant Police Intel personnel estimating 90% of all burglaries since 01 April 2001 have been entered into NIA.

<sup>10</sup> 68.4% of burglaries in the 2001 New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims were reported to Police.

#### ***B2.4.2 Burglaries and burglary attempts***

A burglary attempt (where successful access to the premises has not been obtained) following THP installation may still be considered a success of the THP if the THP security equipment prevented access. Police offence recording, however, does not differentiate burglary attempts from burglaries. The burglary records for some of the individual THP households provided additional narrative indicating whether the incident following THP installation was a completed burglary or a burglary attempt, and what prevented access. This information, however, was not provided for every incident of repeat burglary following THP installation. Neither was it possible to calculate separate rates for burglary attempts and completed burglaries for the Victim Support areas.

#### ***B2.4.3 Defining dwelling burglary***

While a dwelling burglary in NIA would be coded to the location type 'residential' or 'miscellaneous-dwelling', not all of the burglaries in the NIA database extracts had a location type entered. Close to 20% of the burglaries in the West Auckland Victim Support area did not have a location type<sup>11</sup>, while just over 5% of the burglaries in the Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas did not have a location type<sup>12</sup>. The majority, but not all, of the burglaries with no location type appeared to be dwelling burglaries<sup>13</sup>. Therefore in the results which follow, for each repeat dwelling burglary figure or percentage, a range is provided. Figures and percentages in *italics* indicate dwelling burglaries when burglaries with no location type are excluded, while figures and rates in normal font include burglaries with no location type. The true value is likely to be between the two values provided.

#### ***B2.4.4 Time period for analysis of repeat burglaries following THP installation***

The time period for analysis of repeat burglaries among THP households was the period between a household's THP installation date and the date of the data extraction. As the households' installation dates differed, the time period for analysis of repeat burglaries varied among the THP households, ranging from four to 21.5 months. The preferred method is to use the time period of twelve months following installation for each THP household. However, it was not possible to utilise this method at the time of the data extraction, as less than twelve months had passed since THP installation for 45.7% (59) of the 129 THP households in the sample.

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<sup>11</sup> The Rodney and Waitakere police areas had 1059 burglaries with no location type (19.2% of all burglaries entered in NIA between 05 April 2001 and 20 January 2003).

<sup>12</sup> The Counties Manukau police district had 814 burglaries with no location type (5.1% of all burglaries entered in NIA between 05 April 2001 and 20 January 2003).

<sup>13</sup> For example, locations in residential streets, an address with a flat number indicated, burglary narratives indicating the location is residential, stolen property listed indicative of residential items, et cetera.

#### ***B2.4.5 Comparison of repeat burglary after THP installation to repeat burglary in the Victim Support area***

For comparative purposes it was important that the rate of repeat burglary victimisation in the Victim Support area was calculated in the same manner as for the THP households. As described above, the time period for analysis of repeat burglaries among THP households was between the date of the household's THP installation (with this occurring at some point between the first and last THP installations in the area), and the date of the data extraction. Therefore, the time period for analysis of repeat burglaries among households in the Victim Support area was between the date of a household's first burglary occurring at some point between the first and last THP installations in the area, and the date of the data extraction. However, utilising the same calculation methods for repeat burglary victimisation in the Victim Support area also resulted in variability occurring in the time period for analysis of repeat burglaries in the Victim Support area. That is, as the dates of the Victim Support area households' first burglary during the time of the THP installations differed, the time period for analysis of repeat burglaries in the Victim Support area differed among households.

### **B2.5 Areas of analysis**

As only two households received Target Hardening in the North Shore Victim Support area it is not appropriate to conduct a comparison with repeat dwelling burglary experienced by the entire Victim Support area. However, descriptive burglary information regarding the two households is provided. The proportion of repeat burglaries experienced by the THP households in the West Auckland Victim Support area is compared to the proportion of repeat dwelling burglaries in the same area. The boundary between the Counties and the Manukau Victim Support areas cuts across the Manurewa police area. It was not possible to split the Manurewa Police burglary data into the two Victim Support areas, thus the analysis combines the Counties and the Manukau Victim Support areas, so that the resulting area matches police boundaries.

## **B3 Results**

### **B3.1 Extent of burglary revictimisation**

108 of the 129 (83.7%) THP households did not have any police recorded burglaries following their THP installations. The remaining 21 (16.3%) of the THP households, however, experienced a total of 27 burglaries (including attempted burglaries) following THP installation, with sixteen of the 109 households (12.4%) experiencing one burglary; four (3.1%) experiencing two burglaries; and one (0.8%) experiencing three burglaries after receiving their target hardening security equipment. Burglary victimisation following THP installation ranged from within one week following installation to well after a year.

## **B3.2 Security at time of burglary revictimisation**

Narratives were available for 22 of the 27 burglaries experienced following THP installation. Of these, 14 (i.e., at least 51.9% of the 27 burglaries) indicated that the point of completed entry was either where there was security equipment that was not in use at the time, or was an area that remained insecure following THP installation.

## **B3.3 North Shore Victim Support area**

### ***B3.3.1 Burglary revictimisation following THP installation***

Only two households received Target Hardening in the North Shore Victim Support area. More than sixteen months have passed since the second Target Hardening installation, with no police record of either of these two households experiencing any further burglaries.

## **B3.4 West Auckland Victim Support area**

### ***B3.4.1 Burglary revictimisation following THP installation***

Twenty households received Target Hardening in the West Auckland Victim Support area (0.02% of all households<sup>14</sup>), with a total of 21 target hardening installations (one household received additional target hardening following further burglary victimisation after their first target hardening).

Six of the twenty households (30.0%) have experienced one burglary (including attempted burglaries) after having Target Hardening security equipment installed. The repeat victimisations occurred from within two weeks of the installation to well after a year following installation.

Five of the six burglary records provided a burglary narrative, indicating that three of the six burglaries were attempts (15% of the 20 households), with all three of these indicating the attempts to gain entry were hampered by the Target Hardening security equipment:

- 001: (attempt) Two security stays prevented access.
- 003: (attempt) Victim Support equipment prevented entry.
- 005: (attempt) Window locks prevented access.

Of the remaining three burglaries following Target Hardening security equipment installation (15% of the 20 households), one appears to have resulted from the house still being insecure following its initial Target Hardening installation, as it then received additional security equipment; one appears to be due to the occupants not using the provided security equipment:

- 004: (burglary) Back security door unlocked.

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<sup>14</sup> Statistics New Zealand have provided New Zealand Police with 2001 census data matched to police station boundaries. From the 2001 census, a total of 85,578 dwellings are in the Rodney and Waitakere Police areas.

And for one it is not clear whether the point of entry had security equipment that was not in use, or was an area that remained insecure following the Target Hardening installation:

002: (burglary) Entry via garage door.

### ***B3.4.2 THP households compared to total Victim Support area***

2,138 to 2,892 households experienced dwelling burglaries in the West Auckland Victim Support area during the time the 20 households received Target Hardening. Of those who were burgled during this time, 214 to 266 households experienced one or more further burglaries<sup>15</sup>. Therefore, 9.2% to 10.0% of the households in the West Auckland Victim Support area experienced at least one more burglary. This rate range of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for the West Auckland Victim Support area is less than the rate of 30% experienced by the twenty THP households following THP installation.

However, caution should be exercised in comparing the West Auckland THP households' and total Victim Support area's rates of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation because of:

- the small number in the THP sample (20 households);
- inability to distinguish attempted and completed burglaries in the data; and
- differing time periods of analysis among households.

## **B3.5 Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas**

### ***B3.5.1 Burglary revictimisation following THP installation***

107 households in the Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas received a Target Hardening installation (0.1% of all households<sup>16</sup>). Fifteen of the 107 households (14.0%) have experienced a total of 21 burglaries (including attempted burglaries) after receiving Target Hardening security equipment, with ten experiencing one burglary (5.6% of the 107 households); four experiencing two burglaries (3.7%); and one experiencing three burglaries (0.9%). The repeat victimisations occurred from within a week of the installation to well after a year following installation.

A burglary narrative was provided for seventeen of the 21 burglary records, indicating that at least two of the 21 burglaries were attempts:

011: (attempt) Did not gain entry.  
013b: (attempt) Broke window, possibly scared off by seeing alarm.

<sup>15</sup> Up until the time of the burglary data extract.

<sup>16</sup> From the 2001 census, a total of 120 009 dwellings are in the Counties Manukau Police district.

For four of the burglaries the point of entry had security equipment that was not in use:

- 010a: (burglary) Left ranch slider open while home.
- 010b: (burglary) Regularly forget to set alarm (occupants elderly).  
Unknown if entry gained.
- 013a: (burglary) Screen doors not locked, broken a hole to get to latch.
- 017a: (burglary) Access via rear screen door unlocked.

For eight of the burglaries the point of entry either had security equipment that was not in use, or was an area that remained insecure following the target hardening installation:

- 007: (burglary) Burglary of a shed, no sign of forced entry.
- 012: (burglary) Entry via garage tilt door.
- 013c: (burglary) Access via broken window of previous attempt.
- 014a: (burglary) Smashed laundry doors.
- 014b: (burglary) Via door without deadbolt.
- 015: (burglary) Broke window.
- 016: (burglary) Access via insecure kitchen window.
- 017b: (burglary) Forced plastic lock.

With two burglaries, although the offenders gained entry into the premises, the alarms were activated and they left the scene:

- 008: (burglary) Loud alarm scared off offenders.
- 009: (burglary) Access through toilet window, but left when activated alarm.

For one of the burglaries, it appears access was obtained via breaking a window, which the class one target hardening response can not prevent:

- 006: (burglary) Tried door but locks prevented access, broke window instead.

### ***B3.5.2 THP households compared to total Victim Support areas***

6,958 to 7,576 households experienced dwelling burglaries in the Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas during the time the 107 households received Target Hardening. Of those who were burgled during this time, 917 to 988 households experienced one or more further burglaries<sup>17</sup>. Therefore, 13.0% to 13.2% of the households in the Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas experienced at least one more burglary. This rate range of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for the Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas is similar to the rate of 14.0% experienced by the twenty THP households following THP installation.

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<sup>17</sup> Up until the time of the burglary data extract.

However, as with the West Auckland data, caution should be exercised in comparing the Counties and Manukau THP households' and total Victim Support areas rates of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation because of:

- the inability to distinguish attempted and completed burglaries in the data; and
- differing time periods of analysis among households.

## **B4 Discussion**

### **B4.1 Burglary revictimisation following THP installation**

#### *B4.1.1 Why did burglaries following THP installation occur?*

The burglary narratives suggest close to a third of the events recorded as burglaries following THP installation may still be successes of the THP (i.e., entry prevented by THP security equipment, or offender/s fled when activated alarm). However, the narratives also suggest that for more than two thirds of the burglaries, access appeared to be gained either at points of entry still insecure following THP installation, or where the security equipment was not in use at the time of the burglary.

Burglaries occurring at points of entry that were still insecure following the installation of Target Hardening equipment suggests that some THP installations did not sufficiently secure households, due to either inadequate security assessments and/or equipment, and/or inadequate funding preventing complete installations. The fact that burglaries also occurred when the THP equipment was not in use suggests that some recipients of THP security equipment:

- did not understand the instructions provided on how to use the equipment;
- over time forgot how to use the equipment;
- were uncomfortable with using the equipment<sup>18</sup>;
- consider the equipment impractical for their living environment; and/or
- became less vigilant using the equipment as concern of revictimisation decreased over time.

Of the 21 households that experienced burglaries following THP installation, it appears that only one received additional THP security equipment. Five of the 21 households (23.8%) also experienced more than one burglary after the installation. Receiving additional THP installations or further assistance on how to use the security equipment after their first THP revictimisation following THP installation may have prevented their further victimisations.

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<sup>18</sup> For example, concern may limit quick exit in emergencies; cultural reasons for not locking doors; not wanting to heighten their awareness and thus fear of burglary; not wanting to contribute to a fortress-type mentality; et cetera.

#### ***B4.1.2 Why did revictimised THP households not receive additional THP assistance?***

Figure 1 (see following page) illustrates a series of omissions that may have contributed to twenty of the 21 revictimised THP households not receiving additional THP assistance, whether that be more security equipment; more suitable security solutions; further instruction on how to use the equipment; or re-emphasising vigilance with equipment use.

Although none of the possible scenarios in Figure 1 should be dismissed until further examined, it is considered unlikely that THP households reported their further burglaries after THP installation to Victim Support<sup>19</sup>. Had this been the case, this would mean Victim Support did not provide any additional THP assistance, perhaps a possibility if Victim Support personnel were not aware that additional THP equipment could be provided, or Victim Support did provide additional assistance but this was not recorded. Again, this is unlikely, as all THP installations are recorded in the Victim Support database, and interviews with Victim Support personnel did not identify any knowledge of further burglaries, except one, following THP installations. The remaining scenarios are:

- For whatever reason, Police did not report the burglaries after THP installation to Victim Support;
- Police did report the burglaries after THP installation to Victim Support, but for whatever reason, Victim Support did not identify the household as a previous THP household.

There are at least three possible explanations why Police did not report the burglaries after THP installation to Victim Support:


- Police assumed THP households would report their repeat burglaries to Victim Support;
- Not all Police who attended dwelling burglaries, or handle the burglary offence reports were aware of THP, resulting in some potential and previous THP households' burglaries not being referred to Victim Support; and/or
- Police were not identifying some burglary victims as repeat burglary victims so some potential and previous THP households were not being referred to Victim Support.

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<sup>19</sup> The THP application form does state the recipient will advise Victim Support if their property is burgled again following THP installation. The majority of THP recipients, however, received THP equipment after Police referred their burglary to Victim Support. Thus they quite likely assumed reporting any further burglaries



**Figure 1: Logic-chart examining processes that may have contributed to revictimised THP households not receiving additional THP**



<sup>1</sup> THP clients agree as part of the conditions of receiving THP security equipment that they will report any further burglaries to Victim Support.

<sup>2</sup> Please note one of the 27 burglaries after THP was recorded and the household received additional THP equipment.

<sup>3</sup> Please note this is not an exhaustive list.

There are at least two possible explanations why Victim Support did not identify burglary victims as previous THP households:

- Victim Support relied on the Police burglary offence reports to indicate whether a household was a repeat victim; and/or
- Victim Support did not check if a burglary victim was on the list of previous THP households, or check directly with victims if they previously received THP.

Regardless of which scenario, or combination of scenarios led to twenty of the 21 revictimised THP households not receiving additional THP assistance, the consequences were that further THP installations to previous THP households, where eligible, were not provided. Depending on the scenario, it is also possible that some households eligible for initial THP installations were not identified. Furthermore, unsatisfactory installations and any problems with THP recipients not using the Target Hardening security equipment were not identified and resolved.

## **B4.2 Burglary revictimisation of THP households compared to total Victim Support area**

### ***B4.2.1 Interpretations***

It is apparent that THP was not successful in preventing repeat burglary victimisations for all the THP households. The comparisons of the rates of repeat burglary victimisation experienced by the THP households following THP installation to the rates of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for the total Victim Support areas are limited due to the small number of households in the West Auckland THP sample, and both the West Auckland and Counties and Manukau comparisons having differing time periods of analysis among households. The comparisons therefore should be considered only indicative at best. Given the limitations, the comparisons still suggest that the rates of repeat burglary victimisation experienced by the THP households following THP installation were not less than that for the total Victim Support areas. However, this does not necessarily indicate that THP was not successful in preventing repeat burglaries to some extent.

Non-THP households in the Victim Support areas may have also increased their security, lowering their risk for further repeat burglary victimisation. The 2001 NZNSCV showed that the proportion of respondents having a burglar alarm had almost doubled (from 15% to 29%) since the 1996 NZNSCV.

It is possible that the rate of repeat burglary victimisation for the THP households would have been higher had they not received THP security equipment. It is important to note that THP households experienced at least two burglaries prior to receiving THP security equipment<sup>20</sup>, therefore a burglary experienced following THP installation would be at least their third burglary. Possibly households which have experienced two previous burglaries are more at risk of experiencing another burglary than households which have experienced one burglary. If that were the case, then one would expect the THP households' rate of burglary

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<sup>20</sup> Part of the THP eligibility criteria requires households to be a repeat victim of burglary in the past twelve months.

victimisation to be higher than the rest of the population, had they not received THP security equipment. The results could possibly indicate that THP essentially reduced the risk of burglary victimisation experienced by THP households to a rate equivalent to the rest of the population.

To examine the theory that the level of victimisation would have been higher without THP requires a comparison of the rate of burglary the THP households experienced in the year prior to THP installation to the year following THP installation. A decrease in the rate of victimisation following installation compared to before installation, with no similar decrease for the total Victim Support area would then support the theory. Unfortunately however, due to all burglaries only being entered into NIA since 01 April 2001, it was not possible to assess the burglaries experienced before THP installation for those households that received THP prior to 01 April 2002. Furthermore, to include all THP households who received THP installation from 01 April 2001 to the last installation<sup>21</sup> would require examining burglary victimisation following THP installation up till 26 September 2003.

It is also important to note that the results are based on Police recorded burglary data. The results, therefore, may be influenced by differences in reporting practices between THP households and the remaining households in the Victim Support areas. It is possible that THP households in fact experienced a lower rate of repeat burglary victimisation than the remaining households in the Victim Support areas, yet reported a larger proportion of their burglaries to the Police than the remaining households. Lower socio-economic households generally are considered less likely to report offences to Police, and all the THP households are lower socio-economic households. However, it is possible that receiving positive assistance following a burglary, and being requested to report any further burglaries encouraged THP households to report burglaries at a higher rate than the rest of the population. The 1996 NZNCVS also identified that superannuitants and retired people are more likely to report offences. Anecdotal reports indicate that a large proportion of the THP recipients is in this age group. The 1996 NZNCVS also found that less serious offences are less likely to be reported. Burglary attempts, therefore, would be less likely to be reported than completed burglaries. THP households, however, may be more likely to report burglary attempts than the rest of the population, for the same reasons as above. As Police coding of burglary incidents does not differentiate between burglaries and burglary attempts this would result in a higher proportion of recorded burglaries for the THP households in relation to the rest of the population.

## **B5 Suggested Improvements**

### **B5.1 Target hardening programme**

Although this section provides several suggested improvements to ensure revictimised THP households receive additional THP assistance in the future, these are not exhaustive, and some may already be practised in some Victim Support areas. As the suggestions are based on the analysis of data which excluded the Auckland Central Victim Support area, some may not be applicable to this area. In addition to the suggestions listed here, each scenario in the

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<sup>21</sup> 26 September 2002, the most recent installation at the time of the Victim Support data extract.

logic-chart should be examined further to confirm the areas that require improvement. The remainder of the evaluation conducted by IPP is likely to have identified some of these.

It is suggested that those responsible for the programme:

a) Raise Victim Support and Police personnel awareness

Ensure all relevant Victim Support and Police personnel are aware of what security equipment and assistance THP can provide, including additional equipment and assistance after the initial THP installation. Make sure new personnel are also made aware of THP.

b) Examine Police practices

- Emphasise to all Police who attend burglaries:
  - that they ask the victims if they are repeat victims of burglary; and
  - the importance of repeat victims information.
- Examine what offence recording practices each Police area is using for burglary, and ensure that the burglary offence report they use includes both a 'yes' and 'no' check box to signify repeat victimisation. Locally designed burglary offence reports may only have one 'yes' repeat victim check box, or repeat victim details are written as narrative. This prevents determining whether an unchecked box or no mention of repeat victimisation means the victim is not a repeat victim, or whether they were not asked.
- Establish practices to ensure Victim Support is provided with a copy of all reported dwelling burglaries in a timely manner.

c) Examine Victim Support practices

- To avoid relying on burglary offence reports to confirm repeat victimisation, establish practices where all dwelling burglary victims are contacted in order to establish each of the following:
  - if they are a repeat burglary victim;
  - if they fulfil eligibility for THP; and
  - if they have received any THP in the past.
- Identify and resolve problems with initial installations that may not be adequately securing households. For example, the problem/s with some installations may be:
  - inadequate security assessments;
  - inadequate security equipment;
  - personnel not aware discretion can be used at times to provide additional THP equipment; and/or
  - insufficient funding available for appropriate security even with available discretion.

#### d) Examine practices with THP recipients

- Provide all new THP recipients with the contact details for Victim Support and emphasise that:
  - they contact Victim Support if they experience any further burglaries, even if they have reported it to Police. Make them aware that they may be eligible for further assistance;
  - they contact Victim Support if they have any difficulties using the security equipment; and
  - the importance of using the equipment, and the importance of continued use, and at all times.
- Amend THP application form to “I will advise Victim Support if my property is burgled after installation of security equipment or hardware, *even if I have already reported it to Police*”.
- Ensure each new THP household knows how to use each item of security equipment.
- Discuss and resolve with each new THP household any concerns they may have about using the equipment.
- Ensure resourcing is provided for follow-up calls or visits with THP recipients to establish:
  - whether they have experienced any more burglaries;
  - if they are experiencing any difficulties using the equipment; and
  - how often they are using the equipment.

### **B5.2 Further Target Hardening Programme research**

It is recommended that the Ministry of Justice Research and Evaluation Unit conduct another analysis of repeat burglary victimisation following THP installation in two to three year’s time. At that time there would be enough data to analyse the extent of burglary victimisation THP households experienced following THP installation compared to their burglary victimisation prior to installation to test the theory that their rate of burglary victimisation would have been higher had they not received THP security equipment.

### **B5.3 Police electronic recording systems**

The NIA database is the only national electronic system available to identify repeat victims. However, it is apparent that some Police areas are not entering all their offence data into NIA. As repeat victimisation is a growing area of interest for both criminal justice research, policy, and New Zealand Police practices, it is recommended that Police establish practices to ensure all Police areas enter all offence data into NIA. It is also recommended that New Zealand Police develop electronic recording systems to enable the distinction between attempted and completed burglaries.



# Part C: Overview of the Target Hardening Programme Evaluation

## C1 Introduction

The Target Hardening Programme (THP) was developed by the Ministry of Justice to provide increased home security and at the same time provide burglary prevention information. The core of the THP centres on the provision of security equipment such as dead bolts on doors, window locks and burglar alarms to lower socio-economic households that have been burgled twice or more within a year.

Victim Support was chosen by the Steering Committee to administer the THP and Chubb NZ was contracted to install all the security equipment. The New Zealand Police have responsibility for referring repeat burglary victims to Victim Support. The Ministry of Justice is the agency responsible for funding the programme.

In April 2001, a pilot of the THP began operating in seven Auckland Victim Support areas: West Auckland, Auckland Central, Manukau, Counties, North Shore, Hibiscus Coast, and North Rodney. Between April 2001 and July 2002, the THP upgraded the security of 167 Auckland households at a total cost of approximately \$150,000.

Two studies have been conducted to evaluate this pilot. In June 2002, the Institute of Public Policy (IPP) at Auckland University of Technology was contracted to examine the outcomes of the THP for a sample of THP participants and their families and to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the THP.

The IPP evaluation team interviewed 41 adults and eight children from 37 households who had participated in the THP in Auckland. The findings from this section of the study represent the experiences and views of a small non-random sample of THP participants. In addition, 26 key stakeholders were interviewed, representing the views of Victim Support managers, staff and volunteers; Victim Support National Office; subcontracted assessors; Chubb NZ; Housing New Zealand Corporation; New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice THP Steering Committee.

The Ministry of Justice conducted a complementary study aiming to measure whether THP households were less likely to experience repeat burglary compared with all households in the area. Because of key limitations in the data for this exercise the objective was not achieved. However the study has revealed some important findings relating to the operation of the THP, and these will be discussed with the findings for the study.

## **C2 The efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of THP: the views of key stakeholders**

**THP referral process:** Victim Support groups in Auckland operate in three different Police Districts (Auckland City, North Shore Waitakere and Counties Manukau). Each group operates independently and accordingly the repeat burglary referral process is different in each Victim Support area.

Victim Support respondents expressed concern at delays in repeat burglary referrals by Police. A delay in referral means a delay in assessment and ultimately a delay in any security upgrade.

The information on repeat burglaries provided to Victim Support by the District Police Intelligence and Information Centres in each of the three areas is problematic in that it lists all repeat residential and non-residential burglaries for the District. The process of checking this list by Victim Support or the subcontracted assessor using the address is time-consuming and acts as a barrier to the timely implementation of the THP. Victim Support workers are aware that an unprotected property is more 'at risk' in the weeks following the burglary and they feel pressure to follow through with Target Hardening as soon as is practicable.

**THP assessment process:** Just as the THP referral process is different from area to area, so too is the THP assessment process. It works well when one Victim Support staff member or subcontracted assessor does all the assessments and is able to build up knowledge and experience. It is less satisfactory where Victim Support has to rely on Community Constables to do the assessment. This can mean that Victim Support lacks control over the prioritisation of the visit, and this can lead to delays in any security upgrade of the property.

**Financial eligibility:** Across all seven Victim Support areas, workers were unanimous that using the Community Services Card as the sole measure for determining eligibility for Target Hardening was inadequate. Although there is a discretionary clause, which does allow people who do not have a Community Services Card but are on a low income to be considered, few Victim Support workers were aware of it. There was strong demand for greater flexibility in order to allow local Victim Support groups to recommend Target Hardening assistance to low income repeat burglary victims without a Community Services Card.

**Eligibility (repeat burglary within 12 months):** All Victim Support workers expressed strong feelings that the THP should be available to a wider range of burglary victims as well as victims of other types of crime, such as domestic violence. Many felt that first-time burglary victims who are particularly traumatised by the crime should be able to receive help from Target Hardening – especially elderly people living on their own or women living under Protection Orders. In one area, it was impossible to officially verify a repeat burglary occurring outside of the last six months and it fell to the victim to provide verification.

**Time taken to deliver THP upgrade:** The time required to install the appropriate Target Hardening security upgrade in any household in the seven Victim Support areas in Auckland is dependent upon all the linkages in the implementation process being given priority. There is no doubt that if Victim Support receives timely and quality information from the Police, the time from burglary to upgrade will be greatly reduced.



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- (a) **Time taken for Police to make repeat burglary referral:** The time taken for the Police to refer a repeat burglary to Victim Support is dependent upon a number of factors including the decisions made by the attending officer. It was apparent that officers of the New Zealand Police are not well briefed on the aims of the THP and its implementation process.
- (b) **Time taken for Victim Support to contact repeat burglary victim and assess eligibility:** In two Victim Support areas, there was concern that when their crisis workload was heavy, Target Hardening work could build up leading to delays in contacting repeat burglary victims. One of the most time-consuming aspects of implementing the Target Hardening process for Victim Support workers (who do not use a subcontracted assessor) was the lengthy assessment interview.
- (c) **Time taken for security assessment to be made and security upgrade to be completed:** Delegating responsibility for completing the Target Hardening work to a subcontracted assessor reduced the stress on Victim Support to meet deadlines. All the Victim Support areas that do not currently have an assessor, mentioned the difficulty of recruiting a person willing to work sporadically and retaining that person to enable a build up of Target Hardening skills for the remuneration allowed.

**Resources to implement the THP:** There was agreement among Victim Support workers who regularly implement the THP that the \$50 allowance from the Ministry of Justice was inadequate recompense for the time expended on each case. The travel costs associated with Target Hardening were not funded and had to be underwritten by Victim Support.

**Interagency relationships:** Relationships between Victim Support, Chubb NZ and the subcontracted assessors were good. The Police referral process could be improved and standardised. A lack of knowledge on the part of front line Police about the THP impinges upon the efficiency of its implementation.

The relationship between all parties and Housing New Zealand Corporation was poor. Victim Support staff and assessors complained that having to negotiate with individual HNZC offices or HNZC sub-contractors is very time-consuming. The solution identified in interviews was that HNZC should develop a nationwide policy for Target Hardening – especially if the programme extends beyond Auckland.

**Installation costs:** The contract with Chubb NZ sets the average price per household for Target Hardening at about \$750. Twenty-five percent of all Target Hardening installations were above that figure. The cost for all installations averaged at around \$800 each.

**Strengths of the THP:** There is unanimous support for extending the THP to other low-income burglary victims and to other crime victims. The feedback that stakeholders received from clients of the THP has been positive.

### **C3 The perceptions of adult participants in THP**

Forty-one adults from 37 Target Hardened households were interviewed. As this is a small non-random sample, the findings cannot be generalised to the population of all THP participants and should be interpreted with caution.

**Revictimisation:** Revictimisation of three of the 37 Target Hardened properties following THP was due to human error in relation to security and not due to failure of the upgraded security system.

**How householders learned of the THP:** There was a great deal of confusion among householders who had received assistance from the THP about who had actually organised and funded their security upgrade.

**Feelings after THP security upgrade:** All the interviewees, without exception, were appreciative of the extra security provided through the THP. All mentioned that they felt their house was more secure and their fears after the burglaries had lessened.

A major benefit cited in interview was that the THP security upgrade had been at no cost to the householder. It made many feel that they were important to Government and not just another burglary statistic.

**Changes to daily routine after Target Hardening:** As a result of their involvement in the THP, interviewees felt more aware of the need for security around their home and accordingly some had changed their routines. As a result of the Programme, Target Hardening clients also became more aware of additional security that might further 'target harden' their property beyond that which was provided.

**Satisfaction with Police:** Satisfaction with the Police was largely based on how long it took them to attend after the burglary. There is still an expectation that giving security advice is a Police function regardless of whether the officer visiting is a Community Constable, a Burglary Squad detective, a CIB detective or an officer on general patrol. A criticism of Police from the interviewees was their failure to provide feedback to the victims about the progress of their investigation into the burglary.

**Satisfaction with Victim Support:** Most of the interviewees were appreciative of the support given to them after the burglary by Victim Support as well as the information provided by Victim Support about the THP.

**Improvements to the THP:** The heightened awareness of Target Hardening clients about available residential security systems meant that some interviewees were disappointed not to be able to access the full range of security systems – including an alarm.

## **C4 The perceptions of children within households participating in THP**

Eight children aged eight to 14 years from Target Hardened households were interviewed. As this is a small non-random sample, the findings cannot be generalised to the population of all children of THP participants and should be interpreted with caution.

**Children’s fear of being burgled:** All of the children said that while they were aware prior to the first burglary that there was a possibility that a burglary might occur, none of them were worried that their house might get broken into. Each of the children stated that they were aware of the need to secure the house before leaving by locking doors and windows.

**Children’s reactions to the burglaries:** Most of the children in the sample were present when their parents discovered the burglary, which increased their fear of revictimisation and decreased their feelings of personal security. All of the children had a detailed awareness of the way in which their house was broken into. They were able to show the interviewer the exact window or door that was accessed, and to describe in detail how the offender managed to break in.

**Losses experienced by children after burglaries:** Children experienced several kinds of loss – loss of material possessions, loss of trust in the people around them and a loss of a sense of their home as a ‘safe haven’. All of the children mentioned that the burglary made them feel less secure at home and less trusting of others.

It appears that children who have been exposed to repeat burglary suffer a range of effects. Some of these have a negative ongoing effect, such as ‘giving up’ on the hope of ever being safe at home; loss of trust in their peers and local neighbours; and the effects of losing material possessions that cannot be replaced because of their household’s low-income.

**Feelings about security after Target Hardening:** The children of the Target Hardened households were aware of the security upgrade since the burglaries, i.e., that new locks had been put on their doors and windows and that it had made a difference.

All the children reported that they were now more careful about locking windows and doors and several were more fearful at home, particularly if they were at home on their own. All of the children who did not have an alarm said that they would feel much safer if an alarm was installed.

## **C5 Repeat burglary: analysis of Police recorded data in THP areas**

### **Methodology**

One of the objectives of the THP evaluation was to examine whether a decrease in the number of repeat burglary victimisations (i.e., repeated burglaries on one property) among THP participants occurred after THP was implemented. This objective was measured by comparing the proportion of THP households burgled after THP installation with the

proportion of repeat dwelling burglaries recorded by Police in each THP area following a burglary experienced during the time THP installations were conducted.

**Final sample:** The analysis involved all the households in the Manukau, Counties, West Auckland, and North Shore Victim Support areas that received Target Hardening between 10 January 2001 and 26 September 2002 (n=129). Target Hardened households in the Auckland Central Victim Support area had to be excluded from the analysis, as burglary information was not held electronically by the corresponding Police areas for this region.

**Data limitations:** It is important to note that Police recorded burglary statistics are limited in the sense they are restricted to burglaries that have come to Police attention. It is known that lower socio-economic households are less likely to report household offences to Police.

Police offence recording does not differentiate between burglary attempts and completed burglaries. Thus a recorded burglary following THP may have been an attempted burglary, where the THP equipment prevented entry.

Not all Police recorded burglaries had a location type identified, yet the majority of these burglaries appeared to be dwelling burglaries. Therefore, for each repeat dwelling burglary figure or percent presented, a range is provided. Figures and percentages in *italics* indicate dwelling burglaries when burglaries with no location type are excluded, while figures and rates in normal font include burglaries with no location type. The true value is likely to be between the two values provided.

Less than twelve months had passed since THP installation for 45.7% of the THP households, preventing a twelve-month time period of analysis for repeat burglaries following THP installation. Instead, the time period of analysis was the period between a household's THP installation date and the date of the data extraction, resulting in differing time periods of analysis among the THP households.

For comparative purposes it was important that the rate of repeat burglary victimisation in the Victim Support area was calculated in the same manner as for the THP households. However, utilising the same method for calculating repeat burglary victimisation in the Victim Support area meant the time period for analysis of repeat burglaries in the Victim Support area also differed among households.

## **Extent of burglary revictimisation**

108 of the 129 (83.7%) THP households did not have any Police recorded burglaries following their THP installations. The remaining 21 (16.2%) of the THP households, however, experienced a total of 27 burglaries (including attempted burglaries) following THP installation, with sixteen of the 109 households (12.4%) experiencing one burglary; four (3.1%) experiencing two burglaries; and one (0.8%) experiencing three burglaries after receiving their security equipment. Only one of the 21 households that experienced a burglary following THP installation received additional THP security equipment. Burglary victimisation following THP installation ranged from within one week following installation to well after a year.

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### ***THP households compared to total Victim Support areas***

The rate range of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for all dwellings in the West Auckland Victim Support area (9.2% to 10.0%) is less than the rate of 30.0% experienced by the THP households.

The rate range of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for all dwellings in the Counties and Manukau Victim Support areas (13.0% to 13.2%) is similar to the rate of 14.0% experienced by the THP households.

Caution should be exercised in comparing the THP households and total Victim Support areas rates of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation because of:

- the small numbers in the THP samples (20 for West Auckland, 107 for Counties and Manukau);
- inability to distinguish attempted and completed burglaries in the data; and
- differing time periods of analysis among households.

### ***Why did burglaries following THP installation occur?***

Some burglary records provided additional narrative indicating how access was obtained. Narratives were available for 22 of the 27 burglaries experienced following THP installation. Of these, 14 (i.e., at least 51.9% of the 27 burglaries) indicated that the completed point of entry was either where there was security equipment that was not in use at the time, or was an area that remained insecure following THP installation.

Burglaries occurring at points of entry that were still insecure following THP installation suggests that some THP installations did not sufficiently secure households, due to either inadequate security assessments and/or equipment, and/or inadequate funding preventing complete installations. The fact that some burglaries also occurred when the THP equipment was not in use suggests that some recipients of THP security equipment:

- did not understand the instructions provided on how to use the equipment;
- over time forgot how to use the equipment;
- were uncomfortable with using the equipment;
- consider the equipment impractical for their living environment; and/or
- became less vigilant using the equipment as concern of revictimisation decreased over time.

### ***Why did revictimised THP households not receive additional THP assistance?***

Reasons why 20 of the 21 revictimised THP households did not receive additional THP assistance may include that (possible explanations are discussed in the full report):

- Police did not report the burglaries after THP installation to Victim Support; or
- Police did report the burglaries after THP installation to Victim Support, but Victim Support did not identify the household as a previous THP household.

### ***Burglary revictimisation: Why was THP households' rate not lower than total Victim Support areas?***

The rate of repeat burglary victimisation experienced by the THP households following THP installation was not lower than the rate of repeat dwelling burglary victimisation for the total Victim Support areas. However, this does not necessarily indicate that THP was not successful in preventing repeat burglaries to some extent.

Non-THP households in the Victim Support areas may have also increased their security, lowering their risk for further repeat burglary victimisation. The 2001 NZNSCV showed that the proportion of respondents having a burglar alarm had almost doubled (from 15% to 29%) since the 1996 NZNSCV.

It is also possible that the rate of repeat burglary victimisation for the THP households would have been higher had they not received THP security equipment. Possibly households which have experienced two previous burglaries are more at risk of experiencing another burglary than households which have experienced one burglary. The results would then indicate that THP essentially reduced the risk of burglary victimisation experienced by THP households to a rate equivalent to the rest of the population.

It is also important to note that the results are based on Police recorded burglary data. The results, therefore, may be influenced by differences in reporting practices between THP households and the remaining households in the Victim Support areas.

## **C6 Conclusions**

The two studies which comprise this evaluation have produced useful information about how THP might be improved. However, the evaluation conducted to date has not been conclusive on the overall effectiveness of THP in reducing the incidence of repeat burglary among 'target hardened' households.

The findings are clear however that the programme contributed to reducing the fears of the small group of adults and children interviewed. There was also a high level of satisfaction with THP. Because these findings represent a small non-random sample, some caution should be exercised in generalising to all programme participants.

The process evaluation has identified referral difficulties from Police to Victim Support. This referral is key to ensuring eligible victims access the programme. The findings have also revealed some inconsistencies in approach and the application of criteria between Victim Support areas, and a lack of awareness in some areas of the levels of discretion within the programme. A number of key informants questioned the initial criteria set for the programme and believed they should be broadened.

Elements of good practice which can be drawn from the findings are:

- early referral from Police by means of Offence Reports which clearly identify repeat residential burglaries.
- the employment of one Victim Support worker or sub-contracted assessor to carry out all the THP assessments for an area.
- making use of the discretion within the programme when eligibility criteria are a barrier to meeting real need.
- combining THP with support and information from Victim Support and feedback from Police about the burglary investigation.

A number of factors, rather than actual programme failure, may account for the apparent failure to reduce repeat burglaries among THP households identified in the analysis of Police recorded data. It is possible that data deficiencies, some non-THP burgled households taking similar steps to increase their own security, or THP households perhaps being more likely than other households to report burglaries, together or separately explain the apparent lack of reduction in repeat burglaries.

While the repeat burglary analysis could not conclude whether THP had been effective in reducing repeat burglary, it has pointed to some issues relating to the objectives and operation of the programme. It raises the question of whether THP is intended to prevent both completed and attempted burglaries, or whether unsuccessful burglary attempts following the installation of security equipment should be viewed as a success of the scheme. Because few of the programme participants who experienced a repeat burglary were interviewed, we do not know whether further attempted burglaries heightened or reduced participant's sense of safety and security.

The repeat burglary analysis does show that in some cases repeated completed burglaries did occur among Target Hardened households. At least half of the recorded burglaries of Target Hardened households were completed burglaries. The reasons which could be deduced from Police data for completed repeat burglaries pointed to either failure on the part of the householders to use the equipment properly, or to failure of THP to secure all entry points in the house. The analysis also shows that Victim Support was largely unaware that the programme had not prevented revictimisation of these households, and thus further security equipment or advice was not provided. This would appear to be an important shortcoming in the communication between those responsible for the effective operation of the programme and its clients.

Any further evaluation of the programme should include a similar repeat burglary comparison with equivalent follow-up periods and differentiate between attempted and completed

burglaries. Moreover, any further evaluation should be conducted with a larger sample of programme clients, with all households experiencing a burglary following Target Hardening invited to take part.

The findings suggest that while the programme has demonstrated some benefits for participants, a number of processes could be improved to ensure that the service is reaching those for whom it is intended. Further expansion of the programme should be delayed until these issues are addressed.



# Appendix 1 Adult Interview Schedule

## TARGET HARDENING INTERVIEW

(ADULT)

### BEFORE THE BURGLARIES

1. Think back to what it was like before your house got broken into the first time. Did you ever think your house would get broken into?

### THE BURGLARIES

2. Can you tell me about your first burglary?

(Checklist)

- When it happened
- How you felt
- How access was gained
- What was stolen or damaged
- Was it reported to the Police
- Was the offender caught
- Advice from Police on burglary prevention
- Any extra security measures you put in place
- Cost
- Contact with Victim Support
- Advice from Victim Support on burglary prevention

3. After the burglary, how worried were you that your house might be broken into again?  
WORRIED/ A BIT WORRIED/NOT WORRIED

4. How long was it after that burglary when you were burgled again?

Repeat questions 2 to 4 for each burglary

### TARGET HARDENING PROGRAMME

5. How and when did you find out about the Target Hardening Programme?
6. What were the steps in getting the security equipment?
7. How long after you were contacted were you assessed?
8. Did you understand what help with security you would be getting?
9. How did you feel about the planned improvements to security?
10. How soon after you were assessed was the equipment installed?
11. How long was that after the burglary?
12. What equipment was installed
13. How secure do you think it has made your home? SECURE/MODERATELY SECURE/NOT SECURE
14. What else could have been done to make it more secure?
15. Is there any reason why that wasn't done?

16. How long did it take for the work to be completed?
17. How satisfied were you with the way the security firms worked around your home?  
VERY SATISFIED/SATISFIED/NOT SATISFIED
18. If you were not satisfied, how could the security firm have done better?
19. Is the security equipment working now?
20. What information did you receive about how the new security equipment works?
21. Did you receive any written information about the equipment? If yes, was that useful?
22. Could I ask you to show me how it works?
23. Have you made any changes to your daily routines as a result of having this new equipment installed? If yes, what changes have you made?
24. In what ways was the Victim Support worker involved in the process of making your home more secure?
25. How satisfied were you with the involvement of Victim Support throughout the Target Hardening Programme? VERY SATISFIED/SATISFIED/NOT SATISFIED
26. Once the work was done, how worried were you that your house might be broken into again? WORRIED/A BIT WORRIED/NOT WORRIED?
27. Do you believe the extra security will prevent further burglaries?
28. Are any other changes needed to make your home safer from burglars?
29. Has your house been burgled since the security equipment was installed?
30. If yes, ask Questions 2 and 3 above (also ask how the offender managed to get around the added security given through the Target Hardening Programme).
31. Do you think improvements could be made to the Target Hardening Programme?
32. If yes, please describe improvements that could be made.
33. Overall what do you think are the main benefits of you having been part of the Target Hardening Programme?

## Appendix 2 Children's Interview Schedule

Before the Burglaries

Before it happened, did you ever worry that your house might get broken into?

How did you find out about what happened?

How was your house broken into?

*(Show me where/how they got in?)*

What did you lose in the burglary (toys?/television?)

Did the Police ever catch the people or person who broke into your house?

*For younger children:*

Can you draw me a picture of your house after the burglary?

Can you draw me a picture of a "safe" house?

Can you tell me a story about a house getting broken into?

Identify pictures that show how you feel about being burglarised *(using a book of vegetables showing different expressions: fear worry excitement etc)*

After the Intervention:

What things were done to make your house safer against burglaries?

Did you think you would ever get robbed again?

Do you act differently since your house has been broken into? If so, how?

Do you think your house will be safe from now on?

If it were to happen again, what do you think should be done?

Are there other sorts of things that you think could be done to make your house safer?

Other Non-Treatment Factors:

Apart from the installation of locks/alarms/lights, what else has helped you to feel safer?

Has anything else happened that makes you afraid that you are not safe?

Engagement:

Was there anything that you didn't like about how you or your family were treated after you were burglarised? If so, what?



# Appendix 3 Information Sheet

## TARGET HARDENING PILOT PROGRAMME

### Information Sheet

- ❖ **What is the project about?** We are looking at your experience of having received help from the Police and Victim Support Service after you were burgled. Because your house has been burgled more than once, we want to know how you feel since the Target Hardening Programme came to your house to make it safer against burglaries. We are doing this research for the government. The information from you and others in the Target Hardening Programme will help government decide the best ways to try to reduce burglaries.
- ❖ **Who do you want to talk to?** We would like to talk to you and another adult if any live here. A special researcher called Susie Jacka would also like to talk to any children in the household between the ages of 6 and 16 years. Susie is a very experienced child interviewer.
- ❖ **Who will talk to me?** You can choose from any of the list of available interviewers whom you would feel more comfortable with. With your permission, Susie Jacka will interview your children. Susie is studying education at the University of Auckland.
- ❖ **You don't have to get involved in this evaluation if you don't want to.**
- ❖ **What sorts of questions will you ask me?** You will be asked about what it was like when your house was burgled, and if you felt any differently after the Target Hardening Programme made your house harder to break into. You will not have to fill out any forms or do any writing. Susie may ask if she can tape record what the children say to her, so that she knows that she heard you right.  
  
**You won't have to answer any questions that you don't understand.**
- ❖ **How long will it take?** The interviewer would like to talk to you for about 45 minutes to one hour.
- ❖ **Who will know what I have said?** The interviewer does not know at this stage who is being asked to participate. If you agree to take part, the interviewer will be the only one who will know what you have said to her. When the evaluation report is written up at the end your name will not be in it and though your comments may be used, you will not be able to be identified.
- ❖ **Can I pull out later if I want to?** Yes. You can tell us that you don't want to be part of this project at any time. If you do want to participate but find talking about the burglary distressing, the interviewer will provide a range of contacts for you - including Victim Support - should you wish to receive further support.
- ❖ **Who can I talk to if I have a question?** You can call Dr Cathy Casey before the interviewer comes to see on you 09 917 9999 x 8323 or at [cathy.casey@aut.ac.nz](mailto:cathy.casey@aut.ac.nz).



# Appendix 4 Consent to Participation in Research



This form is to be completed in conjunction with, and after reference to, the AUTECH Guidelines Version 3 (Revised September 2000).

ONLY type where indicated by instructions eg <Click here and type>

Title of Project: **Evaluation of the Target Hardening Pilot Programme**  
Project Supervisor: **Dr Cathy Casey**  
Researcher: **Susie Jacka, Bhavani Paulraj, Rob Webb**

- 
- I have read and understood the information provided about this research project.
  - I have had an opportunity to ask questions and to have them answered.
  - I understand that the interview will be audiotaped and transcribed. **(Delete if not applicable)**
  - I understand that I may withdraw myself or any information that I have provided for this project at any time prior to completion of data collection, without being disadvantaged in any way. If I withdraw, I understand that all relevant tapes and transcripts, or parts thereof, will be destroyed
  - I agree to take part in this research.

Participant signature: .....

Participant name: **<click here and type the subject's full name>**

Date: **<Click here and enter date>**

Project Supervisor Contact Details: Dr Cathy Casey 09 917 9999 X8323 (w) 021 176 6633 (cell)

Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on 11 July 2002  
AUTECH Reference number 02/80





# Appendix 5 Support Agencies

## TH SUPPORT AGENCIES

Auckland HELP Foundation (Sexual Assault Victims) 24 Hour  
Tel: 366 6688 or 0800 229 6757

Auckland Rape Crisis  
09 366 7213

Waitakere Sexual Abuse Counselling  
09 837 2491

Presbyterian Support Services  
09 980 1100

Domestic Violence SAFTILINE 24 hour crisis line  
09 303 3939

Counselling Services 24 hour sexual abuse crisis line  
09 277 9324



# Appendix 6 Adult Interview – Statistical Data

## TARGET HARDENING INTERVIEW

(ADULT )

### STATISTICAL DATA

1. Age of respondent \_\_\_\_\_
2. Gender of respondent \_\_\_\_\_
3. Ethnicity of respondent

(Which ethnic group do you belong to? (Please select the group or groups that apply to you)

- New Zealand European \_\_\_\_\_
- Maori \_\_\_\_\_
- Samoan \_\_\_\_\_
- Cook Island Maori \_\_\_\_\_
- Tongan \_\_\_\_\_
- Niuean \_\_\_\_\_
- Chinese \_\_\_\_\_
- Indian \_\_\_\_\_
- Other (such as Dutch, Japanese, Tokelauan) Please state  
\_\_\_\_\_

#### 4. Type of house tenure:

- Rented - Housing Corporation \_\_\_\_\_
- Rented local authority \_\_\_\_\_
- Rented – private \_\_\_\_\_
- Other \_\_\_\_\_

#### 5. Household structure:

- Sole occupier \_\_\_\_\_
- Adults and children \_\_\_\_\_
- Adults flatting, no children+ \_\_\_\_\_
- Other \_\_\_\_\_

**6. Total no. of adults in household** \_\_\_\_\_

**7. Ages of adults in the household**

How many of the members of your household are aged:

Less than 10 years	_____
10-13 years	_____
14-17 years	_____
18-21 years	_____
22-24 years	_____
25-29 years	_____
60+ years	_____

**8. No. of children in household (and ages)** \_\_\_\_\_

**9. What is the gender and occupation of the highest income earner in your household?**

(Obtain job, and type of company. If retired, ask about previous occupation and company)

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**10. Is the main income earner:**

<b>Employed full time</b>	_____
<b>Employed part-time (less than 30 hours a week)</b>	_____
<b>Retired/pensioner</b>	_____
<b>Unemployed/beneficiary</b>	_____
<b>Homemaker</b>	_____

# Appendix 7 Information Sheet for Young People

## TARGET HARDENING PILOT PROGRAMME

### Information Sheet FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

- ❖ What is the project about? Because your house has been broken into more than once, we want to know how you feel since the Target Hardening Programme came to your house to make it safer against burglaries. We would like to learn from you what things have been helpful and what you think could be done better to stop burglaries from happening. By talking to you we hope to learn how to make your house safer against burglaries.
- ❖ Who will talk to me and what do they want to know? Susie Jacka will come and listen to you. She would like to find out how you felt after the burglaries and if you feel safer after the Target Hardening Programme made your house harder to break into.
  - ❖ How long will it take? Susie would like to talk to you for about 30 to 45 minutes.
  - ❖ What will happen to what I say? Susie will write up a report based on what you, and other children like you, say. She will not put your name in this report.
  - ❖ Can I pull out later if I want to? Yes. You can tell us that you don't want to be part of this project at any time.
  - ❖ Will I be able to talk to someone else later if I need to? Yes, Susie will put you in touch with \_\_\_\_\_ who is \_\_\_\_\_.
  - ❖ Who can I talk to if I have a question? You can ask Susie questions when she comes to talk to you, or, you can call her at any time on 09 623-3498 or email her at [s.jacka@xtra.co.nz](mailto:s.jacka@xtra.co.nz)

**Consent to participate:**

I understand why I am being interviewed and I have had the chance to ask questions about it.

I know that I do not have to take part in this project. I can stop being part of this project whenever I want. I don't have to say why.

I do not have to answer any questions that I do not want to.

I can ask for the audiotape to be turned off whenever I want.

Please tick:

( ) I agree to take part in this research/evaluation project.

( ) I agree to have my interview taped on a cassette and typed up.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_.

# Appendix 8 Further Notes to Children's Section

## 1 Protecting the international rights of the child in New Zealand

New Zealand signed the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) in 1993. It is a set of standards on children's rights to healthy living, rights to protection from harm and rights to fully participate in their social environment.

Article 12.2 says that,

*“State parties shall assure that a child who is capable of forming their own views has the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting them, with the child's views being given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity.”*

In 2002, the Government released *New Zealand's Agenda for Children*, a framework for the development of a comprehensive children's policy. One of the key action areas is to increase children's participation in government and community decision-making processes that affect them.

Including children's perspectives in the evaluation of the Target Hardening Programme is one way of promoting this participation.

## 2. Children as Victims of Violence

Although children make up 27 percent of the population, as a group they have low political status and little say in many decisions that affect them (Ministry of Social Policy, 2001:6). The statistical impact of crime in children's lives is known. For example, in real numbers 23,707 of the 71,842<sup>22</sup> households burgled to June of 2002 had children living in them. The New Zealand census estimates that there is an average of 1.9 children in each household (www.stats.govt.nz). This means that there are potentially 45,044<sup>23</sup> children in New Zealand living in households at-risk of inadequate home safety protection.

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<sup>22</sup> 33 percent of the total number of burglaries.

<sup>23</sup> The number of burglaries to households with children multiplied by the average number of households with children.

There are links between children's experience as victims of violence<sup>24</sup> and their risk of developing similar patterns of violence to those they have been exposed to (Kinsey et al, 1986; Falshaw et al 1996). Despite these links, the impact of crime in children's lives is less well known. Brown (1998) regards this as a manifestation of a judicial and societal evasion of child victimisation. However, there is a small literature that examines differences between children and adult's experiences as victims of crime.

### **3. Children as victims of crime**

An extensive literature documents children's experience as victims of sexual and physical abuse. However, the literature on young people and crime tends to concentrate on their role as perpetrators rather than as victims (Brown, 1998; Morgan and Zedner, 1992). There is much less awareness of children's experiences as victims of 'normal crime', that is, violations such as theft and harassment (Brown, 1998; Cusick et al, 2001; Morgan and Zedner, 1992).

A range of international victim surveys reveal that levels of contact with crime faced by young people are considerably higher than those of the adult population. Young people are also more likely to be victims of crime than are adults and have low levels of reporting to the Police of crimes against children in comparison to adults (see Anderson et al, 1994; Cusick et al, 2001; Hartless, et al, 1995; Morgan and Zedner, 1992;). For example, Anderson et al (1994) found that contact with crime is a 'routine experience' for the 1000+ eleven to fifteen year old Scottish young interviewed in their study. Morgan and Zedner (1992) found that more than 30 percent of households burgled each year in Great Britain are home to children.

Morgan and Zedner's study of child victims of burglary found that three-quarters of the children were prone to emotional distress after a burglary<sup>25</sup>. These included being party to the shock of discovery, to seeing their home disrupted or vandalised, to the feeling of invasion, to the loss of a sense of security, and to coping with the influx of Police, fingerprint, insurance, and repair men who follow (1992:63). The feeling of invasion was the most common reaction, leading some children to become fearful of coming home alone, of being left in the house, or of sleeping by themselves. They also found that children's limited financial resources mean that the impact of property crime was more severe on children because they lack money to replace items. Furthermore, their relative powerlessness to make changes to household security and insurance arrangements contributed to their feelings of vulnerability (ibid).

These are consistent with the effects of burglary on children in New Zealand. The North Shore (Auckland) Victim Support Service outlines<sup>26</sup> the effects of repeat burglaries on children. These include:

- Phobic behaviours – extreme fears for their safety in the house, fears of going out, fears of strangers.
- Physical symptoms, such as bed-wetting and refusal to leave the house.

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<sup>24</sup> Violence for the purposes of these studies is defined as victimisation and lack of personal safety in their homes and community.

<sup>25</sup> As part of a larger study of 212 households where children were victims of a range of crimes. Of 40 households that were indirect victims of crime, twenty-seven families with children had been victim of burglary.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with Jan Wilson, North Shore Victim Support.



- Depression.
- Anger (at parents' failure to protect them and at the unknown offender) that is acted out both at home and at school.

Despite these kinds of findings, Brown argues that child victimisation is framed in such a way that prevents children's concerns from being seen as part of the legitimate concerns of criminology or victimology (1998:83). For example, it was not until 1994 that national crime surveys in Great Britain began to incorporate the views of children, and even then this was limited to those aged between 12 and 15 years (*ibid*). Some of the reasons identified in the literature for the invisibility of children as victims include lower levels of reporting 'normal crimes' to the Police in cases where children are victims (Anderson, 1994), and a more general scepticism about both child victimisation reports and children's reliability as court witnesses (Cusick, 2001:37). According to Brown, this is a reflection of broader social conceptions of children as untrustworthy and/or unreliable, upholding an overwhelming focus on children's potential criminality.

Morgan and Zedner (1992) observed that half of the child victims of burglary in their study readily recovered with the replacement of the stolen goods, but they argue that it is "wrong to assume, as adults all too easily do, that all children are 'naturally resilient', or have short memories, or readily put unpleasant experiences behind them" (1992:66). The other half of the children were found to have retained some degree of nervousness or fear by the way they were interviewed, in one fifth disrupting their normal behaviour in a serious way (nightmares, needing to shift houses, extreme clinginess). Two-thirds of the children in their sample suffered some form of longer-term effect that became more readily apparent only after they went on to investigate the effects in the longer term (*ibid*).

#### **4. Providing support for child victims**

Cusick et al (2001) sought to explore what kinds of assistance are available to child victims of normal crime in England. While strong interagency networks exist to support young victims of crime, their study revealed "caring professionals without adequate guidance on supporting child victims of 'normal crime'" (p. 41). Key informants in support agencies, particularly Victim Support representatives, reported that they seldom come across victims of 'normal' crime and this was because Police rarely record the presence of children in households where crimes such as burglary or domestic violence occur. This has meant that Victim Support services are limited by their primary function to provide support services for adult crime victims on referral from the Police.

Furthermore, organisations with remits to work with children were also not sufficiently networked to the Police to provide them with systematic referrals (Cusick et al, 2001). Some volunteers felt they were insufficiently prepared to work with young victims of crime, and that it was difficult to provide support for children, particularly if their parents did not desire it. Cusick et al recommend that developing services to provide support to child victims of 'normal crime' requires Police notification of child victims, as well as guidelines on both accessing and providing services to them. Such guidelines should include encouraging child victims to report their experience, training support workers, including Police, in child interview techniques. They also point out the need to develop strategies to deal with the

difficulty inherent in relying on parents to grant access to children, including appropriate measures to deal with confidentiality.

“There is now a growing body of evidence that children, both in respect of individual decisions that affect their lives and as a body in the broader public policy arena, have a considerable contribution to make to decision-making” (Lansdown, 2001:93). In preparing the discussion paper for New Zealand’s Agenda for Children, 7000 children were given the opportunity to voice their opinions.

When children are allowed to influence decisions that affect them, the quality or effectiveness of those decisions is improved and can lead to crime prevention. For example, the level of use and incidence of vandalism is decreased when children’s input in designing community facilities is included (Thomas, 2001:106).

## **5. Criteria for good communication with children**

If children believe that their testimonies will not be accorded the same status as adults, “they build conceptions of themselves as individuals who do not count, who are not full citizens, who are excluded and unimportant” (Cusick, 2001: 42).

Therefore, to implement the kinds of listening and support required to understand children’s experience as victims of crime requires consistent relationships and acknowledging children’s individuality (Thomas, 2001). There are few fixed and specific formulas for communicating effectively with children (Garbarino et al, 1992, p. 8), however Thomas summarises some key aspects of ‘best practice’ in communicating with children:

- Building trust and warmth with the child by supporting and encouraging them to feel as if they have an ally in expressing their views.
- Spending time with a child and being receptive to what she or he wants to communicate. This means having *enough* time with a child, to go at their own pace and not expect them to participate ‘on demand’.
- Giving children a choice about whether and how they participate.
- Preparing children for discussion and giving them time to think beforehand.
- Respecting the child’s agenda, not simply the pursuit of what the adult wants to know.
- The listening process must build in the time, space and safety to allow them to raise other issues they may also want to discuss.

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